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It ’s Tim e for Mea ns -Test ing
Judge Edi th  H.  Jones*
Todd  J .  Zywick i**
I. IN T R O D U C T I O N
 In  an  era  of low unemployment,  s teady economic growth,
and genera l prosperit y, one ja r r ing s ta tis tic begs for exp lan a-
t ion : th e un rem ittin g growth in consum er ba nk ru ptcy ra tes
dur ing the past  decade.1 Rising from 172,000 filers in 1978,2 t he
last  year before th e Ban kr upt cy Code took effect, th e nu mber
sur pas sed 1.4 million  consum er filer s la st  year , ap pr oximat ely
1% of Amer ican  households, a nd  th e en d of this  tr end  is n ot in
sigh t. 3 More filin gs occur r ed dur ing  six months  in  1997 than
d u r ing the en t ir e d eca de  of the Grea t  Depr es sion .4 This r ecor d
num ber  of bankruptcy  fi lings  in  an  e ra  of p rosper i ty has dis -
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5. NBC S ays  Cred it I nd us tr y’s Ref orm  Prop osal s M ean -S pir ited , 32 Bankr . C t .
Dec.  (CRR ) 4 (Apr . 7,  199 8).
6. Peter  Pae & Steph an ie St ough ton , Personal Ban kruptcy Filings Hit R ecord;
Easy  Cred it B lam ed,  Con gres s M ay A ct , WA S H . P O S T, June  7, 1998, at A1.
7. E l izabe th War ren , Th e Bankru ptcy Crisis, 73 IN D . L.J . 1079, 110 1 (19 98).
8. S ee, e.g.,  Michae l Higgin s, Putting Back the Bite, A.B. A. J ., June  1998 , a t
74, 75 (J effre y L. S olomon  sa id t ha t “in  effect , ‘We don’t ca re  ab out  the th ings tha t
happen  in the n orma l vicissitu des of life; pay th e dam n ba nk ,’ . . . . It’s really th a t
me an -sp ir it ed .”); Richa rd A. Sch war tz, CON: Root of Problem is A ggressive Lending ,
CO U R IE R-J . (Louisville, KY), Jun e 27, 1998, a t 11A (calling H.R. 3150, which w ould
apply  a mea ns-test, “one of the most m ean-spirited pieces of legislation in recent
mem ory”).
tu rbed  a l l bu t t he most commit ted ba nk ru ptcy advocates. The
problem has insp ir ed  bot h  an  exa min a t ion  of t h e  causes  of in -
creased  filings  and congress ional  proposals to reform the  bank-
rup tcy  syst em.
The most conten tious r eform  that  has been suggested to
rein  in  the p recip it ous increa se  and cos t s of b a n kr upt cy filings
has been  the im pos it ion  of mea ns-t es t in g for  upp er -in come
debtors. Means-testing expresses  no speci fi c p roposa l bu t
embodies the  concept  tha t we ll-off,  in come-earn in g debtors
shou ld be r equ i red to repay what th ey can to their un secured,
nonpr ior i ty credit ors, in  exch ange for  th e valua ble benefits th ey
rece ive from ba nkrupt cy. J udgin g fr om the cr it ics ’ rea ct ion ,
however, an  un informed observer m ight be led t o believe t h a t
pr oposals  to mea ns-t es t  the e ligibil it y of debtors for Cha pter  7
a r e t an ta moun t t o reviving debt ors’ prisons a nd in dent ur ed
servitu de. Consider  ju s t  a  few of the ove rwr ough t  res pon se s of
bankrup tcy schola r s to p roposa ls  for  means-tes t ing. “Means
tes t ing is mean -spirited,” opines Professor Ken neth  Klee.5
Professor Elizabeth Wa rr en echoes this sen timen t somewha t
m or e spe cifically, “Th ose wh o wan t t o say [t ha t] t he  wa y to
solve r i sing consumer  bankrup tcy  is  by  changing the  law  a re
the same people wh o would h ave s aid  du rin g a m ala ria
epidemic that  the way to cut down on hospital admissions is  t o
lock  th e door.”6 She op ines e lsewhere tha t  the answers to “the
problems  of more t ha n a  million fam ilies [ar e] not as ea sy a s
closing th e doors  to t he  ban kr up tcy cour ts .”7 Other critics of
mea ns-tes ting h ave picked up t he m an tr a. 8
It  i s un for tuna te t hat  well-known academics and
ban k r u ptcy specia list s h ave ch osen t o oppose mea ns -test ing
viscer ally.  For t he fact is, t he H ouse of Rep r es en t a tives , while
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9. S ee Ed i th  H. Jones & James  I . Shepard,  Nat’l Bankr . Rev.  Comm’n ,
Add itional  Dissent to Recomm endations for Reform of Consum er Bankruptcy Law
(visited Nov. 24, 199 8) <ht tp://162.140 .225.1/re port /24commv i08.ht ml>. 
10. See the Ba nkr uptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. (1998)
[here ina fter  H.R. 3150], passed by the H ouse of Represent atives on J une 10, 1998.
Befor e th e en d of the  105t h Con gres s, th e S e n a t e also pa ssed  a ba nk ru ptcy bill, t he
Con s u mer  Bankr uptcy Reform Act of 1998, S. 1301, 105th Cong. (1998) [hereina fter
S. 1301], see i n fra not es 1 03-06 , an d a  Con fer en ce Com mi tt ee w ork ed ou t r evis ions
t o H.R. 3150, wh ich th e Hou se a ppr oved as  a su bst itu te on  Oct. 9, 199 8. Th e
confe re nce  b il l was  not  vote d on  by th e Sen at e becau se th e end  of the legisla tive
ses sion  approached and a pr esidential veto was threat ened.
The compromise ban k r u p t cy reform bill proposed a mea ns te st incorpora ted in 11
U.S.C. § 707(b) (1994) and based  on  more len ien t  s tandards  than  those  ea r lier favo red
by th e Hou se of Repres ent at ives. Our  discuss ion will focus on th e origin a l ver sion  of
H.R. 315 0 for  tw o r ea son s. F ir st , a  su cces sfu l de fense of the “up-front” means test
also just ifies less dem an ding compr omises t ha t m ight  be passed. Second, the fairest
and most uniform way to administer mean s-tested ban kr upt cy relief is ult ima tely
th rough  an  up -f ron t  ca l cu la t ion .
11. On  Januar y 19, 1999, Rep. Rob Andr ews (D-NJ ) intr oduced a  mea ns-te stin g
bill i n  the 1 06th  Congr ess. I t is e xpecte d th at  Rep. Ge orge Ge ka s (R-PA), wh o
sponsored H. R. 3 150  la st  se ss ion , wi ll in tr odu ce a  com pr eh en siv e m ea ns -te s t ing
proposa l th is yea r. S ee H.R . 333 , 106 th  Con g. (199 9); see als o Amer ican  Bankruptcy
Institu te, Fir st  Mea ns -test in g B ill  of N ew C ong ress  In tr odu ced i n  House (Jan . 25,
1999) <www.abiworld.org/legis/bills/hr333int ro.ht ml>.
repud ia t ing th e silen ce of th e Na tion al Ba nkr upt cy Review
Com mission  on  t he s ubject ,9 overwhelmingly supported a
means-tes t ing bill in J un e 1998.10 The Sen at e pass ed a m odified
means-tes t ing bill lat er  in th e sum mer .  In th e end, however,
means-tes t ing foundered in the  face  of a  t h rea t ened  Whi te
House veto.   Al though  bankrup tcy  reform foundered in  the
105th  Congress, it h as a lread y resur faced t his  year , with
means-tes t ing as it s center piece.11 A const ru ctive debate on
me an s-te st ing,  which this ar ticle hopes to assist, will aid the
legisla tive  process a nd the interest of society beyond the
ba nk ru pt cy comm un ity.
The debat e ou g ht  to begin  by a cknowle dgin g t ha t  cr it ics  of
me a ns-tes t ing ha ve been discussin g two separ at e issues. Th e
first  is whether means-testing is a good idea . Bot h  p ract i ca l  and
theore t ica l objections ha ve been deployed  aga inst  the  pending
leg is la t ion . Cr it ics  se ek , h owever , t o focus m ed ia  a t t en t ion  not
on  th e bat tle t hey cannot win —tha t well-off debtors s hould be
requ ired  to pay s om eth ing t o un secu re d cre dit ors in  excha nge
for  th e privilege of obta ining th e au toma tic sta y and  a fresh
s t a rt—but  on  longs t anding cu r ren ts  of an t icr edi tor  popu li sm.
The second issue, in which critics blam e lenders  for  inducing
D :\ 1 9 9 9- 1\ F I N A L \ J O N - F I N . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
180 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1999
12. In  th eir a cadem ic writin g, scho la rs  such  as  E l izabe th  Warren  and  Jean
Brau cher  for th ri gh tl y fa vor  exp an siv e ba nk ru pt cy r eli ef a s p ar t of a  l a rger  pol it i ca l
and socia l ag en da  in w hich  ba nk ru pt cy is a  sa lve for  cer tain excesses of capitalism
and credit or over rea chin g. S ee, e.g., J ean  Bra uch er, Increasing Uniform ity in
Con su m er Bankruptcy: Means Testing as a Distraction and the Nation al B an kr up tcy
Review Comm ission’s Proposals as a Startin g Point, 6 AM . BANKR. IN S T . L. RE V. 1
(199 8).
13. S ee d is cuss ion  supra no tes  9 -10 and  accompanying t ext .
consumers to bor row more  than  they  can  a fford,  tra nscends
specific m ea ns-t es t in g p r opos a ls  and e m br aces  br oad
assumpt ions abou t t he r ole of ban kr up tcy law  in r edist ribu tin g
wea l th  from creditors to debtors.12 Criticisms of means-test ing
mask  fundamen ta l ques t ions of social policy an d dema nd
cons idera t ion  of the  causes  of the  recent  dr am at ic rise in
persona l ban kr upt cies. For if the in crease h as been  spur red by
reckless cred it -gr an t in g policies , m ea ns-t es ted  ba nkrupt cy
refor m is  mor e difficult  to jus tify. Cr itics of me an s-te st ing a re
quick  to asser t  th i s pejora t ive conn ection, but t hey ha ve been
slow to deve lop pr oof of it.
In  this art icle we address both issues. First,  we will discuss,
as a  nonexclusive e xa mple of m e a n s-tes tin g, th e r eleva nt
prov is ions of th e ban kr up tcy r eform  bill pa sse d by t he  House of
Representatives, H.R. 3150.13 An a ccu ra t e  explana t ion
demons tr at es that  this bi l l’s  means t e st  i s not  on ly modera t e
and fair  bu t  a lso p ract i ca l an d a dm inis tr at ively rea sona ble. We
will a lso r e spond  to the  mos t  common cr it icis ms of t he pr oposal,
cr i ti ci sms  tha t  app ly  to any bankrup tcy  means  t es t .
We wil l t hen  tu rn  to the p rope r  br oade r  is su e of t he r ole of
consumer  ban kr upt cy in t he Am er ican  economy a nd  society.
Unlike,  p er h aps, th e critics of mea ns-tes ting, we believe tha t
the dra ma tic esca la t ion  in  consumer  bankruptcies  in  an  e ra  of
p rosper i ty is a troubling and costly social phenomen on. In  our
view, the evidence now available tends to suggest tha t th e
recent  rise in personal bankr uptcies has b ee n  sign ificant ly
influenced by a d ecline in  th e per sona l sh am e a nd  social st igma
t rad it iona l ly accompa nyin g ban kr up tcy, an d by cha nges  in  t he
law  an d lega l pr act ice  t h a t  ha ve facilit at ed filin g ban kr up tcy.
On  th e other  ha nd, t he m ost promin en t  cou n t e r-
expla na tion —risin g consumer  cr ed it  card d ebt—is  ba se d on
fau lty da ta  an d fau lty a r g umen ts.  Ot her  pop ula r  exp la na t ion s
for  in crea sing per son a l ba nkrupt cies are b oth  emp irica lly
D :\ 1 9 9 9- 1\ F I N A L \ J O N - F I N . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
177] IT’S TIME FOR MEANS-TESTING 181
14. S ee MATT RI D LE Y, TH E  OR I G IN S  O F  VI R T U E: H U M A N  IN S T IN C T S A N D T H E
E VOLUTION O F  COOPERATION  69-70, 130-31 (1996). 
15. H ENRY SUMNER MA I N E, ANCIENT LAW : ITS CON N E C T I O N  W I TH  T H E  E ARLY
H I S T O RY O F  SOCIETY AND IT S  RELATION TO MO D E R N  IDE AS  174 (reprint.  ed. Hasell,
Wa ts on  & Viney, Ld. 192 4) (18 61) (“[W]e  ma y sa y t ha t t he  mo vem en t of t he
progr essive  soci et ies  ha s h it he rt o be en  a m ovem en t fr om  St at us  to C on tr act .”).
16. S ee J ona th an  R. Macey, Public and Private Ord erin g an d t he P rod uct ion  of
Legitimate an d I llegi tim at e Leg al R ul es, 82 CORNELL  L. RE V. 112 3, 1 127  (199 7).
un proven and ideologically selective. Cr itics of mea ns -test ing
have not borne t heir  b urd en of dem onst ra tin g syst ema tic
unfairness in  credit p ra ctices or s ocial policies th at  would
rende r  means -t e st ing  un fa i r.
II. TH E  TR U TH  AB O U T  ME A N S-TE S T IN G
A. The Under ly ing  Assumpt ions
Debt  relief sh ould be a vaila ble t o victim s of tr ue h ar dsh ip
whose debts exceed their ability to repay. Bankru ptcy is an
a p p rop r ia t e las t  resort for in dividu a ls  wh o be com e
incapaci t at ed or impecun ious because of unforeseen illness,
unemploymen t , or  other catast rophe. In man y such cases,
liqu ida t ion  of the d ebtor ’s nonexempt assets a nd a  fr e sh  s t a r t  is
th e only r ea list ic, hu ma ne  alt er na tive . 
But  bankrup tcy sh ould n ot m ere ly be a m ean s of violat ing
promises  willy-nilly. A pr omise  to r epa y money i s a n  im por tan t
lega l a nd m ora l obl iga t ion , n eit her  ligh t ly t o be  unde r taken  nor
light ly cas t  away . F i ling bankr u p t cy r epresen t s a  deci sion  to
repud ia t e pr omise s m ad e in e xcha nge  for goods, se rvices , an d
other pr omises . Of such  pr omises  an d r eciprocity is th e fabr ic of
civil society woven.14 Henry Sumner  Maine  famous ly  wrote  tha t
the foundat ion of freedom in the western  world was a ssociat ed
with  th e m ovemen t fr om “Sta tu s t o Cont ra ct.”15 What  happens
when  con t ract s  a re rou t inely swept  as ide for  any  reason ,  le t
a lon e as a  sheer  m a t t er of conven ien ce? Childr en  ar e t au ght
from a ver y you ng age to keep their promises.16 What  is  the
int an gible soci a l impact  of r ampa n t  pr omise  br ea kin g?
Alth ough difficult  to qu an tify, th ere  ar e un que st iona ble
ne gat ive social consequ ences . It is  doubt ful, for  exam ple, t ha t
ban kr upt cy academics would be sanguine abou t  let t in g obl igor s
walk  away from th eir debt s  for  paymen t  of ch i ld  suppor t  or
a lim ony ra th er t ha n credit ors’ bills. Or, hitt ing closer t o home,
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17. S ee Jones & Shepar d, supra  note 9, at pt. II. As the  Jones  and Shepa rd
d is sen t  from  th e N BRC ’s r ecom me nd at ion s obs er ved , “Mea ns -te st in g is  not  a r ad ica l
idea . We already use it  to determ ine child care benefits, Medicaid ben efits, social
secu r i ty benefits,  supplemental security income, food stamp bene fits an d stu dent  aid
benef it s at  th e feder al leve l alon e.” Id .
18. One poll estima ted th at last  year $4 billion in paya ble debts had been  wiped
out  by bankru ptcy. Seventy-six percent of those polled reacted by saying they were
“critical,” wh ile for ty-t hr ee p er cen t w er e “out ra ged .” Ja cob M. S ch lesin ger, Card
Games: As Bankru ptcies Su rge, Creditors Lobby Hard to Get Tougher Law s , WALL ST .
J ., June  17,  199 8, a t A1  (re por ti ng  re su lt s of p oll b y F re de ri ck S chn eid er s).
it  is doubtful that t hey would advoca te  a  “pay wha t  you  want
to” appr oach to law school tuit ion or lawyers’ consu lting fees,
aft er p rom isin g to pa y in full.
Means-tes t ing i s thus ba se d on  the s im ple p ropos it ion ,
gener ally accepted in Amer ica n  society, that  people should pay
th eir  deb t s i f t hey a re able. Ban kr up tcy is a  ser ious et hica l an d
economic mat ter  and s hould  not  be  abu se d.  Th e a mount  of
bankrup tcy reli ef a fforde d a  de bt or  sh ould  be  adju st ed  by b oth
h i s abil ity t o pay a nd  his  nee d. If a debt or  can  make  fu l l or
par t ia l r epayment  to h is  cred it ors fr om fu ture in come wit hout
un rea sona ble ha rd sh ip, he  sh ould end eavor  to do so. Fu rt her , if
a debtor is able-bodied and earns an  in come t ha t  wil l a llow  h im
to live comfort ably but  s t il l make  payments to h i s credi tor s , the
law ma y requir e some repa yment  as a  condit ion of ban kr u p t cy
reli ef. Debt ors w ith  good jobs a nd  re gula r  i n comes s hould be
held  to a different st andar d from debtors w h o confron t  rea l
ha rd sh ip or  in capa cit y. Debtors w it h  h igh er  in comes shou ld
ord ina r ily r epay more  to credi tor s  t han  debtor s wit h lower
in com es. The se p rin ciples a re  ap plied  rou tin ely by
governmen t—highe r -income ea rner s a re expect ed  to pa y m ore
in  ta xes, jus t a s n eeds -base d r elief is th e ha llma rk  of most
socia l welfa re p rogr ams.  Th ose  wh o disa gr ee  wit h  ba nkrupt cy
m e ans-tes t ing ought  to expla in wh y th e ba nk ru pt cy syste m is
or  should be  so different from other institu tions.17 View ed  from
th i s la rger  pe r sp ect ive , m ea ns-t es t in g is  not  designed as a
det err ent  to filing ba nk ru pt cy; it is  design ed t o ma ximize s ocial
equ i ty as well as assur e some  r ep a ym ent  in th e cour se of
d is ch a rging de bt s.  It  sh ould  be no su rpr ise, t hen , t ha t  recen t
polls sugges t  s trong suppor t  for  means-tes t ing  among  the
pu blic.18
It  is a lso ad van ta geous t o min imize, to the exten t possible,
the costs  imposed by ban k r u p t cy. P rovid er s of goods  and
D :\ 1 9 9 9- 1\ F I N A L \ J O N - F I N . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
177] IT’S TIME FOR MEANS-TESTING 183
19. S ee RICHARD A. P O S N E R, E CONOMIC AN A LY SI S  O F LAW  § 14.5, at 443 (5th ed.
199 8).
services wh o become in volun ta ry claim ants a ga in st  the d ebtor
bear  t h e  in i tia l br un t  of the d ecis ion  to file . Th e im pos it ion  of
losses on creditors by debtor s  w h o a re a ble t o repa y some or  all
of their  obliga t ion s i s u nfa ir . In  som e ca ses,  such  losses  a re
fina ncia lly deva s t a ting t o sma ll credit ors, wh o ha ve less a bility
to sp read  those  losses . Tangible costs ar e also borne by
consum ers, t o t he  ex ten t  t ha t  cr edi tors pas s on t heir
b a n krup tcy risks and losses.19 The pr inciple often forgott en by
bankrup tcy specialists is t ha t ba n k r uptcy is not a victimless
event.
Bankrup tcy relief should not give debtors a  ma rk ed
advan t a ge over sim ilar ly situ at ed n ondeb tor s. Society sh ould
not  broadly afford r elief to well-off, able-bodied debtors wh en
poorer  people, w ho h ave  not  electe d t ha t r em edy, s t ruggle t o
keep  their commitm ents an d live within th eir means. As a
calcula tin g, in cen t ive-drive n r emedy t ha t can  openly be tak en
advan tage of by t he op por t u n istic, bankru ptcy dishonors poor
bu t honest nondebtor s. An a bility-t o-pay te st  min imizes  th is
ine qu ity.
Fin ally,  a s pa te of high -profile celebr ity, s port s figur e, an d
pol it ica l ban kr up tcies, t ogeth er w ith  th e disillu sionin g
experiences of growing num bers  of bankruptcy  credi tor s  has
called int o quest ion th e syst em’s abilit y to police itself . By
adju st in g t he a mount  of debt  reli ef t o the d ebtor ’s need, means-
tes t ing would increa se  pu bli c confiden ce in  the bankrupt cy
sys t em. Well-off debtors would not be per ceived to get awa y
with  abu se, a nd  th e sys te m w ould a gain  be viewe d a s a  re fuge
for  the h ones t , n eedy de bt or .
A means-t es t in g proposal su ch as H .R. 3150 implem ent s
these common ly sh a red  judgmen ts b y provid in g a  ru le of
de cis ion  th at  distin guishes  betwe en  t hose  who can  and  cannot
make paymen t s t o credi tor s  from fu tur e income . Bankrup tcy
should not  be m er ely a d evice to cas t a wa y pr om i ses.
Sometim es it  is necessary to do so, but th e key is necessity.
Ban kr upt cy should not be ava ilable as a  ma tt er of convenience.
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20. H.R. 3150, supra  no te  10,  § 101 (1), (4 ).
21. S ee U.S. BU R E A U  OF  T H E  CE N S U S, STATISTICAL AB S T RA CT  O F  TH E  UN I T E D
ST AT E S: 1997 (117th  ed. 1997) (report ing the m edian income for two-paren t families
with  at  lea st  tw o ch ild re n i n w hi ch t he  pa re nt s w er e m ar ri ed  to e ach  oth er ).
22. S ee H.R. 31 50, su pra note 10, § 101(4). Living expenses (as det erm ined by
IRS collection standa rds), secured debt paymen ts, and pr iority uns ecured debt
paymen t s are su btra cted from the debtors “curren t  m ont hly t otal in come.” Id . The
rema inder  is  the d eb tor ’s “p rojec ted  mon th ly  net  in com e. ” Id .
23. Id .
24. S ee id .
25. S ee id .
26. S ee d is cuss ion  infra  Pa rt s II.B.1 , II.C. 
B. H.R . 3150
 H.R. 3150  di r ect s consu mer  debtors a way from Cha pter  7
and into Chapt er 13 based on a th ree-part  t est .  F ir s t , the
deb tor ’s “cur ren t m ont hly t ota l income,” includin g, if applicable,
hou seh old in come fr om all sources, must be at least  equa l  to the
na t i on a l media n for a fam ily of compar able size.20 For  a  fou r -
person family, the most  recen t  median  annua l income was
about  $49,000.21 Second , t he debtor’s “projected mont hly net
income” mu st exceed $50.22 Third , the pr ojected mont hly net
in come must  be “su fficie n t  to rep ay t wenty per cen t  or  more of
un secured  nonpr ior i ty cla ims  dur ing  a  five -year  repayment
pla n.”23 A deb tor  may avoid an  au tomat ic Chapte r  13  or d er  by
a s s er t i n g extr aor din ar y circum sta nces i n a n  it e m iz ed
s ta tement  verified by him and his att or n e y.24 If no pa rt y in
interest  objects t o t he st at emen t with in sixty da ys, Chapt er 7
relief will be allowed.25
By its  expr ess  te rm s, t his  me an s-te st ing provision applies
only to those debtors whose income exceeds the  n a tion a l
median . Given  the p a ten t ly m ode st  app lica t ion  of means-
tes t ing , it is  bizar re , if not ju st  disin gen uou s, t o char act er ize
H.R. 3150 as “me an -spir ite d.” Even t he su pport ers of H.R. 3150
est imate tha t  t h i s pr ovis ion  wil l cover  fewer  than  10% of t he
consumer  ban kr upt cy cases  f iled each  yea r .26 Thu s, it s imp ly
has  no impact  on  the  hundreds  of t housands  of deb tor s  who a re
poor . Moreover , th e r ea son for filin g ban kr up tcy is ir re leva nt .
The amount of debt a person has upon filing bankru ptcy is also
irr eleva nt . Wha t  ma t t er s is a n in dividu al’s abilit y to r epa y.
Those who can  make  some repayment t o unsecured,  nonpr ior i ty
cred it ors from  fu tu re  income a re expected  to do so,  bu t  the
ext r aord ina ry ci r cums tan ces  pr ovis ion  affords  ext ra  reli ef for
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27. Midd le clas s m ak e up  ban kr up tcy  fil in gs; Con gres s t ryi ng  to s low  th e surge ,
CINCINNATI  E N Q U I RE R , J uly 27, 1 998, a t B16 .
28. The re as ons  wh y ba nk ru pt cies  am ong the m iddle-class ha ve risen will be
discussed below. See infra Par t III.B.
29. In  a Ch apt er 7 ca se, all a sset s which  ar e non exempt  ar e liqu ida t ed and  the
proceeds ar e di st ri bu te d t o un secu re d cr edi tor s. D ebt ors  ar e a llowed to retain exempt
assets. While exemptions vary great ly by state in both t he type of as se t  involved  and
the am oun t of t he  exe mp tion , m ost  st at es i nclu de e xem pt ions  for households, vehicles,
those in  need. The only effect of mea ns -test ing is t o prohib it
well-to-do debtors who can make some repayment  from walk ing
awa y an d st icking cr edit ors a nd  oth er cons um ers  with  th e bill.
Indir ect con fi rmat ion  of the n eed for m ean s-tes tin g is
provided by Pr ofessor E lizab e t h  Warren ,  who asser t s  tha t
bankrup tcy is n ow a m iddle -class  pr oblem. S he contends  tha t
deb tor s in ba nk ru pt cy “ar e mid dle-class—tha t ’s  wha t ’s  s ca ry
about  th is . . . . They ar e not m ar ginal worker s. They ar e you
and me , th ey ar e our  neigh bors .”27 This observa t ion  i s not ,  a s
Warren conclude s, pr oof of th e need for th e s ta tus quo or  an
argument  aga ins t m ea ns -tes tin g. On t he  contr ar y, it  i s
pr ecisely becau se m ore m iddle-clas s a nd  wea lth y gain fully
employed people a re  ava iling t he ms elves of ba nk ru pt cy th at
mea ns-tes t i n g h a s  be com e  im p or t a n t .2 8  T r a di t ion a lly,
bankrup tcy was seen  a s a  la s t  r e sor t , a r eme dy for th ose tr uly
down on their  lu ck, n ot  a  de vice  for income-earn ing, middle-
class  families t o w a lk  away from the ir  p romises  and  sh ift  the
losses from th emselves t o oth ers. Mea ns-tes ting r equires  well-
off debtors, t hose above the n at ional media n income level, t o
repay what t hey can to their creditors.
If one  accept s  the genera l r a t iona le of mea ns -tes tin g, th e
pract i ca l que st ion is  whe th er it s ben efits e xceed its  costs. Wh ile
the pr ecise imp act  of H.R. 3150 can not  be kn own u nt il it is
implemented, we a re convin ced th at  th e re su lts  of th is
assessment  will be posi tive. Means -testin g will increas e th e
overa ll amoun t  col lect ed for  d is t r ibu t ion  to unsecured creditors.
The size of th is  effect  is  uncer ta in , bu t  eve n  discou nt in g for
unce r t a in ty in t he d at a a nd  met hods , it  appears  tha t sign ifica n t
recoveries wil l r es u lt  from di rect in g h igh  in come debtor s  in to
Cha pter  13  rep aym en t  plans.  As a  benchmark ,  cons ider  tha t
when  a debtor elects Cha pter  7, the debtor’s unsecured,
nonpr ior i ty creditors usually receive no distrib u tion  a t  a l l.
Because few consum er debt ors claim nonexem pt a sset s,29 more
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and retir emen t ass ets. Accordingly, Ch a p t er 7 debtors frequen tly reta in some asset s
after  a ba nk ru ptcy dis char ge. 
30. S ee Whit e, supra not e 2, a t 3 8-39; cf. Michae l J . H erber t  & Domenic E .
Pa citti,  Down and  Ou t  i n  R ichmon d , Vi rgi ni a: T he D ist rib ut ion  of A sset s in  Ch ap ter
7 Bank ruptcy Proceedings Closed in 1984-1987,  22 U. RICH . L. RE V. 303, 315-16 (1988)
(“Even  in a sse t C ha pt er  7 pr oceedin gs, only a sma ll fraction of general unsecur ed
debt  is pa id.”); Note , A Reformed  Econom ic M odel  of Con su m er B an kr up tcy , 109
H ARV. L. RE V. 1338, 134 5 (1996) (discus sing s tu dies of Ch apt er 7  cases ). 
31. S ee Amer ica n  B a nkru ptcy Institu te,  Non-Busin ess Bank ruptcy Filings by
Ch ap ter  1990-1998 (3rd Quarter) (visit ed F eb. 2 , 199 9) <h tt p://www .ab iwor ld.or g/ st a ts/
1990nonbu schapt er.h tm l>. 
32. Tom  Neubig  e t  a l. , Chapter  7  Bank r u ptcy Pet itioner s’ Ability to Repa y:
A dd it iona l Evidence from Bankr uptcy Petition Files (Policy Economics and
Qua nt ita tive  Analys is Group, Ern st & Young LLP) (Feb. 1998) (unpu blished
manuscr ipt , on  file  wit h a ut ho rs ).
33. S ee id . at 1, 3.
34. S ee id. at  21-25. 
than  90% of Chapter 7 cases p a y n o dividend to un secured
nonpr ior i ty cla imants , and  the a verage  r epaymen t  r at e  in
Cha pter  7 ca ses is only about one t o two percent. 30
App roxim ately  70% of consu mer  de bt ors file un der Ch apt er 7.31
Compar ed with  the Chapte r 7 r ecord,  the on ly h urdle for
means-tes t ing is whether the plans pr oposed u nd er it  will
gen e r a te som e payout larger th an zero to unsecured,
nonpr ior i ty cred it ors.  Com mon  sense, su pport ed by several
studies, suggests tha t mean s-testing will satisfy this standar d.
1. S tud ies
 One such st udy wa s condu cted b y Er ns t & Young. 32 The
study is b a se d on  an  ea r lie r  ver sion  of H.R.  3150, wh ich
tr iggered means-test ing  for debt ors whose income was a t leas t
75% of th e n a t i on a l  med ian  income, a  level lower t ha n t ha t in
the fin a l bi ll.  Th us,  the E rnst  & Young s tudy  over st a tes  bot h
the nu mber  of debtor s poten tia lly directed in to Cha p t er  13 as
well as t he a moun t t ha t m ay be collected. But  even un d er  t he
more expa ns ive m ea ns -tes tin g pr ovision, t he  E r n st  & Young
study of petit ions filed prima rily in 1992-93 found t ha t fewer
than  15% of those filing would even be affected by means-
tes t ing .33 The other  85% of debt ors w ould  ret a in  fu ll d iscret ion
to file un der  Cha pter 7. Among the affected debtors, Ernst  &
Youn g foun d th at  nea rly 40% of those filers would be a ble to
repay all of th eir nonp riority debt s over five years. 34 Overa ll, it
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35. S ee id. at 17. Of course, this figure would also likely be higher if only those
above  100% of t he  na tion al m edi an  incom e we re  incl ud ed,  ra th er  th an  75%.
36. S ee TOM  N E U B I G  &  F RIT Z SC H E U R E N, E RNST & YO U N G, CHAPTER 7
BANKRUPTCY P ETITIONERS ’ ABILITY TO RE P A Y: T H E  NATIONAL P ERS PE CTIVE , 1997 (Ma rch
199 8).
37. Id . at 1.
38. Because th is stu dy app lied th e 75% of nat ional m edian income test, it tends
to overst at e th e nu mber  of people who will be su bject to m ean s-test ing.
39. S ee NEUBIG  & SC H E U R E N, supra  note 36, at 8. Those affected by means-
t e s t ing also had m ore un secured n onpriority debt  ($30,813 at the median) than t hose
una ffected ($23,570 a t t he m edia n). See id . at 11.
40. S ee id. at 8.
41. Those affected  by H.R. 3150 had m edian h ousehold incomes of $44,738
compared  to th e na tion al m edia n in come of $35,492. See id.  a t  11. O f cour se, th is
different ial  is under stat ed in the E rnst  & Young stu dy because the m edi a n  incom e
of th ose  im pa cte d u nd er  th e fin al  ver sion  of H. R. 31 50,  wh ich  re qu ir es  100 % of t he
is est ima te d, t h ose s ub ject t o mea ns -tes tin g could r epa y an
average of 62% of their total debts over five years.35
Ern st  & Youn g su bsequ ent ly revis ited  th e issu e us ing a n ew
data base t h a t  draws from a nationwide sample of petitions.36
This  stu dy examin ed 2,200 Cha pt er 7  pet itions  filed in 1997
and was drawn  from a ll 90 bankrupt cy dis t r ict s in  the n a t ion .
Thus, it  repres en t s the m ost  recen t  and t he on ly fu lly  na t ion a l
da ta set st udied t o date. 37 It  was also fu lly  con t r olled to ensure
a  repr esent at ive samp le of Cha pter  7 filings  on a  national basis.
The findings of th e second Er nst  & Young st udy r eplicated
those of the  ea rlie r s tu dy. App lying t he t es t  of 75% of na t ion a l
median  income of the original vers ion of H.R. 3150, the st udy
found that  15% of 1997 Chapter 7 filers wou ld ha ve been
impacted by the n eeds-based pr ovision of H.R. 3150 and
requ ired  to file Cha pter  13.38 Those a ffected  by mea ns -test ing
would ha ve had  th e ability to repa y 64% of their u nsecu r ed
nonpr ior i ty de bt s,  wh ich  rep res en ted  over  $4 bil lion .39 Including
secured  and priority debt, those affected b y mea ns -test ing could
have rep a id  abou t  $9 bil lion  of total Ch apt er 7  debt  at  ris k if
th ey ha d filed under  Cha pter  13.40 Th is  s tudy  upda tes  and
confirms  th e find ings  of ear lier  st ud ies a nd  re cognizes  tha t
some ten  to fi ft een  percen t of Cha pt er 7  ban kr up tcy filers  could
r e pa y a  su bst an tia l port ion of their  debt s if th ey filed in
Chapter 13 instead.
It  is also significant  th at  filers impa cted in 1997 u nder  H.R.
3150 had  median  incomes  consider ably  above  the 1996 n a t ion a l
median  incom e for  all households.41 In addition, filers not im
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median  na t iona l  income , w il l be  h ig h er  t h a n  t he 75% of national median  income used
in  th e st udy. See id . at 11.
42. Those not  affected  ha d me dian  income s of $20,417. See id.
43. S ee id .
44. S ee Joh n M. Ba rr on & Michael  E.  Stat en , Pe rs ona l Ba nk ru pt cy: A Rep ort
on  Petitioners’ Ability-to-Pay (Oct. 6, 1997) (unpublished manuscr ipt ,  on  fi le  w ith
au thor s an d t he  Cr ed it  Res ea rch  Cen te r,  Geor get own  Un ive rs it y).
45. S ee id . at 25.
46. S ee W E F A GR O U P  RE S O U RC E  P LANNING SERVICE , TH E  F INANCIAL COST S  OF
P ERS ONAL  BANKRUPTCY 19 (1 998 ).
47. S ee id . at 2, 23.
48. S ee NEUBIG  & SC H E U R E N, supra  note 36, at  12.
pacted  by means-testing earned less than half  of the m edia n
in come of th ose affected.42 Finally, those subject to means-
tes t ing could re p a y t he media n a moun t of unsecur ed
nonpr ior i ty debt of $21,679, whereas t he compa rable  figu re for
a l l Chapte r  7 filer s  was  ze ro.43 In sum, the idea tha t mean s-
te st ing w ill ad ver sely a ffect poor ba nk ru pt cy filers is  a m yth .
A stu dy by John M. Bar ron an d Micha el E .  Sta ten  of the
Cre dit  Resear ch Cent er a t t he Georgetown School of Busin ess
achieved compa rable  res u lt s b ase d on  de bt ors’ pet it ion s a nd
schedules.44 While t his  st ud y did not  select  deb tors  accord ing to
min imum income cr iter ia,  its  findin gs are supportive of means-
tes t ing . The y found  th at  5% of those filin g Cha pt er  7 could h ave
repa id 100% of their  debt  in five yea rs . Approxim at ely 25% of
Cha pter  7 debtors h ad in come su fficient  to repa y at  least  30% of
th eir  nonhousing d ebt  over five yea rs  wh ile ke epin g up
mor tgage or ren ta l paymen ts on t heir h omes. Ten per cent  of
Chapter  7 debtors declar ed income sufficient t o repay at  least
78% of their n onhousin g debt over five years .45
The WEFA Group  a lso conducted a  s tudy  us ing the  ea r li er
s t a tu tory baseline of 75% of na tional m edian  income.46 WEFA
estim at ed mea ns-tes ting would r educe, by eight  to seventeen
percen t , th e losses  an nu ally cau sed b y ban kr up tcy filings, t hus
saving somewh ere from $3.6 to $7.4 billion per year .47
The fin dings  of th e most recent Er nst & Young study
suggest tha t ,  i f anyt h i n g,  the WEFA s tudy underes t imates  the
tota l amount  of Chapt er 7 debt in the bankru ptcy system and,
consequ en tly,  the fin ancia l cos t s of t he p er son a l ba nkrupt cy
sys t em.48
The findings of th ese credit-indu str y sponsored st udies  have
been la rgely con firmed  in  a  recen t  st udy  by P rofes sor s
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49. S ee Ma ri an ne  B. Cu lh an e & M ich ae l a  M. Whit e, Mea ns -Tes tin g for  Ch ap ter
7 Debtors: Repaym en t  Capaci t y Un tapped? (December 1, 1998) <http://www.abiworld.
org/resea rch/creight onstu dy.htm l>.
50. Cu lhane an d Wh it e s tu die d t he  Nor th er n D ist ri ct of C al ifor ni a,  th e Di st ri ct
of Color ad o, t he  Nor th er n D ist ri ct  of Georgia, t he D istr ict of Mass achu set ts, t he
Dis tr ict  of Ne br as ka , t he  Mid dle  Dis tr ict  of Nor th  Ca rol in a,  an d t he  Wes te rn  Dis tr ict
of Wisconsin.  See id . (describing their sam ple design).  The reliability of their stu dy
may be su spe ct a s a  res ult  of a failu re t o adju st t heir  sa mp le t o accou nt  for
va r ia t ions in  nu mb er s of file rs , in come , a nd  ra ti os of ch ap te r 7  to ch apter  13 filers
in  the distr icts studied.  For inst ance, Culhan e and  W h it e  d r ew 15 0 pe ti ti ons  ea ch
from  the N orther n District of California an d the Middle Dist ri ct of  Nor th  Caro lina ,
desp it e t he  fa c t t h a t  17,437 pet itions w ere filed in  th e Nort her n Dist rict of Californ ia
and only 1,151 in the Middle Distr ict of North  Carolina, Ca lifornia generally has a
higher  in come  th an  Nor th  Ca rol in a,  an d t ha t a  mu ch l ower  per cen t a ge of ba nk ru pt cy
filers  choos e ch ap te r 7  in st ea d of ch ap te r 1 3 in  th e Mi dd le D ist ri ct o f  No r t h  Carol ina
than  in t he N orth ern  Distr ict of California.
Marianne B. C ulh ane a nd M ich aela  M. Whit e of Creigh ton
Universit y School of Law.49 Althou gh t heir  sa mp le is sm aller  in
size, less recen t , and  from fewer distr icts th an  th e stu dies
discussed above, the Culhane an d White study also shows that
a  su bs tan t ia l n umber  of consu m er b an kr up tcy filers  could
repay a l l or  a  subs tan t ia l  por t ion  of th eir u ns ecur ed n onpr iorit y
deb t s in  Chap ter  13,  and tha t  m eans-tes t ing  prov ides  an
effective mechanism for identifying those individuals. Culhane
an d White s tu died 150 cases from 7 distr icts for a  tota l of 1,050
cases, a ll  t aken  from 1995 files.50 Twen ty-on e p er cen t  of
Cha pter  7 filers in their sa mp le were a bove  the n a t ion a l
median  income , ad jus te d for fam ily size, s ugges tin g th at  79% of
filers  would not even be affected by means-testing. Indeed, the
median  g ross  income of the potent ially mean s-test ed g roup  was
22% higher t han  the  na t iona l  median  incom e  for all families,
sugges t ing tha t  many bankrup tcy  fi le r s t oda y  a re re lat ively
well-off. Even under th e researchers’ restrictive assumpt ions,
appr oxima tely  one-fift h  of those  above -med ia n  file r s h ad m ore
than  $50 in net  month ly income ava i lab le  for  a  p lan  as r equired
by th e second  elem en t of H.R . 3150, a nd  m ost of th em could
also repa y 20% or m ore of th eir  un secu re d n onpr iorit y debt s, a s
req uir ed by th e th ird  elem ent  of H.R. 3150. In  su m, Cu lha ne
and Wh it e fin d t ha t  app roxim ately  35,00 0 of la st  yea r ’s on e
mill ion  Chapte r  7 bankrup tcy filers, could have repaid a
subs tan t ia l por t i on  of their d ebts h ad t hey elected Cha pter  13.
Those who would be covered by mea ns-tes ting wer e able , on
avera ge, to repay 70% of their unsecu r ed nonpriority debts.
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51. Id . at  pt . II  (dis cus sin g t he  IR S Colle cti on  Fi na nci al  St an da rd s).
52. The proposed means-test ing legislation specifically allows payment of secured
debt s (not  limite d to secu red d ebts  on au tomobiles ) but p rovides n o basis for a llowing
the incursion of new secured debt  on an  aut omobile or anyth ing else. Moreover,
alt hough  IRS  poli cies  ar e m ad e a pp lica ble for calculat ing t he de btor’s mont hly
expenses, th e app licable provisions specifically “exclud[e] paymen ts for debts” f rom the
reach  of the IRS  ru les, su bjecting t hem  to specia l ban kr upt cy r u les . Th is p re em pt ion
lan gua ge act ua lly h as  th e effect  of ma kin g th e m ea ns -te st ing  pr ovisi ons  s ig n ificantly
more generous for debtors tha n would the IRS standa rds, as it eliminates th e caps
imposed by the IRS on indebtedness and does not limit the types of secured deb t  tha t
the debt or is per mit ted t o repa y.
53. F o r i n st a n ce, the Interna l Revenue Manua l provides, “If a taxpayer has no
car  paym en t, or  no ca r, on ly t he  oper at ing  cost s por tion  of th e t ra ns por ta tion
s t anda rd is  used  to co me u p w it h  the a ll owabl e t r anspo r ta t ion  ex pe nse. ” IN T E R N AL
Thus, even u nd er t he a ssu mp tion s m ad e by Pr ofessors Cu lha ne
and Whit e, m a n y high-income bank ru ptcy filers would be
affected  by means-testing, and those individuals cou l d r epay a
subs tan t ia l amount of their nonpriority unsecu red  debt s in
Cha pter  13.
But  Culh an e an d Wh ite’s stu dy r est s on s ome qu est iona ble
assumpt ions th at  ten d to un deres tim at e th e nu m ber  of
bankrup tcy filers t ha t would be affected by m e a n s-testing. In
pa r t icu lar , Cu lhane  and White make  two dubious  assumpt ions
in  ru nn ing th eir tes t s . F ir st, t hey in clude a  “mot or veh icle
own er sh ip  a llow ance” in  the d ebtor ’s bu dget , in  effect  expectin g
the debt or t o spen d u p t o $20,100 t o buy a  new car dur ing  the
t e rm of her p lan . They cr iticize Er ns t & Youn g’s “und uly
rest rictive” assumpt ion  tha t  a  deb tor  should only be perm itted
to pay off the  amount  owed  on  h e r  ex is t ing ca r , r a the r t han  to
provide  en ough  money t o bu y or  lea se  a  new car  while in
ba nk ru pt cy.51 But  wh at  jus tificat ion can  be offered for  invi t ing
debtors to buy new cars while th ey are in  ba nkru pt cy?
Culh ane and Whit e’s ass umpt ion  app ea rs t o be  ba se d on  a
misunderst and ing of t he  author i ty  of deb tor s  t o i ncu r  new
au tomobile ownersh ip debts u nder  the ter ms of the pr oposed
means-tes t ing legislation and applicable IRS policies. The
proposed mea ns-t es t in g provis ion s p er mit  an  a llow ance for  a
deb tor  t o pay off his preexisting automobile ownership debts,
bu t they do not perm it th e debtor t o incur new deb t  or  t o
increase his car  owners h ip allowance.52 IRS p olicies sim ilar ly
(and unsu rpr is -in gly) pr ovid e a n  a llow ance for  p a ym en t  of
exist ing au tomobil e d ebt  bu t  do n ot  make a llow ance for  the
deb tor  t o i ncu r  n ew  a u tomobile debt. 53 The  st at ut ory la ngu age
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RE V E N U E MAN UAL -ADMINISTRATION ¶ 5 323.433 su b-¶ 3. Clea rly t he IR S does n ot
c rea t e an a llowance for a t axpayer  to incur n ew indebte d n e ss  t o b u y a  new ca r  o r  t o
re pla ce an old car with a  new one.
54. S ee Culh an e & Wh ite, supra  note  49, at  pt. II  (discussin g Adminis tr at ive
Expenses  an d Ch ap te r 1 3 Tr us te e’s Fe e).  It  sh ould  als o be a dde d t ha t a dop tin g
mea ns -t e s t ing will likely cause man y debtors not to file at all, thus n o trust ee’s fees
will be in clud e a t a ll in  th ose ca ses .  In  pa rt icul ar , de bt ors  wh o will be forced to
repay 100% of their  debt s will proba bly choose not t o file at all.
of th e actu al m ean s-test ing pr oposals an d th e app licable IRS
policies ar e consis t e n t wit h  the r equir em en ts of com mon
sens e—a de bt or  is  pe rmit t ed  to pay off h is  se cured  de bt  on  an
au tomobile if he has one bu t  not t o incur new debt  to buy a n ew
car . A revi sion  of the p ecu lia r  and incor rect  a s sumpt ion  tha t  a
deb tor  would be perm itted  to buy a $2 0,000 n ew car  in
bankrup tcy r a ises  t he number  of de bt ors w ho qu alify  for
m eans-tes t ing to over  6% of the  sample , a  number  tha t is  quit e
sim ilar  to the findings of the more extensive studies d iscussed
above.
Culhane and  Whi te make  a  second quest ionable adjus tm ent
in  deduct ing from the d ebtor ’s a bil it y t o pa y a  t rust ee’s fe e of
5.6 %. This  as su mp tion  ap pea rs  in t wo places a nd  each  tim e it
redu ces the  number of debtors who will qualify for mea ns-
tes t ing . Firs t, it r educes th e debtor’s pr ojected  net  mon th ly
income for  purposes of dete rmin ing whether t he  debtor  can  pay
a t  least  $50 pe r  m on t h  int o her  pla n. Se cond, it a rt ificially
diminish es th e debtor’s calculated  ability to repa y 20% of her
unsecured nonpriority debts.
But  it is  un ten able  to conside r t ru st ees’ fees in  th is  manner .
Means-test ing is  concer ned  wit h  the d ebtor ’s a bil it y t o pay $50
per  month  in to a  p lan  and to repa y 20% of her un secured debts,
not  w ith  whethe r  t he  credit ors  will a ctu ally receive those
a m ount s. Tru st ees’ fees a re  irr eleva nt  to t he  debt or’s a bilit y t o
pay—although they a re r ele va nt  to the cr ed it ors’ abilit y to
collect. The fees refl ect  t he  amoun t  t ha t  cr edi tor s  a r e wil li ng to
pay in  orde r  t o collect  a  pa r t  of th e debt  owed  to them . After
t hese expen ses  ar e dele te d from  th e deb tor ’s bu dget , an d t he
deb tor ’s motor  veh icle ownersh ip  a llowance is  eliminated,
ap pr oxima te ly 7% of debt ors q ua lify for m ea ns -tes tin g.54
Alth ough  their  sample is  not  as e xt en sive or  recen t  as s ome
pr ior st ud ies, Culh an e an d Wh ite’s stu dy is st ill valu able  as  it
tends  to confi rm the results of these pr ior st ud ies. Th eir r esu lts
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55. S ee  B rauche r , supra  not e 12, a t 8-9; War ren , supra  not e 7, at  1085-95. 
56. The consumer credit indu stry h as been a  long-time a dvocate of som e for m
of mea ns-t est ing for Ch apt er 7  relie f. S ee Elizabet h Wa rr en, A P rin cipl ed A pp roach
to Con su m er B an kr up tcy , 71 AM . BANKR. L.J . 483 , 50 3 (19 97).
57. S ee Warren Challenges Creditor Findings in New Study , 32 Bankr . Ct. Dec.
(CRR) A8 (Ju ly 21, 1998) (argu ing t ha t even  un der id eal condit ions, cred itors  get lit tle
or  no benefit from means-test ing) [hereina fter Wa rren  Ch all eng es].
58. S ee, e.g.,  War r e n , supra  note 7, at 1085. Warren also routinely refers to
means -t e s t ing a s  “t h e cre dit  in du st ry ’s m ea ns  te st ,” ap pa re nt ly for  rh et ori cal
a r e even more s im ila r  once t heir  st udy  is  adju st ed  for  it s
un rea list ic and  er roneous  assumpt ions . In  shor t ,  ther e a re
many high -income Ch ap te r 7  debt ors w ho could r epa y a
subs tan t ia l p or t ion  of th eir un secured n onpriority debt s if they
were forced to elect Ch apt er 13.
While  t he re i s room for  d ispu te as to how la rge an  impact
means-tes t ing will ha ve, it is s illy to ar gue t ha t it  will ha ve no
impact  or  t o discount the veracity of these studies only because
th ey wer e fun ded  by th e cred it in du st ry. 55 I f ther e  r ea l ly  were
no benefit  to unse cured  cred it ors from channeli ng m ore d ebtors
in to Cha pter  13 pa ym en t  plans,  the cr ed it  in du st ry wou ld  not
be a dvocatin g me an s-te st ing. 56 Su rr ealis tica lly, however , law
professor s ar e lectu ring th e credit indus tr y on t he best wa y for
cred it ors t o collect  on  their  out st anding loa ns. 57
Independen t  of cost-bene fit a na lysis, m ean s-tes tin g would
send an  imp ort an t m ora l signa l to ba nk ru pt cy debtor s t ha t if
th ey ha ve the abi lity t o repa y a su bst an tia l port ion of their
deb t , th ey should be requ ired t o do so. Thus , to the  ex ten t  tha t
the re ar e doubt s a bout  th e ad min ist ra tive s avin gs t ha t wou ld
resul t from a  b r ight -l ine  st a tu tory  means-t e st ing requ iremen t
or  abou t t he n um ber  of ind ividua ls who would qualify under
m e a n s-tes tin g, th is  mora l m es sa ge m ust  a lso be  pu t  on  the
scale  in  favor  of mea ns -test ing. Wh ile differen t in dividu als  will
weigh  th is va ria ble differ en tly, it  is u nq ue st iona bly re leva nt  t o
t h e mea ns -test ing de bat e an d sh ould be k ept  in m ind in
weigh ing t he  costs a nd  ben efits  of mea ns -tes tin g.
2. At tacks
 Attacks on t he se s tu dies  ha ve been vociferous and well-
pu blicized, pa rt icular ly when  they purport to damn t he studies’
int egr ity solely because th e research was funded by the credit
ca rd ind us tr y.58 Sim ilar ly, th ey rou t inely re fe r  to means-tes t ing
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advant age. War ren , supra  note 56, at  503.
59. War ren , supra  note 56, at  503.
60. Memorandum from Kim J. Kowaleski to The Na tional Bank rupt cy Review
Com mi ssi on,  Evalu ations of T hr ee S tu di es S ub m itt ed t o th e N at ion al B an kr up tcy
Review Com m iss ion  1 n .* (Oct. 6, 199 7) (on fil e wit h a ut hor s); Me mor an du m fr om
Kim  J. Kowa leski t o The N at ional B a n kru ptcy Com mis sion, Follow -Up  Com m ent s on
Dr. S ta t en ’s  S tudy 1 n .* (Oct . 10 , 19 97) (on  file  wit h a ut ho rs ).
61. S ee Lett er from  Thom as A. La yma n, Sen ior  Vice-Pres iden t, VIS A U.S .A.,
Inc., t o Bra dy William son, Ch air ma n, N ati ona l B an kr up tcy R eview  Com m iss ion  2 (Oct .
14, 1997) (on file with au thors). In his letter,  Layman notes:
Fin ally, as we  discuss ed, even  th ough you  ask ed Mr . Kowalesk i t o  prepa re
th is critique in his capacity as an  employee of the Congressional Bud get
Office, Mr . Kowa les ki s ta te s a t t he  bot tom  of the first page of his critique
pr oposals  as  “th e cred it in du st ry’s m e a n s t es t” in  order  to t a r
t hose proposals with antibank populism.59 Gu ilt  by a ss ocia t ion
is an old r h e t or ica l  tool , and  one  tha t  cr i t ics  have  used to g rea t
effect . Beyond scoring r het orical point s, however, it is un clear
wha t th e pur pose is of dwelling on the fact that  these studies
were  funde d b y t he cr ed it  card  indu st ry. Are  th e crit ics
claim ing th at  th e dat a a re fa b r ica t ed or falsely reported? Or do
th ey mer ely disagree with  th e conclusions dr awn  from th e ra w
da ta? Assuming  tha t  the  da ta  a re  accura te, t he  conclusions  a re
the resu lt of simple, easily reproducible, ca lcu la t ion s.  If s o, th en
the fact  t ha t  t he credi t  ca r d industry funded the research is a
non sequitur, r ep ea ted ly invok ed  only t o obscure t he a ctua l
results of the stu dies.
Moreover , man y of the criticisms of the ability-to-pay
stu dies su ffer  from met hodologica l fla ws  of their  own . F or
inst an ce, Elizabet h  Wa r ren h as r epeat edly referred  to a r eview
of these abi lity-to-pay st udies, conducted by Kim J . Kowaleski
of th e Congr ession al Bu dget  Office, as  if it w ere a  r epor t  by t he
CBO. In  rea lity, ever y Kowales ki r eport  iden t ifie d b y P rofes sor
Warren conta ins a footnoted cavea t : “The ana lys is  and
conclusions presented in th is  memo a re those  of the  au thor  and
do not  neces sa r ily  rep res en t  the p osi t ion  of the Congr es siona l
Budget  Office.”60 Ne ver thele ss , Wa r ren , t he r ep or ter  for  the
Nat iona l Ban kr up tcy Review Com mis sion a nd  th e au th or of its
r e por t  on  con s u m er  b a n kr up tcy, repea tedly describes
Kowales ki’s work a s an  official CBO cr it iqu e. When  the s pon sor
of Dr . S t a t en ’s  r epor t  ca lle d t h is  se r iou s e r ror  to the a t t en t ion  of
the Cha ir man of the N at ion a l Ba nkrupt cy Re view Commission ,
he was ignored.61 La ter ,  in  a  law review ar ticle, War ren
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tha t  ‘[t]he a na lysis an d conclusions  pres ent ed in t h i s  m em o  a re  those  of  the
au t h o r an d do n ot n eces sa ri ly r epr ese nt  th e pos iti on of t he  Con gr ess iona l
Budget  Office.’ Accordin gly, a ny  re fer en ce t o th e Congress iona l Bu dge t O ffice
in  his  critiqu e or in r elat ed m at eria ls descr ibing Mr . Kowalesk i is ent irely
inappropria te, potentially deceptive and must  be deleted.
Id . (cit at ion  om it te d).
62. War ren , supra note 7, at  1086 n.25, 1091-92.
63. S ee gen eral ly W arr en  Chall eng es, supra note 57, at A8 (quoting Elizabeth
War ren ).
64. S ee War ren , supra note 7, at  1092-93.
65. Personal Ba nk ru ptcy —T he C red it R esear ch C ent er an d E rn st &  You ng
Reports on Debtors’ Ability to Pay, Before the Subcomm. on Adm in. Oversight & the
Courts, Senate Comm . on the Jud iciary, 105 th  Con g. *3 (1 998 ) (st at em en t of R ich ar d
M. Stana , Associate Director, Administration of Ju stice Iss u es , Genera l  Governmen t
Div isi on ), avai lab le  in  1998 WL 130307 [hereinafter Pers ona l B an kr up tcy ].
66. Id . at *17-18 (em ph as is a dd ed ).
con t inued to refer  to Kowa lesk i’s r epor t a s a  “CBO r epor t,”
“CBO ana lysi s, ” or  “CBO r eview.”62 She and other mean s-
tes t ing cr it ics  convey a  mis lead ing im pr ession  to t he p ublic
even as  th ey compla in t ha t t he cr edit or -sup port ed s tu dies  ha ve
received undue a t t en t ion .63 In  the end,  the s t ronges t  in fer en ce
tha t  can  legitim at ely be dr awn  from Kowa lesk i’s crit ique  is t ha t
he personally  di sa gr ees w it h  som e of the  findin gs of the WEFA,
CRC, and Er nst & Young reports.
Relia nce on  a  r epor t  by the  Government  Account ing Office is
also quest ionable. While Professor Warr en cha ra cterizes th e
GAO’s r epor t  a s having discredited the earlier studies,64 her
conclus ion  di ffer s s ubs tan t ia lly fr om tha t  of th e GAO it se lf,
which  s t a t ed  t h a t  the CRC and E rnst  & Young r ep or t s
“[b]oth  . . . repr esen t a  us eful firs t s tep  in a ddressing a  major
pu blic pol icy iss ue—whet her  som e p ropor t ion  of those  de bt ors
who file for per sonal ba nk ru ptcy un der cha pter  7 of th e
bankrup t cy code  have s ufficie n t  in come, a ft er  exp en se s,  to pa y
a  ‘subst an tial’ portion of their out sta ndin g debts.”65 She also
omit s the followin g pass age fr om the GAO Rep or t : “[T]he a ctua l
nu mber  of chap ter  7  debtors  who cou ld  rep ay a t  lea st  a  por t ion
of t h e ir  n onh ousing debt could be m ore or  l ess  than  the
estim at es in these two studies. Similar ly, the am ount  of debt
these debt ors could p oten tia lly repa y could a lso be m ore or less
than  th e r epor ts  est ima te d.”66 Thus,  accord ing t o t h e GAO, th e
stu dies may  und erestimate t he  tot a l num ber  of filers  who could
repay a  subs t an t ia l  amoun t  of their debt . Given tha t t he
au thor s of th ose r epor ts  delibe ra te ly ma de cons er vat ive
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67. The CRC and Ernst  & Young repor t s  both  es t imate  tha t  to the  exten t  tha t
debtors’ schedules inaccurat ely describe repayment  ability, they will tend to
unde r st a t e incom e, ove rs ta te  exp en ses , an d t he re by u nd er st at e t he  ne t in come
ava ilable  for debt r epaym ent . The GAO believe s it t o  be  “p la u sibl e” tha t ,  t o t he  exten t
the re are er rors in th e debtors’ schedules, they ma y either u nderst ate or ove r s t a t e
“their  capacity to repay their debts, wi th  a  net  unknown bia s i n  t he aggrega te  dat a
re por ted  by all d ebtor s.” Id. at  *8-9. The GAO gives n o rea son t o belie ve  t h a t  a
sign i fi can t  number of debtors will be so ignorant of the bankruptcy process that  t h ey
will overst at e th eir a bili t y to p ay t he ir  cre dit ors . Ev en  th ough  a la rg e n um ber  of
debto r s have n o repr esen ta tion in  dra wing u p th eir sch edule s, it is d oubtfu l th at
many debtors will oversta te, as opposed to underst ate, th eir a bility t o repay debts.
Anyon e familia r wit h  bankrup tcy p ra ctice  will r ecogn ize t ha t t he  GAO’s conclu sion
tha t  thes e err ors will be ra ndom ly distr ibut ed is m ista ken . It wou ld be equ ally
plau sible t o  ar gue  th at  beca us e m ost  Ame ri can s file  th eir  ta x r et ur ns  wit hou t
p rofess iona l assistance that th ey overstate their income, understate their deductions,
and othe rwise  rout inely  overstat e their  tax liability by a sign ificant a moun t. Sim ilar ly,
the GAO Report fault s the a uth ors of the st udies for failing to consider t hat  the
debto r s income may fall or expenses may  r ise du rin g th e per iod covered by th e
Chapt er  13 pla n. Id. at *10. While valid as fa r  a s  it  goes, this criticism is also
misp laced. Fir st, it  is just  as lik ely th at  a debt or’s income w ill rise a nd fall d ur ing
the pendency of a bankru ptcy. For instan ce, to the extent t hat  the debt or files
ba nk ru pt cy becau se sh e is youn g an d at  th e beginn ing of he r work ing car eer or  is
chang ing jobs, her income will be expected to rise dur ing the  3-5 ye ar  pe ri od of a
Chapt er  13 plan . Second, to t he ext ent  th at  th e debt or lear ns be tt er fin an cial
managemen t techn iques , her  expen ses will t end t o fall.
68. S ee War ren , supra note 7, at  1091-92.
69. S ee Neu big et  al.,  supra  note 32, at  1.
estim at es of repaym ent  ability, it is more likely th at  th ey
u n d er st a t e ra th er  th an  overs ta te  th eir  re su lts . Not  only t ha t,
bu t GAO’s  reason  for  sugges t ing th at  th e find ings  of repa yment
abilit y in the CRC and E rnst  & Young r ep or t s ar e overst at ed is
impla us ible on its face.67 Even if the GAO’s report may cast
some dou bt  on the u lt im ate con clu sions of th e CRC an d Erns t  &
Youn g report s, it is not clear  th at  th is red ounds to the critics’
bene fi t .
On a substa ntive level, Warren an d others have taken issue
with  the  sample  si ze  and distr ibut ion used  by th e CRC an d
Ern st  & Young studies,68 a lle gin g t ha t  their  da ta  ba se s a re t oo
small to su ppor t gen er alize d in feren ces a bout  debt ors’ ability t o
repay . Yet the CRC and Ern st & Young studies together include
more pet i t ions  over  a  broader  geogra phical scope tha n War ren ’s
recent  r e se a r ch. Er nst  & Young st udied 5,722 Cha pter  7
pet i t ions in fou r  bankrup t cy cour ts, m ainly du ring 1992-93.69
CRC studied 2,441 Chapter 7 and 1,357 Chapter 13 petitions,
select ing a t  random  app roxim ately  300 p et it ion s in  each  of
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70. S ee Bar ron  & Sta ten , supra  note 44,  at  7. 
71. S ee Culhan e & White, supra  note  49. Alth o u gh  C u lhane and White  make
different  as su mp tion s r ega rd ing  th e ca lcul at ion of  ability-t o-pay, th eir m eth odology for
collecting and evalu ating t he dat a was similar . Moreover, where t heir met hodologies
and ass um ption s differe d, E r nst  & Young’s appr oach wa s gen era lly sup erior . S ee
supra  note s 51-54 an d accompa nyin g text .
72. S ee supra notes 36-43 a n d  a ccompan ying te xt (discus sing N eubig a nd
Scheuren ’s Ma rch  199 8 Re por t p re pa re d for  Er ns t &  Youn g).
73. War ren , supra note 7, at  1097.
74. S ee id . at  109 6 (“Bec au se  we  ha ve b oth  diffe re nt  dis tr ict s a nd  differen t  t i m e
periods in some of the studies, it is difficult to determin e w h e t he r  t h e differences
were caus ed becau se Oh io differed from Te xas or  whet her  a 1981 s am ple differed
from  a 1997 s am ple or both . Moreover, it  is alwa ys difficult t o  r el y o n  th e an alysis
of a l im it ed  nu mb er  of dis tr ict s . .  . .”).
75. Id . at 1097.
th irteen  cities prima rily from May to J uly 1996.70 Moreover ,
Culhane and White used the same meth odology as Ern st &
Young’s stu dy, thereby su ggesting tha t t heir m ethodology was
app ropria te. 71 The follow-up Ern st & Young  study examined
tw ice a s many pet it ion s (2 ,20 0) d rawn  from a ll 90 bankrupt cy
court s, a ll fi led  du r in g 19 97, t he m ost  recen t  yea r  for  wh ich
da ta was a vailable.72 As  the Erns t  & You ng and  CRC stu dies
ask  th e correct  que st ions, fort hr ight ly ackn owledge t heir
assum ptions, and  link the ir  conclu sions  to the  relevan t  da ta ,
they offe r  use fu l, even  if n ot  de fin it ive , in format ion .
It  is str an ge tha t War ren  ut ter ly discoun ts t he m e a ns-
tes t ing s tudies while d efend ing h er own  res ear ch a s sim ply
bett er  th an  “cur sin g th e da rk ne ss.”73 Ev iden t ly she holds CRC
and Er ns t & Youn g to one se t of emp irica l st andards and
her self t o some th ing d iffe ren t .  Warren ’s  t hes is  is  t ha t  debtor s
today are on average poor e r  t h a n  they were in  past  years . Her
recent  da t a  ar e dra wn from 1,000 petit ions filed in seven
judicia l districts in 1995 and 150 cases filed in one dis tr ict in
1997. Her ar ticle admits its limited sample size, random  t im e
periods, and other limitations.74 It  also appears that  she made
n o effor t  t o ad jus t  t he r e levan t  fi gu res or  othe rwise  a t t empt  to
e n su r e  t h a t  t h e y w er e  n a t ion a l ly  r ep r es e nt a t ive .
Notwiths tand ing the  pauci ty of he r  sample  and th e failure even
to attempt  to scientifically cabin the t ime periods un der r eview,
Warren a s ser t s th at  “th e su ggest ion of a t re nd  is st ron g.”75 If
the “suggestion  of a tr end” is so strong in War ren ’s limited
research , wh y is  it  les s s o for  st udies  tha t  in clu d ed  t h ousands
more pet ition s in  mor e geogra p h ic a reas with  appropr ia t e
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76. Warr en  is n ot det err ed from  ass ert ing t he con tr ar y. S ee i d . at 1101
( sugges t ing tha t mea ns-testing will “clos[e] the doors ” of the  ba nk ru pt cy cour ts  on
“mor e th an  a m illi on  fam ilie s”).
77. S ee Pers ona l B an kr up tcy , supra note 65, at  *3.
78. S ee War ren , supra not e 7, at  1097 (“Noneth eless, t he comp ar ison a mong t he
eleven districts is a li tt le like ligh tin g a can dle; it pr ovides limit ed light  an d it is
more productive than cursing the da rkness.”). Given the deficiencies, the publici ty it
has gar ner ed in  some  qua rt ers  is su rpr ising. See Warren Ch all eng es , supra  note 57,
a t  A12 (“Wa rr en ’s s tu dy s up por ts  wh at  vir tu al ly ev er yon e in  th e ba nk ru pt cy
communi ty has been saying. Will Congress listen to hard dat a  ins te ad  of t he  numbers
in  a st udy pa id for by a sp ecial int eres t gr oup—a st udy t ha t have [s ic] been called
in to qu es ti on  by a  gove rn me nt  ag en cy?”).
weigh tin g to ensur e na tional r epres ent at iveness t ha n War ren
explored?  Whet her  th e stu dies were done by credit or-fun ded
aca dem ics and  accoun ting firm s or by ideologically motivated
aca dem ics is u ltim at ely ir re leva nt  or  m utu ally ca ncelin g.
Standa rds  of proper s cientific dat a collect ion  and  analys is  a r e
in de pe nde nt  of the s in cer it y or  mot ives of individ ua l a u thors.
J udged  by such objective standards, Warren’s study
compares poorly to those she criticizes. Her dat a limitations are
far  more  prob lemat ic than th ose of CRC an d E rn st  & Young.
More sign ificant , her  conclusion—tha t t he a verage income of
bankru pt  debtors is qu ite  low—is ult ima te ly irr eleva nt  to
means-test ing. 76 As  the GAO noted , the  relevan t  quest ion  i s
whet her  “som e p ropor t ion” of individua l Chapte r  7 deb tor s have
sufficien t  income, after expenses, to pay a “subst an t ia l ” por t ion
of their debts.77 War ren ,  however, only investigates th e
ci rcumstances of th e average debtor. Attem ptin g to evaluat e a
program to m ea ns -tes t b an kr up tcy r elief for high -income
deb tor s based on t he cha ra cterist ics of average debtors is
illogical.  While  War re n’s sam ple p rovide s m odest  ins ight  i nto
the fina ncia l condition  of some people wh o file ba nk ru pt cy, it is
v ir tua l ly us eless  for an alyzin g mea ns -test ing of high -income
debt ors. Th e light  sh ed by t his  can dle cert ain ly is dim !78
The nu b of the p roblem  in Wa rr en’s resea rch  is it s flawed
hypothesis. She conten ds t ha t “[i]f th e sha rp r ise in consu mer
ban kr upt cies i s a t t r ib utable  to a  sh arp increa se  in  de bt or
abu se, th en  th e ba sic fina ncia l pr ofiles of the  filers  ough t t o
change over  t ime: t he a ddit ion of more a ffluent  debt ors s hou ld
increa se bot h  th e mea n a nd t he m edian  incomes or lower t he
re lat ive size of th e debts, dem onstr at ing th eir rela tively better
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79. War ren , supra note 7, at  1094.
80. S ee High est  N um ber , supra note 3 (“Total pers onal ban kru ptcies in . . . 1997
were 1,350,118, a 49 .9 percen t in creas e from . . . 1992, t he h eigh t  o f t he  Recession ,
when  pe rs on al  ba nk ru pt cies  re ach ed  900 ,87 4.”).
81. S ee Neu big et  al., supra  not e 32 , at  3; supra text  accompa nyin g not e 32. 
abilit y to r epa y debt s.”79 Th is  im pl ies  tha t  mea ns-t es t in g ca n
only be just ified i f ther e  a r e enough ba nk ru ptcies of higher
income-ea rn ing debtors to skew the income average  upward
over time. Su ch evidence could supp ort m ean s-test ing, but  i t is
har dly a n ecess ar y an d su fficien t cond ition . Ban kr up tcies  ha ve
increas ed tr em en dous ly du rin g five year s of allegedly
un precedent ed na tion al em ploym e n t an d pr osper ity. 80 The
growin g num bers of debtors wh o are of “avera ge” sta tu s even by
Warren’s sta nda rds could swamp the  sta t i st i ca l  impact  of the
t en to fifit een  pe rcen t  of filers who would qu alify for mea ns-
tes t ing un der H .R. 3150.81 And because War ren ’s  r esea rch
esse nt ially ends in 1995, it  fails to cap tu re mos t  of t he  drama t ic
increase of filings between  1993 and  1997, in which th ere is
most gr ound for  su sp icion  tha t  we ll-off d ebtors b eca me m ore
common.
Fin ally,  t he su ggestion that if the average debt load had
decreased, th is would  sign a l t ha t  de bt ors w er e fil in g wh o had
a n  abilit y to re pa y th eir d ebt —an d it s u ns ta ted  corollary  t h at
a n  in crea se  in  aver age d ebt s m ea ns “poor er ” deb tors a r e
filing—makes no sense. Ga mblers  often  ru n u p high debt s
re lat ive to t heir  abil ity t o rep ay,  yet few would describe them  as
poor  but  hon est  debt ors. Lik ewise, h igher -income ea rners may
be tem pt ed t o gamb le on overly opt imis tic forecasts of th eir own
fina ncia l well-bein g an d in cur  extr aor din ar y mor tga ge, au to
loa n , an d consu mpt ion debts before fate t ak es a ba d  t u rn .
Nevertheless, because t he  high earners still  have more funds at
th eir  disp osa l t han  most  Amer ica ns,  it  doe s n ot  seem
u n r e a son able to as k t hem  to rep ay som e of t he vict im s of t heir
profligacy. Th is  la st  asp ect  of Wa r ren ’s inves t iga t ion  has
noth ing to do with  the ability to repay and the policies that ma y
be warrant ed toward higher-income debtors.
Even  assum ing that Warr en’s a v er a ges  a re  accura te  and
tha t  man y debtors are poor , or—count er-intu itively—even
poorer  th an  th ey wer e du rin g the fa rm cr is is  of the 1980s , or
t he brief but ha rd r ecessions of the ear ly 1980s an d 1990s, why
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82. S ee Brau cher , supra  not e 12, a t 10; Ga ry Kle in, Means Tested Ban kruptcy:
What  Wou ld  it  Mean?,  28 U. ME M . L. RE V. 711, 734 (1998); Warr en, supra n ote 7 , a t
1091.
83. The confu sion  i n  the curr ent cas e law is sum mar ized in Michael D.
such facts would a dmin ister  th e coup de gr ace to means-tes t ing
is unclear. The stat us of average deb tors  says  noth ing about  the
abilit y of high-income debtors to repay some of their debts.
Turn ing the  poin t a round, a means t e st  w ith  an  income
t h resh old lik e t ha t  of H.R.  3150 wil l n ot  a ffect  poor  de bt ors a t
all.  Th e empir ica l a rgu men t  aga in st  mea ns-t est ing, if it  exists,
must  u l t imate ly  have  a  fi rmer  founda t ion  than  t he one Warr en
ha s adva nced in order  to be persu asive.
Alth ough  th e exact  am oun t of bene fit is u ncer ta in,  it  is clear
tha t  unsecured credi tor s  and  nonbankrupt  consum ers will
ben efit  from m ean s-tes tin g of debt ors, a s m ean s-tes tin g will
in crease t he amounts collected in bankr uptcy and may lead to
fewer ban kr upt cy filings overa ll. As th e subsidy t o bankrup t s
declines, consum ers who pay their bills and  d o n ot  file
bankrup tcy wil l be nefit  from lower costs  of goods an d services
and credit.  Means-test ing will a lso incre as e un iformit y in t he
ap plica t ion  of the law, a s it will for t he first  time crea te a
na t iona l ru le for  the a va ila bil it y of con su mer ban kr upt cy relief
and th e cont en t  of Ch apt er  13 p la ns.  At l ea st  as t o wel l-off
debtors, gone will be th e days wh en t he pa rt ies could be t rea ted
vas t ly differen tly by cour ts n ext door to each other , t o sa y
noth ing of th ose  in  di ffer e n t  dis t r ict s or  cir cu it s.  Bot h  the
Const itu t ion  and e conomic sen se  manda te a  un ifor m
bankrup tcy law; mean s-testing pr ogresses far  toward  th at  goal.
Cr it ics  of means-testing not only discount  its benefi t s bu t
raise var ious object ions t o its p ra cticab ility a nd  fair ne ss. O n
ana lysis , however, it  is evident th at complaints th at m eans-
t es t ing wil l i nfl ict  mor t a l cos t s  on  the  bankrup tcy  syst em ar e
overstat ed. The pr imary  ob ject ion  to means-t e st ing  is  t ha t  it
would  needlessly increase the administra t i ve cos t s of t he
bankrup tcy syst em  by m a k i ng  it more complicated. 82 This
concern  is mispla ced.
Und er  the  cu r ren t sys t em,  a  form of means-testing occurs,
bu t in  a  very  uncer ta in  and  ad  hoc m a nner . Section 707(b)
provides no crit er ia for t he  defin ition  of “su bst an tia l abu se,”
and caselaw h as pr ovided litt le guidan ce.83  As  a  r esu lt, t her e is
D :\ 1 9 9 9- 1\ F I N A L \ J O N - F I N . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
200 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1999
Bruckman , No te, The Th ickening Fog of “Su bstantial Abuse”: Can 707(a) Help Clear
the Air?, 2 AM . BANKR. IN S T . L. RE V. 193, 205 (1994) (char acter izing judicia l
int er pr et at ion  of “sub st an ti al  ab us e” as  ma rk ed b y “un cer t a in ty  an d in con sis te ncy ”).
84. Indeed, s u ch local variations will be endemic in any stan dard-based
ga tekeepe r , such as “substan tia l abu se.” S ee J ack F . William s, Th e Fal lacies  of
Contemporary Fra ud ul ent  T ran sfer  M odels as Applied to Intercorporate Guaranties:
Fraudu len t T ran sfer  La w a s a F uz zy  S yst em , 15 CARDO ZO L. RE V. 140 3 (19 94).
85. S ee, e.g., In re La m a n na, 153 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1998) (stating consumer
debto r ’s ab ilit y to r epa y h is d ebt s ou t of fu tu re  dis posa ble i ncom e is  st ron g evid en ce
of “substantia l abuse”); In re Koch, 109 F.3d  1285, 1288 (8th  Cir.  199 7) (n ot ing tha t
“the su bs ta nt ia l a bu se  in qu ir y focu se s p ri ma ri ly on  Debt or s’ abi lit y t o pa y”).
86. S ee Lamanna,  153 F .3d  a t  4 ( rejectin g “per  se r ule s m an da tin g dis mi ssa l for
‘subs tan t ia l ab us e’ whe ne ver  th e d ebt or  is a ble  to r ep ay  hi s d ebt  ou t of fu tu re
disposa ble in com e”).
87. S ee generally William s, supra  note 84.
a  wide va ria tion in “loca l  cu l tu re s” a s  t o wha t  cons t it u t e s
“subst an tia l abu se.”84 To t he exten t  tha t an y consist ency can be
tea sed ou t  of t he  cases , t hey agree tha t  t he p r imar y factor in
dete rmin ing whether “substantial abuse” exi st s i s t he d ebtor ’s
abilit y to pay.85 Bu t  the re is  vast  d isagreement  and
incons is tency as  to “how much” a  deb tor  must  b e ab le  to pay
before the “su bs tan t ia l a bu se ” pr ovis ion  is tr iggered.86 The legal
s t anda rd of “how much” var ies  from ca s e t o case and  cour t  t o
cour t .87 W he t h er  a p ar ticu lar  debt or is eligible for Ch ap ter  7 is
poten tia lly litigable in  ma ny cas es wit h h ighly u np red icta ble
results. Need less t o say, t he a ctu al a d m inis tr at ive costs of th is
fact-intens ive, ru leless  inqu iry  a re  not  t r ivia l; the  h idden  socia l
cost s of non-uniformity and t he  pe rcept ions  of abuse  and
un fairnes s it spa wns a re a lso considera ble.
By st a tu tor ily  qu ant ifying a bil it y-t o-pa y a s a  de marca t ion
for  Cha pt er  7 eligibilit y, Congr ess will en ha nce u niform ity,
ce r ta in t y, a nd consist ency of the  law a nd , by definit ion, will
r educe adm inistr at ive costs as sociated  by th e pr esen t confus ing
condi t ion  of § 707(b). The cr i tics of mean s-test ing nevert heless
compla in  tha t , be cause  of th is  change,  the cou r t s and clerks’
offices wil l be  forced in to makin g ca se -by-ca se  eva lu a t ion s of
Cha pter  7 eligibility in large nu mber s of cases, an d tr ust ees’
burdens will increase.  Such cri t icisms, h owever , ar e
con t rad icted  by a  p roper  ana lys is  of the  proposa l.
C. H.R . 31 50 S upp ort
 Und er  th e th ree -par t t est  descr ibed in  H.R. 3150, a  deb tor ’s
in come and cost  of living is compa red t o objective sta nda rds  an d
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88. S ee H.R. 31 50, supra  no te  10,  § 101 (4).
89. S ee id . § 101 (1)(B).
90. S ee id . § 101 (4).
91. S ee id .
92. S ee id .
93. S ee Carl Felsenfeld & William J . Perlstein, The Practicalities of a Needs-
Based Bank rup tcy System 5 (Apr. 24, 1998) (unpu blished ma nus cript, on file wit h
auth ors). 
da ta tha t  have b een  in  exi st en ce for yea rs  an d a re r out inely
upda ted  by relevant government a gencies.88 Thu s, t he e ligibility
prong tha t  de pe nds  on the d ebtor ’s b ein g in  the t op h a lf of
na t iona l med ian  income, a djus ted  for family s ize, relie s on
Census Bu rea u  figu res  for  t h e benchmark.89 The second
cr it er ion  measures month ly incom e  a ft e r  deduct ing (a ) the
deb tor ’s actu al pa yment s to secured a nd  unsecured p r ior i ty
creditors; (b ) the  ord inary  and  necessa ry  living expenses ; and
(c) the  debtor ’s  expenses  for  cus tomary  char i t able con t r ibu t ions
and actua l  medica l /den ta l  cos t s  in  order  to dete rmine  whe ther
a t  least  $50 rem ains  available for paym ent  on uns ecured,
nonpr ior i ty claims.9 0  The $50 minimum will be calculated,
however , not  bas ed on t he b y-guess -an d-by-golly “disp osable
income” test  ma inta ined in cur ren t law, bu t  b ased  on objective
na t iona l sta nda rds  for a llowable living expenses p ublished  by
the In ter na l Revenu e Service.91 The  th ird  crit er ion, a bilit y to
repay at  least 20% of unsecured,92 nonpr iority debt in a  five-
year p lan, is a  simple division exercise.
H.R. 3150 contemplat es tha t  even if its sta nda rds  were
difficult  to ascertain, which they are not, the principal
enforcement  res pons ibility lies  with  th e debt or a nd  his
at torn ey. It is the debtor’s a t torney w ho wil l per form the
screen ing funct ion  in  the  cour se of p rep ar in g t he d ebtor ’s
schedules. The schedules will  be a  modifi ed  ver sion of th e
cur ren t Schedules I  a nd J  an d will n ot pose a n in su per able
cha llen ge to de bt  couns elors . Obvious ly, m os t  debtors whose
in come is  we ll below  rele va nt  na t ion a l med ia n  levels  wil l n ot
req uir e me an s-te st  scru tin y. For  those  rela t ive ly few whose
s ta tus is dubious, however, a  mode l per sona l compu te r p rogr am
has already been developed by Carl Felsen feld an d William  J .
Per lst ein  to conform t o the r equirem ent s of H.R. 3150.93 Us ing
th i s or  s imi la r  software,  the a t torney or  pa ra lega l  can , with in a
few m i nutes, insert the informa tion pertinent to an individual
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94. S ee Picking Up the Pieces on Bankrupt cy Reform , AM . BANKR. IN S T . J ., Dec.-
J an . 1999, at  1, 54 (notin g th at  Cha pter  13 procedu res  ar e bett er wh en t hey a r e
allowed to fo llow  flex ibl e p ri nci ple s).
deb tor , an d th e progra m will calculate eligibility for Chapt er 7.
In format ion  techn ology can  likewise be applied by th e pan el
tr ust ees and  the court s  to simplify the exam inat ion of cases
th at  pr esen t close qu est ions of me an s-te st ing.
In  light  of the a men abil it y of these tests to standard
in forma t ion  processing techn iques, it is ina ccur at e to cont end
t h a t  mea ns-t es t in g wi ll im pos e ca se -by-case over sigh t
res pons ibility  on  cour t s . The vas t  ma jority of cases  will be
un cont ested  and  ina rguab le  unde r  t h e s t andards . One may
qua rr el with  the  normat ive  cont en t of th e st an da rd s, a lth ough
as we have noted , the a r gum ent s ar e overwhelm ing for H.R.
3150’s modest m ean s-test ing. But d isagreem ent  over the
subs tance of the  st andards shou ld not  be confused  with  th eir
ad min ist ra tive  feas ibilit y.
There is a lso a d eepe r confu sion u nd er lying t h e  ge n era l
crit icism tha t  mea ns-t es t in g wi ll ove rwh elm  cour t s wit h
individual case decisions. U nd er C ha pt er 1 3 toda y, comp ris ing
about  one-third  of all ban kr up t cy filings , t he s t anda rd for
repayment  p lans  is  t he ju s t ly-cr iticized disposable income test.
T h a t t es t  a lr ea dy  pr es upp ose s individ ua l ca se  de ter min a t ion s
concern ing debt ors’ ability t o rep ay. J ud ges d ecry t he
disp osable  income test in par t  because they abhor  making
“ju dgm ent al” lifestyle d ecisions, s uch  as  whe th er t o perm it
p r ivat e school tuit ion. Par adoxically, those wh o criticize th e
complexit y of H.R. 3150 give it n o credit for simplifying cases  by
prov id ing congres siona l an swer s t o most  of the lifest yle
p rob lems th a t pla gue th e disposable income test . H.R. 3150
furn i shes objective gu idelin es for a bilit y-to-pay a nd , in s o doing,
er ect s guide post s t ha t will be  rea dily applicable to the debtors’
repayment plans.
Other s cr it icize H .R.  3150 for  removin g th e flexibilit y th at
the law now allegedly affords  to ta ilor Ch apt er 13 t o the n eeds
of in divid ua l ca ses.94 At th e sa me t ime, h owever, it  is well
known  tha t  mos t  Chap ter  13 confi rmat ions ar e rou t ine,
uncontested, an d based  solely on th e Cha pter  13 tr ust ee’s
recommenda t ion . Cha pter  13 confirma t ions  have , i n shor t ,
become st an da rd ized a ccord ing t o th e crit eria  for disposa ble
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95. S ee Henry E. Hildebran d, III, The Hid den Costs of Bankruptcy Reform , AM .
BANKR. IN S T . J ., Apr. 1998, at 16.
96. S ee Bra uch er, supra  note 12, at  14-15.
in come adopted  by each cour t. The “t ailorin g,” to t he e xten t it
exists, depen d s  n ot  so m uch on the in divid ua l debtor ’s
pred icament  as u pon th e ha ppens ta nce of th e tr ust ee and  cour t
he ha s dr awn . A modification  in Ch ap ter  13 p ract i ce  tha t
subst itut es n a t ion a l s t anda rds  (in corpor a t in g r egiona l in come
var ia t ions ) for  the  cur ren t  ba lkan ized r egime is  fa r  more
unifor m and e qu it able  than  the s t a tus q uo.
More sop his t ica ted  cr it ics  of H.R.  3150 go beyond  the
blunderbuss asser t ion  of it s com plexity to focus on t he IRS
stan dards,  contendin g t ha t  they a re u ndu ly va r ia ble , a nd on
lit iga t ion  tha t  m a y be ima gined  to t est  th e “extra ordin ar y
circumstan ces” exce pt ion  to the means t e st .95 Severa l responses
t o th is crit ique  ar e in or der . Fir st , am biguit y in a pplying t he
stan dards  will only ar ise in  a limited number  of cases. It  stands
to rea son  tha t  ambiguit y wi ll n ot  be out come det erm ina tive in
many of th ose case s s im ply be cause  of the la rge n umber  of
varia bles in t h e abilit y-to-pay equ at ion an d will t hu s r ar ely
furn i sh  g rounds for  l itiga t ion .  Second , concerns abou t
ambigui ty involve short -term  costs , not system ic increa ses  in
the difficulty a nd  expens e of ban kr up tcy a dm inis tr at ion, a s
sign ifica n t  am biguities will eventu a l ly be resolved by
au thor i ta t ive case law. Thir d, th e concept of “ex t raord ina ry
cir cum stan ces” i s not  mean t  as a  ca tch-a l l for  expenses  the
h igh -in come deb tor  cann ot  shoehorn into the IRS standa rds.
Where  compelling circumstances exist,  such as medical needs of
a  fam ily mem ber , th ere  is n o need for in dividu a l  case
determinat ions. On ly wher e a  de bt or  t r i es  to manipu la te the
definit ion of “ext raor din ary, ” an  effor t t ha t t he cour ts  sh ould
st rongly discou rage,  wil l t h is  exce pt ion  gen er a te li t iga t ion .
Some opponen ts of means-tes t ing a rgue  that  excess ive cos t s
will accrue from t he inevi t ab le  fr aud  and p rebankrup tcy
p lanning  done to evade man dated Chapt er 13 filings.96 While
th i s view has  some theore t ica l validit y, it pr oves too mu ch, for if
the cost s  of policing fra ud  wer e a d ete rr ent  to im plem ent ing
sound social policy, then  vir tua lly  eve ry gove rnmen t  de cis ion
would  be doomed, includin g the in come t ax and social he alt h
and welfare pr ograms . Indeed , it is widely underst ood that
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97. S ee H.R. 31 50, supra  note 10, § 406.
98. S ee id. § 410.
99. Pr ofess or  Marcus Cole has su ggested in conversation th at per ha p s  t h e most
likely var ian t on  th is s tr at egy w ould  be for  one  spou se t o st op wor king in  a fam ily
where both p revious ly worked . To the  exten t t his  occur re d, one wou ld ha ve to weigh
in  th e “sh ad ow” valu e of t he  st ay-a t-h ome  spous e’s domes tic produ ction in d eter min ing
the net welfare loss to society from this str ata gem. Given that a spouse who chose
to do this would almost by definition value his or her  domestic option almost as
high ly as h is or h er m ar ket  option, it  is likely t ha t t he n et loss t o society from t his
beh avi or  wou ld lik ely b e sm all . Of cou rs e, t his  st ra te gy is  no d iffer en t fr om t hos e who
“evade” ta xes by r aisin g th eir child ren  at  home  or ear nin g lar ge a mou nt s of psychic
“income.” A s a  r e sult , th e sam e ar gum ent  could be us ed even  more  powerfully t o
a t tack the income tax system and social welfare programs.
debtors’ bankru ptcy petitions and schedules are, to put it
k indly, r ife with er rors a nd u nr eliable. Under t he critics’ view,
the ent ire curr ent  ban kr upt cy system sh ould presu ma bly be
suspect .
But  a m ean s t est  th at  covers  only a b ou t  10% of filers an d
can  only be m anipula ted  a t  the m argin  wil l n ot  in crea se  fraud
to a degr ee su fficient  to un der min e th e valid ity of th e en tir e
p roject . H.R. 3150 also cont ains  provisions designed t o reduce
the wides pr ea d in ciden ce of inaccur acy in  bankruptcy  pe t it ions
by, am ong oth er t hings, r equirin g debtors t o fur nish  ta x retu rn s
and pay s tubs  wi th their pet it ion s97 and requiring attorneys to
verify claim s for ext ra ordin ar y expen ses. Th e legisla tion  als o
expresses  th e sen se of Congress t ha t Ba nk ru ptcy Rule 9011
ough t  to include the attorney’s express responsibil it y for  the
ver ifica t ion  of unsign ed  docu m e n t s, like the debtor’s schedules,
filed at  th e ba nk ru pt cy cour t .98 The  possibilit y of fra ud , in
sh ort , is n ot a  per su as ive objection t o mea ns -tes tin g.
The p rob lem of p rebankr upt cy plannin g to avoid Chapt er
13, wh ile  not  to be  dism isse d,  is  bot h  over st a ted  and n ot
ultim at ely compell ing . I t  mus t  be  kep t  in  mind tha t  under  the
cur ren t re gime these debtors would still be in Chapter  7. Thus,
b a nkrup tcy pla nn ing w ould p ut  th em  exact ly wh er e t he y ar e
today. Mean s-tes t i n g might  be ren dered ir relevan t by
bankrup tcy planning, but it  would not ma ke mat ters worse.
Th us , th is is n o ar gum en t a gain st  me an s-te st ing.
It  is a lso ar gue d t ha t d ebt ors could  evad e the  h igher -than-
average in come cr it er ion  of the t es t  by n ot  work ing or by
deliber at ely accepting lower-p a yi n g work  in ord er t o obtain
Cha pter  7 r eli ef.99 Th is  they cou ld  do,  a lt hough  it  is  not  clear
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what th e debtor would really accomplish by this tactic, as the
h igh -in come debtors covered by means-testing would ha v e to
accept a  dr amat ic decr ea se  in  in come for  th is  st r a tegy  to wor k,
and th us  would  ma ke t he ms elves w orse  off by t h is  s t rat egy.
Thu s, few debtors ar e going to find th is option desira ble.
Another  self-defea tin g st ra te gy would  have t he d ebtor
deliber at ely incur r ing unsecur ed  de bt  wh ile  pr ep ar in g for
bankrup tcy in order  not t o be able to rep ay “20% or  more” of
such  debt through a Chapt er 13 plan , as r equ i red by the  thi rd
prong of the m ean s-tes t. Again , th is is  not an ar gument against
means-tes t ing a t  a l l,  because th is t act i c i s ava il able under  the
cur ren t system wh ere t he debt or elects Chap ter  7. Moreover,
t h e same objections to Chapter 7 discharge that exist tod a y,
such  as the nondischargeability of fraudulent ly incurr ed debts
and ce r ta in  expendit ur es on luxur y goods, would n ot be affected
by th e a dopt ion of mea ns -tes tin g.
Fin ally,  a debtor could delibera tely  in cur  se cured  de bt , for
instance by buyin g a n ew car , in ord er t o inflat e mon th ly
expenses  and  have less income to satisfy the $50 test . Of
course, if the  debt or su cceeded in  th is  las t m an euver , his
collater al  would r ema in bou nd  to t he h igher  secur ed de bt in
Cha pter  7. So again, th is str at egy is implaus ible.
More gener ally, a ny of th ese d evices, su ch a s volun ta ry
unemployment  or str at egically run ning u p debts , would seem to
furn i sh  grounds for  d ismissa l of the case for “substan tial abuse”
un der  § 707(b), in add ition t o comp lain ts  aga ins t  d ischarge and
disch ar gea bilit y.
Perha ps more  t el ling,  the p red ict ions  of rampant
p rebankrup tcy pla nn ing illu st ra te  th e degr ee of abu se an d
gam esm an sh ip inher en t  in  the cu r ren t  syst em . Th is  in fer en ce
is es pe cia lly  st rong, given  tha t  in  th is  case the  st akes  a re qu it e
low; if m anipu la ted  pr ope r ly,  the d ebtor  can  ava il h im se lf of
Cha pter  7 ra th er  th an  Cha pter  13. If the critics ar e so confident
t ha t  debt ors will p lay ga mes  with  credit ors a nd  will
deliber at ely take on obligations they cannot  r epay ju s t  t o
shelt er  more  wea lth  in  a  Chapte r  7 case and to a void p ropos ing
a  Ch apt er  13  plan , wh a t  doe s t h is  sa y a bou t  m or e  high -pa yoff
str at egies such as hiding assets from creditors? U n doubt edly,
th e cries for r eform w ould not  be so vehement ,  and the need for
means-tes t ing not  so pr essin g, if ba nkrupt cy we re in  fact  the
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100. S ee Neu big et  al., supra  not e 32 , at  3; supra  text a ccompa nying note 32.
101. Thus, wh il e t h e r e may be som e eligibility challenges, t hey ar e likely to be
far  fewer t ha n som e ha ve su ggest ed. S ee Bra uch er, supra  note 12, at  11.
102. S ee I saac Ehr l ich  & Rich ar d Posn er, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Ru lemak ing, 3 J.  LEGAL ST U D. 257  (197 4).
103. S ee S. 1301, supra  note 10.
104. S ee id .
pure refu ge of th e poor an d n eedy a s it  is port ra yed by it s
defenders. They cannot have it  both ways.
There i s a l so no reason to bel ieve  tha t  admin i st r a t ive cos t s
will r i se  compared  to the cur ren t syst em. Most consum er
ban kr upt cies will plain ly fall below th e income t hr esh old an d
will be u na ffected by m ea ns -tes tin g.100 Fur t her, it will be
rela tively  easy  to dete rmine  wheth er  someone  mee ts  the
crit eria  for  a  manda ted  Chapter  13,  a lthough  in  some margina l
cases fu r the r  inqu iry  may be n ecessa ry. 101 Means-tes t ing
ident ifies object ive  ru les  tha t  wil l gu ide e lig ibi lit y for  and t he
componen t s of Cha pt er 1 3 re lief. At th e sa me t ime, it  ret ain s
focused discretion for a judge to excuse a debtor for hardship.
As compared  to the op en-en ded § 707(b) inqu iry concern ing
abilit y to pay, th ere is n o reason t o believe th a t  a dmini st r a t ive
cost s would rise un der m ean s-test ing. In sh ort, st at ut ory-based
means-tes t ing wou ld  su bs t it u te a  br igh t -lin e r u le for  the
cur ren t mur ky standa rd. In general, bright-line rules tend to
red uce ad min ist ra tive cost s r elat ive to st an da rd s a nd  increase
the pr edict ab ility of the ir  app lica t ion .102 A simila r r esu lt could
be expecte d by su bst itu tin g a m ean s-tes tin g ru le for  the  cur ren t
“subs tan t ia l abu se” sta nd ar d. In deed , th e issu es in  a  case un der
means-tes t ing a re  much  fewer  and more  sharp ly  focused  than
u nder  th e cur ren t s yst em. M ean s-tes tin g red uces u ncer ta int y
as to th e legal sta nda rd t o be applied, as well a s  the factua l
findings to be established.
The br igh t -lin e n a ture of H .R. 3150’s t est  als o ma kes  it
pr efera ble to the  Sena te’s  ve rs ion  of me an s-te st ing. 103 Und er
the Sena te’s bil l, m ea ns-t es t in g wou ld  not  be  a  pr er equis it e for
Cha pter  7 relief. Instea d , t he S en a te b ill  pu ts t he on us on
cred it ors to bring a  motion un der § 707(b) to prove “abu se”
before a  de bt or ’s case  can  be d ismisse d (a nd presu ma bly refiled
un der  Cha pter  13).104 Mos t  in divid ua l cr ed it ors w ill  la ck the
incenti ve to bring su ch an  action, as t hey will have to bear  a ll
the cost s of lit igatin g, while the ben efits of convers ion will be
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105. F o r inst an ce, “The  average ba lance on  a  C a r sons dep ar tm ent  stor e credit
ca rd for  a  cu stom er  in  ba nkrupt cy is  $7 94 .” Hearing on  S . 130 1, T he C ons um er
Ba nk ru pt cy Reform A ct Before the S ubcomm . on Adm in. Oversight and  the Cou rts of
the Senate Comm . on the Jud iciary,  105th Cong. *12 (1998) (testimony of Stanto n
Bluestone, Cha irm an , Car son P irie Scott  & Co. on beha lf of th e Na tiona l Reta il
Federa t i on ), avai lab le  in  1998 WL 115686. If recovery in a Cha pter 13 allowed
cred ito r s to collect 30% pa yout s, t h e recovery would be boosted from zero to $238.
Moreover, un der  th e Se na te  bill,  inv olun ta ry  conve rs ion would not  be a ut oma ti c. On ce
the costs of attorneys’ fees are added in, it is doubtful tha t similarly situ ated
credi tor s will find it feasible to avail themselves of the cumbersome pr ocedure p u t  in
pla ce by th e Sen at e bill. S ee id. at *11-12.
106. S ee Bra uch er, supra not e 12 , at  11 (n otin g th at  th e H ous e ve rs ion of  means -
t e s t ing “migh t  be somewha t l es s  bu rdensome” than  the  Sena te  ver s ion ).
107. S ee War ren , supra no te  7, a t 1 101  (“[L]ow e r in g  t he  bankrup tcy  fi li ng r a t e
shou ld no t b e a n e nd  in  it se lf.”).
108. S ee B rauche r , supra  note 12, at  13.
109. I d .; see also Klein , supra  note  82, at  736-37 (argu ing t ha t m ean s-test ing will
increase th e fa ilu re  ra te ).
110. S ee H.R. 31 50, supra  no te  10,  § 101 (4).
sha red  among  all creditors.105 The  st an da rd s for convers ion
un der  th e Sen at e bill a re  als o more  open -end ed, r equ irin g a
more fact-intens ive inquiry on a case-by-case basis and
reducing th e a dm inis tr at ive savings of a bright-line means test.
Thus, while t he S ena te ver sion of mea ns -test ing is p refe rable to
the s ta tus  quo, the a dmin istr at ive savings over th e sta tu s quo
will be sm aller  th an  un der  th e Hou se bill.106
Moreover , because  h igh -in come debtors will have to repay
grea t e r am ount s of th eir debts unde r  means-tes t ing , they may
be less likely to file in the first  pla ce. For t hes e complet ely
oppor tun is t ic debt ors,  red ucin g t he n umber  wh o file  ba nkrupt cy
is an  en d in  it se lf.107 Elim i n a t in g  these  cases  from the
bankrup tcy syst em w ill red uce t he n eed t o expend  judicia l  and
admin i st r a t ive cos t s  on  them.
In  a last-ditch effort at dispr oving th e pra cticability of H.R.
3150, cr i t ics  of means-tes t ing  argue tha t  Chapte r  13  doesn’t
work and  tha t  it is  ther efor e a  mis take t o force m ore d ebtors
in to Cha pter  13.108 This a rgum ent  is based on a  faulty pr emise.
Professor  Braucher , for  instance , a rgues  tha t  “making ch a p t er
13 th e only option for ma ny debt ors would mea n  a  lot  more low
per cent age  plan s . . . and a n even h igher failur e ra t e . . . th an
we alr ea dy h ave .”109 Braucher  assumes tha t  means-tes t ing
would  lead t o more low percentage pla ns bu t overlooks t he fact
t h a t  mea ns-t es t in g a pp lie s on ly t o de bt ors w ho can  rep a y a t
least 20% of their u nsecur ed, nonpr iority debts. 110  These
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111. S ee Bra uch er, supra  no t e 12, at  10 n.58 (r elying on d at a for gen era l failur e
rat es in  Ch ap te r 1 3).
112. S ee supra  not es 32 & 4 6 an d accomp an ying t ext. 
deb tor s ar e likely to have hi gh  percen tage  plans with  a  low
failur e ra te. F ur ther , t hes e well -off debt ors will r i sk  fa r  more
tha n  the or dinary Ch apt er  13  pa r t icip an t  by d efa u lt in g on  a
p lan , an d th eir income level equips th em far  bett er t o complete
it.  As  a  resu lt ,  da ta  on  the  genera l  fa i lu r e  r a te of Cha pter  13
deb tor s are not persuasive when applied to the  h igh-income
deb tor s who will be placed in Ch apt er 13 by mea ns-tes t i n g.1 1 1
Again,  the critics of means-tes t ing have fa l lacious ly  lumped the
situation of extraordinary debtors together with averages.
Sober ana lysi s demons t rates t ha t m ean s-test ing is an  idea
whose t ime has come. In de ed , t he id ea  of mea ns-t es t in g is  not
new a t  a ll, but  is condu cted e very d ay—a lbeit in consist ent ly
and un pr edicta bly—in court rooms  un der  § 707(b). Apocalypt ic
rh etor ic to the con t ra ry, t he r ea lit y of mea ns-t est ing is t ha t it
will ap ply only t o bankru ptcy filers with above median incomes,
suffi cien t  disposable income to fund a plan , the ability to repay
a  subst an tial port ion of th eir un secured debt, an d no other
overr idin g hardsh ip. Rather t han  confronting the merits of the
actual mea ns-t es t in g propos a ls  tha t  have b een  advanced,
opponen t s have chosen  to m isr epr esen t m ean s-tes tin g, implyin g
tha t  it  would nega t ive ly a ffect  a ll d eb tors,  eve n  those  wh o are
worst  off. Profes siona l s tudies  de monst ra te t ha t  a t  lea st  som e
deb tor s cou ld pay s ign ifi can t ly more  of the ir  ou t s tand ing  debt
by proceeding in Cha pter  13 ra th er t ha n in Ch apt er  7.112 Cr it ics
of thes e s tudies  have cr ea ted  a  gr ea t  de a l of smoke by
q u es t ion ing the motives and techniques of the studies’ auth ors,
bu t thes e cr it iqu es  do n ot  rebu t  the cen t ra l con clusions. Given
tha t  means-testing would crea te a t m ost a  limit ed in crea se in
the administra tive costs associated with  bankruptcy , the
benefit s of m ea ns-t es t in g clea r ly excee d t he cos t s.
III. ME A N S-TE S T IN G  AN D  T H E  CA U S E S  O F  BA N K R U P T C Y
A. Introduction
 As we h ave  a rgued , means-tes t ing is warrant ed on  gener ally
accepted pr in cip les  of fa ir nes s.  Th ose  wh o can  pa y a ll or  som e
sign ifica n t  por t ion  of their  de bt s s hould  be  requir ed  to do s o.
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113. S ee Bra dy C. Willia ms on et  al., N at iona l Ban kr . Rev. Comm ’n, Bank ruptcy:
T h e Next Tw enty Years  84 (Oct. 20, 1997) (visi ted J an.  19,  1999 )
<h tt p://1 62. 140 .22 5.1 /r ep or t/0 5a con s.p df>  [he re in aft er  NB RC R ep or t].
Means-tes t ing is not intended to be punitive; it  is a modest  t ax
on the p r ivi lege of esca ping on e’s obliga t ion s.   Th us,  the ca se  for
means-testing is compelling on its nar row merits.
More gene ra l t r ends  in  bankrup tcy  filings  lend u rgency  to
the need for m e a ns-tes tin g. In p ar ticu lar , we conte nd  in t his
Par t  t hat  incr ea sed  ban kr up tcy filings  ha ve been  fueled  by an
increase in t he n et e conomic b en e fi t s of filing a nd  by a d ecline
in  th e level of personal sh am e and s ocieta l st igma  th at
pr eviously deterred individuals fr om filin g ban kr up tcy.
Ban k r u ptcy is now too frequ ent ly a choice foster ed by
irr espon sible  spend ing  habi t s and an  unwi ll ingness  to l ive up  to
commi tmen t s. In  som e ways , m ea ns-t es t in g ca n  be  unde rst ood
as a necessary substitute for th ese traditional restraints.
Our view is oppos ed by t hose  wh o advocat e ba nk ru pt cy’s
s ta tus quo. Bankru ptcy advocates believe that  debtors ar e
overwh elmin gly hones t , down -on-their -lu ck individua ls buffeted
by forces beyond their  cont rol. One s uch  force is  tha t  of
exce ssive  credit car d debt, foisted upon consum ers  by
underhanded a nd hu gely profitable credit  card issu ers. Ot her
forces in clu de  divor ce, job  loss,  u n insu re d m edica l bills, a nd
t r aumat ic exp er ien ces , a ll of which  are a ss umed  to be beyon d
the debt or’s cont rol. Advocates  of th e sta tu s quo view the r ecent
explos ion  in  ba nkrupt cy fil in gs  as indica t ive  of econ om ic
condi t ion s tha t  r eward the  ruth le ss  pur su it  of p r ofit by ban ks
and oth er cr edit ors a nd  political d ecision s tha t  have
un der min ed the vi t a lit y of t he welfa re s t a te. I n  a  va r ia t ion  of
the cat echis m for t he  st at us  quo, t he  a uthor s  of t he  major i ty
repor t  for  the  Na t iona l  Bankrup tcy  Review Commiss ion  a rgue
tha t  th e r ap id gr owth  in t he  ban kr up tcy filing r ate ha s been
caused by increa sed levels of consu mer  debt. 113 Consum er debt
is proffered as independent of consum er  ch oice, a nd h en ce
consu me r r esp onsib ility.
These model s of t he  bankrup tcy  process  as a  haven  for
victims  sound  be t t er  in  theory  than  they  prove to be in fact .
F i rs t , as w e will s how, t he dem oniza t ion  of th e cred it  card
i ssuer s i s based on  fau lty analysis. Second, wh ile in any free
society wit h  an  advanced  market  econ omy, s ome cor e n umber  of
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114. S ee Delinquency on Consum er Loans Before H o use Comm . on Banking and
Fin. Servs. , 104th  Cong. *8-9 (1996) [her eina fter Delinquency on Consumer Loans]
( st a t ement  of La wr en ce B. Lindsey, Member, Board of Governors of the Feder al
Reser ve Syst em), avai lab le  in  1996 WL 517589.  Mr. Lindsey stated:
To the  exten t  t ha t  bankr uptcy is perceived by consumer s as an  easier
o pt ion,  the  demand for  credit ,  and par t icular ly  the wi ll ingness to  take on
high  levels of credit, is  enh an ced. With  the conse qu en ces  of ba nk ru pt cy
reduced, ind ivid ua ls, ot he r t hin gs e qu al,  ma y be m ore  willing to b orr ow
than  would ot herwise be the case. One m ay not wish to foreclose the
poss ib il it y of renewed credit a ccess to those who ha ve been forced by
un contr ollable circumsta nces to seek t he pr otection of bankr upt cy, but  it
shou ld be r ecogn ized that  undu e generosity on this score only encourages
greater  us e of t he  ba nk ru pt cy r em ed y a nd  con se qu en t ch ar ge-offs .
Id .; see also Bank ruptcy R evision Before the S ubcomm . on Comm ercial and Adm in.
Law  o f t he House Comm . on the Jud iciary, 105th Cong. *4 (1998) [hereinafter
Ba nk ru pt cy Rev ision ] (te st im ony of  Lawrence M. Ausubel, Dept. of Economics,
Un ive r s ity of Maryla nd), avai lab le  in  1998 WL 107376 ( st a tin g we h av e t o “go ba ck
a  st ep ” to loo k a t t he  cau se s of t he  ri se  in  ho us eh old d ebt ).
115. S ee Gar y S. Becke r, A T heor y of S ocial I nt eract ion s, 82 J.  P OL . E CON . 1063
(1974) (modeling social approval and disapproval as a n element  of pe rs on al  we lfa re ).
ban kr upt cies wil l be  cause d b y in volu n ta ry even t s s uch  as
illness, un employment , recessions, and  frau d, th ese events
cannot  an d do not  expla in t he u np reced ent ed gr owth  in
consumer  ban kr up tcy filings in  th e era  following the  enactment
of the 1978 Bankr uptcy Code, part icula rly during the past
decade. Thir d, t he s imp list ic equa tion  of rising d ebt  with  ris ing
bankrup tcy is  in  fact  qu es t ion -begging, a s b oth  consu m er debt
and the bankr uptcy filing rate ar e endogenous variables.114 If
disch ar ge of debts  is ea sy in  bankrupt cy, d ebtors w ill  in cur
more de bt . Con ver se ly,  if obt a i n ing ba nk ru pt cy relief is
difficult, debtors will be more reluctant t o incur debts. Thus,
bot h  personal debt levels and ban kr upt cy filings mus t be
caused by some in depend ent  varia ble.
B. Grow th  of Personal  Ba nk ru ptcy Fi lin gs
 In  our  view, t he  sur prisin g growth in p ersona l bank ru ptcies
in  recent years ha s been influenced by two factors: (1) chan ges
in  th e law an d th e ban kr upt cy system t ha t h ave increa sed the
net  econ omic benefit  of filing ba nk ru pt cy and  (2) a decline in
the per sonal shame an d social stigma t raditionally attached to
filing ban kr up tcy. Th ese t wo var iab les a re  int er re lat ed. T h u s,
the social st igma  from filing could be  includ ed as pa r t  of the
tota l econ omic “cost” of filing ba nk ru pt cy.115 In deed , it is
pr obable  t ha t continu ing sha me a nd st igma r estr ained
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116. S ee People Behind Ban kruptcy N um bers: Preliminary R esults of Chapter 13
S tudy in Progress Before the S ubcomm . on Adm in. Overs igh t  and  the Cour t s o f t he
Senate Comm . on the Jud iciary, 105th Cong. *6 (1998) (tes t imony of  Tahi ra  K. Hi ra ,
pr ofes sor ), available in  1998 WL 899299 3 (report ing r esu lts  of survey,  demons t r a t ing
tha t  bankr uptcy filers indicate that benefits of filing bankr uptcy  a r e “n o more phone
calls  from c re dit or s” a nd  in cre as in g fa mi ly s olid ar it y).  
117. Am erica  Goes Bust , EC O N O M I S T, Ju ly 4, 1998, at 78.
118. F . H. Buck ley & Ma rga ret  F. Br inig, Th e Bankru ptcy Puzzle , 27 J.  LE G AL
bankrup tcy filings for m an y year s des pit e th e pu rely  econ omic
bene fi t s of filing.  A decline in the st igma atta ched to
bankrup tcy filers will th ere fore r educe  the tota l  cos t  of fi ling
ba nk ru pt cy. By the sam e token , mak ing bankrup tcy  more
economically a t t r act ive  wi ll  t end  to increase the nu mber  of
ind ividua ls wh o file . As more ind ividu als  file ban kr up tcy, t ha t
opt ion  wil l t en d t o become m ore s ocia lly  accepta ble, ther eby
reducing th e st igma  at ta ched  to it . Increa se d a dver t is in g of
bankrup tcy services and  th e pr evalen ce of celebrit ies filing
bankrup tcy redu ce bot h  the s t igm a of filin g a nd t he “se arch”
cost s of lear nin g about t he ba nk ru ptcy option. Despite th e
overla p between  th ese var iables, however, it  is  use ful to discuss
th em  sep ar at ely. 
1. Econom ic benefi ts  of ban kru pt cy
 The decision wh eth er t o file ban kr up tcy is in  pa rt  a fu nct ion
of ban kr up tcy’s r ela tive  costs a nd  ben efits . Th e  t angible
benefi t s of filin g ba nkrupt cy a re obviou s: a n  opp or tun i ty  to
disch ar ge deb t s  and  to get  a  “fresh s ta r t ” a t  th e end  of the
process. The au tom a t ic s t ay s tops  credi tor s  cold,  a llowing
deb tor s to ret a in  house s,  car s,  and ot her  pr ope r ty for  add it iona l
periods of time. Th ere  ar e int an gible ben efit s a s w ell , such  as
pu t t ing an  end  to “annoy ing” phone  ca l ls  by  credi tor s s eek ing to
re cover a sse ts  an d m oney. 116
The econ om ic a nd oth er  ben efits  of filing ba nk ru pt cy ar e
reflected in the  h igh r a t e s of bankrup tcy  in  the  Un i ted S tat es
as compa red  to the r es t  of the wor ld . As  T h e Econom ist
magazine observed, “America’s pers onal-bank rupt cy laws are
s t r ik ing ly kinder to distressed borrowers than  those of most
other de velope d e conom ies.”117 These differences “in part
exp la in [] why filing rates ar e high er  in  the United  S ta tes  than
in  Canada , where legal barriers to debtor opportu nism a re  more
exa ctin g an d wh er e fres h-st ar t p olicies ar e wea ker .”118
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ST U D. 187,  192 (1 998); see also F.H . Buck ley, The Am erican Fresh S tart , 4 S. CAL .
IN T E R D I S C . L.J . 67 (1 995 ).
119. S ee White,  supra not e 2, at  45; S cott  Fa y et  al. , Th e Ba nk ru pt cy Deci sion :
Does Stig ma Matt er? (Jan . 1998) (unpublished manuscript,  on file with auth ors and
the Depa rt men t of Econom ics, Un ivers ity of Michiga n). But see Buckley & Br inig,
supra  note  118, at  204-05 (finding t h a t  exempt ion levels wer e not  rela ted t o filing
rates); Dian e Ellis , Th e In flu ence of  Legal Factors on  Personal B ank rupt cy Filings ,
BA N K TRENDS  (Fede ra l Deposit  Ins . Corp., Wa shin gton , D.C. ), Feb. 199 8, at  9 (finding
l a ck of corr ela tion  bet wee n s ta te  hom est ea d ex em pt ion r at es a nd  st at e pe rs ona l
ba nk ru pt cy rates).
120. Thus, th ey estima te,  “a  $1,000 increase in  the f inancia l benef it  o f f il ing  fo r
ba nk ru pt cy is associated with 31,000 additional bankru ptcy filings per ye ar .” S ee Fay
et  al., supra  not e 11 9, a t 2 3. An  incr ea se of $ 1,00 0 in  th e ba nk ru pt cy exe mp tion  level
would  res ult  in a n est ima ted 5 ,000 add itiona l ba n k r u p t cy filings ea ch yea r. See id.
a t  24. They also estim ate t hat  the N BRC’s  r ecommendat ion for a u niform federal
level of exempt ions would  lead t o an over all increa se in  ba nk ru pt cy filin gs of
appr oximat ely 89,000 pe r yea r. See id.
121. S ee Michelle  J . Whit e, Why Don’t  More Household s File for Bank ruptcy?, 14
J.L.  E CON . & ORG . 205, 205 (199 8).
122. S ee id . a t  214. Ca sel aw  pla ces s ome  out er  lim its  on b an kr up tcy e xem pt ion
plan nin g, such as den ying the debtor’s dischar ge, but such limits a re m inor a nd ea sily
evaded. S ee Todd J. Zywicki, Rewrite the Bank ruptcy Laws, N ot the Scriptures:
Protecting a Bankruptcy Debtor’s Right to Tithe, 1998 WIS . L. RE V. 1223, 1264 n.170.
Another  sign ifica n t  benefit  of ba nkrupt cy is t ha t  deb tor s
may ret a in  exe mpt  pr ope r ty fr ee  of most  creditors’ claims. In
two differen t st udies, economist Michelle White ha s fou nd  tha t
bankrup tcy filing ra tes  are, to some degree, positively related to
the gen er osi ty of exem pt ion s. 119 In  th e m ost r ecent  st ud y,
Hurs t , Fay , and  Whi te confi rm tha t  the financia l bene fi t  of
filing ban kr up tcy is st ron gly corr elat ed wit h a n in crea se in  th e
nu mber  of people s eekin g ba nkrupt cy protect ion .1 2 0 White also
shows th at  at  least  15% of Am er ica n h ouseh olds would  ben efit
fina ncia lly from fi li ng bankrup tcy .1 2 1  Whe n  the  abi li ty to p lan
st ra tegica lly for  ba nk ru pt cy is factor ed in , inclu din g th e
conver sion  of nonexempt  to exe mpt  ass et s or  loa ding u p on
d ischa rgeable  un secu re d de bt  an d bu ying exe mp t a sse ts , th e
nu mber  of househ olds t h a t  would ben efit from  filing
bankrup tcy exceed s 20%.122 Not  su rpr is in gly, t he ben efit s for
filing bankru ptcy are largest for th ose with  the g rea t es t amount
of income and wea lth, a s th ey can  make gr ea ter  use  of gen er ous
exemption laws.
But  t here  ar e als o cost s a ssociat ed wit h p ur su ing
bankrup tcy re lief. Fir st , a  debtor mu st  l ea rn  tha t  bankrup tcy  is
a  viable opt ion. In  economics, th is concept  i s r e fe r red  to as
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123. S ee George  J . Stigle r, Th e Econ om ics of I nf orm ati on , 69 J.  P OL . E CON . 213
(196 1).
124. S ee Terr y Calva ni et  al., Attorney Advertising and Competition at the Bar,
41 VA N D. L. RE V. 761  (198 8).
125. A st ud y by Vis a r epor ts  th at  19% of ba nk ru pt cy filer s le ar ne d a bou t
ba nk ru pt cy th rou gh a dver tise men ts. S ee Vern M cKinley, Ballooning Ban kruptcies:
I s su ing Blame for the Explosive Growth, REGULATION , Fall 1997, at 33, 38.
126. SMR Research “did a brief study of telephone book ads an d foun d tha t cities
with  high  ban kr upt cy filing rat es us ua lly do have  high er leve ls of lawyer a dvert ising
than  cities w ith  low filings r at es.” See The Rise in Personal Bankrup tcy : Causes and
Im pa ct Bef ore t h e S u bcom m . on C om m ercia l an d A dm in . La w of  th e Hou se Com m .
on  the Ju diciary, 105th Cong. *18-19 (1998) [hereina fter Rise in Person a l  B an k ruptcy]
( te s t imony of Stua rt A. Feldstein, Pr esident of SMR Resea rch ), avai lab le  in  1998 WL
105080. Of course, it is difficult to determin e wheth er th ese  lawyer s  a re r e sponding
to ext an t d em an d for  at tor ne y se rv ices  for b an kr up tcy , cr ea t i n g dem an d for
ba nk ru pt cy filin gs t hr ough  ad ver tis ing , or b oth .
127. S ee McKinley, supra  note 125, at 38 (discussing a survey conducted by Visa
finding  th at  “66% of fil er s fou nd  th e ba nk ru pt cy pr oces s t o be  an  ea sy o ne ”).
128. S ee id . (report ing a n April 19 97 Visa st udy). As Fa y, Hu rst , an d Whit e
observe, even where t here is no direct commun ication betw e en  filers and non-filers,
t he “herdin g” lit er at ur e in  econ omi cs “sugges t s  t ha t  in fo rma t ion  flows  from ea r ly f il er s
could cau se n on-file rs  to r evis e t he ir  est im at es of t he  cost s of bankruptcy downward,
so th at  th ey become  mor e likely  to file.” Fay e t a l., supra  no te 119, at n .13 (citing
Abhijit  Ban erjee , A S im ple M odel  of H erd  Beh avi or, 107 Q.J . E CON . 797  (199 2)).
“search” costs.123 Severa l  changes in the American landscape
s u ggest tha t  the s ea rch  cost s of lea rn in g a bou t  the bankrupt cy
opt ion  ar e significan tly lower tha n in p revious era s. The 1980s
saw a  d rama t ic g rowth  in  a t torney a dver t is in g, which  has
redu ced the informa tion and sea rch  cos t s  for  deb tors  and
encoura ged competition among att orneys.124 Daytim e and lat e-
nigh t  television, as well as news pa per s, m aga zine s, a nd
tele ph one books a re now awa sh  i n  bankruptcy  adver t i sements
by lawyers.125 This  pr olifera tion  of att orn ey ad ver tis ing h as
accompa nied  increasin g  bankr uptcy filing rates. 126 Moreover ,
the sheer num ber of consumer bankr upt cies ha s increa sed
pu blic awareness  tha t ban kr up tcy is  an  ava ilable a nd  rela tively
easy process.127 This is th e “wat er cooler” effect: people learn
about  bank ru ptcy from friends a nd fam ily who h a ve filed
bankrup tcy and report th at it  was cheap , easy , and  pu t  an end
to cred itor s’ collection  efforts. Indeed, a  Vi sa  s tudy  found  tha t  a
conside r a ble percent age of ban kr upt cy filers sa id th at  if they
had known  how ea sy t he b an kr up tcy pr ocess wa s, t hey w ould
have d on e  it  much  soone r .128 “A Ga llup pol l found  tha t  51
percen t of filers h ad a  close friend or  r e la t ive who filed
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129. McKinley,  supra note 125, at  38.
130. Id .; see also Bankrup tcy  Law Revision  Before the Subcomm. on Comm ercial
and Ad m in . L aw  of th e House Com m . on the J udiciary, 105th Cong. *8 (1998)
[hereinafter  Bankru ptcy  La w R evis ion ] (testim ony of Mallory B. Duncan, Vice-
Pres iden t , Genera l  Counsel of Nat iona l Reta il Fed era tion ), avai lab le  in  1998 WL
8993460 (“[O]ne recent  study found a five hundr ed percent  increase in  less tha n two
yea r s in t he  nu mb er  of filer s wh o sa y th ey fir st  he ar d a bou t t he  ide a of f ilin g from
a frien d or r elat ive.”). 
131. S ee J oshu a Wolf Sh enk , Ba nk ru pt  Poli cy, NE W REPUBLIC , May 18 , 1998 , a t
16 (noting tha t Toni Bra xton, Kim Basin ger, Bur t Reynolds, an d M.C. Ha mm er h ave
all  filed ban kr upt cy ther eby bein g able t o “fend off creditors  while cont inu ing t o live
in  lu xu ry ”).
132. Id . (no t ing  tha t  Brax ton ’s  two a lbums have earned $170  mi ll ion  in  sa les  and
tha t  sh e ow ns  “a ba by g ra nd  pia no , a  Po rs che , a nd  a L exu s”).
133. S ee, e.g., J A M E S P . CA H E R  & J O H N  M. CA H E R, DEBT F R E E ! YOUR GUIDE TO
P ERS ONAL  BANKRUPTCY WITHOUT SH A M E  (1996). 
ba nk ru pt cy.”1 29 A “Visa sur vey found t ha t 45 per cent of filers
l ea rned abou t  bankrup tcy  from fr i ends  or  fami ly .”130
The de clin in g sea rch  cost  is  rein forced  by t he n otor iet y of
politicians, en ter ta iners , and  other  celebr itie s wh o ha ve
recen tly  filed ba nk ru pt cy.131 As performer Toni Braxton told a
rep ort er a fter  her  filing in J an ua ry  1998, “I’m gonna  go ou t  and
en joy mys elf . . . .”132 Mos t  p riva t e compan ies have to pay
celebrities t o endor se the ir  p roduct s in  adver t isem en ts; t he ease
with  wh ich  Braxton  and  othe r s ha ve sailed th rough  bankrup tcy
is equivalent  to free advert ising for t he ba nk ru ptcy system .
In  th e pa st , a compelling dis incen tive t o file ba nk ru pt cy lay
in  th e un ava ilabili t y  of credit for th ose with an impaired credit
ra t ing. Bankru ptcy was an a lmost i nsu rmoun tab le  hu rdle to r e -
es tabl ish ing one’s cred it. Th e disin cent ive to bankru ptcy has,
however, sign ifica n t ly d ecli ned  in  recen t  yea rs d ue t o the
flourish ing of the “sub-pr ime” lend ing marke t  and the
willingness of some len der s t o look fa vora bly on t hose  wh o ha ve
wiped the slate clean of most other obligations thr ough
ba nk ru pt cy. No doubt th e pr ospect of paying high post-
bankrup tcy r a t e s for  credit  r ema ins  a cost of filing, but  it is
ma rk edly lower t ha n before.
The la rge n umber  of bank ru ptcy filings ha s engen dered
cer ta in  econ omies  of scale wh ich ha ve redu ced the out -of-pocket
cost s of filin g ba nkrupt cy. Thus,  “do-it -you rself” bankrup tcy
book s ha ve become a  sta ple of bookst ores an d even gr ocery
s t or e check-out  lines.133 S imi la r ly , t he  crea t ion  of bankrup tcy
“mills ” has  redu ced the costs for at torneys wh o represent
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134. S ee J ean  Bra uch er, Law yers an d Con sum er Ban kru ptcy: One Cod e, Man y
Cu ltu res , 67 AM . BANKR. L.J . 501  (199 3).
135. Thus, in t he S ulliva n, Wes tbr ook, an d  W a rren s tudy, only 4% of 1981
debto r s wer e not  rep res ent ed by a tt orn eys. S ee TERE SA A. SULLIVA N  ET AL ., AS  WE
F ORG IVE  OUR DEBTORS  23 (1989). By 1991-1992, however, paralegals in  one Ca lifornia
dis tr ict  prep ar ed 14% of the cons um er filings. S ee Sus an  Block-Lieb, A Com par ison
of Pro B ono Representation Programs for Consum er Debtors, 2 AM . BANKR. IN S T . L.
RE V. 37, 40 (1994); Geraldin e Mu nd, Paralegals: Th e Good, Th e Bad, and  the Ugly ,
2 AM . BANKR. IN S T . L. RE V. 337, 340-41 (1994). The 1994 amendmen ts to th e Code
att empted  to  crack-down  on  the  p repa ra t ion  of bankrupt cy pe t it i ons  by pa ra lega l s and
o ther  non-lawyers.
136. A Visa study found tha t about 24% of respondent s lea rn ed a bou t b an kr up tcy
direct ly f rom an  at to rney.  S ee McKinley , supra  note 125, at  38.
137. S ee Ian  Domowit z & Thom as L . Eovald i, T he Im pa ct of t he B an kr up tcy
R eform  Act  of 19 78 on  Con su m er B an kr up tcy , 36 J.L. & E CON . 803  (199 3).
138. S ee Dian ne E llis, Th e Effect of Con su m er In teres t R ate D eregu lat ion  on
Credit Card Volum es, Charge-Offs, and th e Personal Bankru ptcy Rate, BA N K TRENDS
(Federa l Deposit Ins. Corp., Wash ington, D.C.), Mar. 1998, at 1.
139. S ee William  J . Boyes & Roger  L. Fa ith , S om e Ef fects  of th e Ba nk ru pt cy
R eform  Act of 1978, 29 J.L.  &  E C ON . 139 (1986); Richard  L. Pet ers on & Kiyomi Aoki,
Bankruptcy Filings Before and After Implementation of the Bankruptcy Reform Law ,
36 J . E CON . &  BU S . 95 (1984); Lawr ence S hep her d, Personal Failures and the
Ba nk ru pt cy R eform Act of 1978, 27 J.L. & E CON . 419  (198 4); Wil lia m T . Vu kow ich ,
Reforming the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197 8: An  Al ter na tiv e Ap proa ch , 71 GE O . L.J .
1129, 1129 (1983). Other studies  failed to detect a significant increa se in filing rat es
as a r esu lt of th e 1978 Cod e. S ee Ja gdeep S. Bha nda ri & La wre nce A. Weiss , The
Increas ing Ba nk ru pt cy Fi lin g R at e: An His torical Analysis , 67 AM . BANKR. L.J . 1
(1993 ); Domowit z & Eova ldi, supra  not e 13 7. F or a  cri ti cism  of th e s ta ti st ica l m et hod s
used  in t hes e lat ter  two st udie s, see  Buck ley & Br inig, supra  n o te 118, at 194 n.17.
Desp it e the pr oblems with the st atistical met hods used  i n  t hese l a t t er  s tud ie s , t he
repor t  of the N ational Ban kru ptcy Review Commission referre d on ly  to the  la t t e r
studies  wh ich  sh owed  no cor re la ti on b et wee n l ega l ch an ge s  a nd in cre as ed b an kr up tcy
rat es an d m ad e n o re fer en ce a t a ll t o th e for me r g rou p of stu dies. S ee NBRC Repor t ,
supra  not e 113, a t 87 n n.140 , 141. 
140. S ee She phe rd, supra  note 139, at  437.
deb tor s in  h igh-volume, repetitive cases.134 Using teams of
pa ra legals  and secretaries, these att orneys represent t housands
of deb tor s  per  ye a r ,1 3 5  th eoret ically, at  lower cost t ha n in
previous eras. 136
Fin ally,  the  passage of the  Bankru p t cy  Code in 1978
sign ificant ly r educed the  cos t s137 an d in crea sed t he b ene fits 138
t o consum ers of filing bankru ptcy. Thus, it  is not sur p r ising
tha t  several researchers have found th at t he  en a ct ment  of the
1978 Code sign ificant ly incre as ed consu mer  ban kr up tcy filing
rat es.139 Shepherd’s s t u dy , for  instance , concluded tha t  the
enactment of th e 1978 Code increased ind ividual ban kr upt cies
by appr oxima tely 180,000 per year .140
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141. S ee, e.g., RI D LE Y, supra no te  14,  at  69-7 0. Inde ed, exper imen ta l psychology
has demonstrated th at in a face-to-face setting, humans h a v e  a  r emarkable ab il it y  t o
distin gu ish those who are likely to keep th eir promises from th ose who are less
tr ust worth y. S ee generally ROBERT  H. F R A N K, P A S S I O N S  WI T H I N  REASON : TH E
STRATEGIC  RO L E  O F E MOTI O N S (198 8).  Sim ila rl y, st ud ies  ha ve s how n t ha t p eopl e fr om
sma ll t owns ar e both  more  tr ust ing a nd m ore t ru stwor th y th an  th ose from la rge
cities. S ee RI D LE Y, supra  not e 14, a t  70. Lar ge cities a re ch ar acter ized by a h igh
degree of anonymit y, where repea t  d e a li n gs with people are infrequen t. In sm aller
towns, by contr ast, both formal a nd informal repea t dealings ar e far more frequen t.
Not only  will y ou s ee a  bu sin ess  as socia te  du ri ng  wor k h our s, bu t you  wil l a lso  ofte n
see him at  the grocery store or at  the b a s eb a ll  ga m e. This discipline of repeat
dealin gs tends t o lead to a higher degree o f promise-keeping than  the  mere  lega l
sanct ions th at  police  beh avi or in  lar ge, a non ym ous ci tie s. I nd eed , hu ge a mou nt s of
our  bra in capa city ar e dedicat ed to m ain ta inin g recipr ocity “scores ,” i.e., rem embe rin g
who ha s pr oven t ru stin g an d tr ust wort hy in  th e pa st, so tha t  you  know who you  can
trust  to r eciproca te in  th e fut ur e. S ee id. at 69-70.
142. S ee Eliza beth  Hoffma n et  al., Beh avi oral  Fou nd ati ons  of R ecipr oci ty:
Experimental Econ om i cs  a n d Evolu tionar y Psychology , 36 ECON . INQUIRY 335, 350
(199 8).  
Dur ing the  pas t  twen ty yea rs , an d es pecia lly du rin g th e
pas t decade, t her e is rea son to believe that  th e benefits of filing
have a t  l eas t  r emained  cons tan t  and  may even  have risen  as
more pe ople becom e a wa re of h ow t o pla n  st ra tegi ca lly  for
ba nk ru pt cy. I n  tu rn , t he economic cost s of lea rn in g a bou t  and
filing for  bankruptcy  and ob ta in ing pos t -bankruptcy  credi t  have
declined significan tly. These factors h ave fa v ored in creased
filings.
2. T he d ecline of ban kr up tcy sh am e and  stigm a
 Bankrup tcy r e pr e se n t s a  r epudiation of one’s promises, a
de cis ion  not t o bestow a reciprocal benefi t  on someone  who has
given you  som et h in g of va lu e.  As a  r e su lt ,  fi li ng bankrup tcy
t rad it iona l ly ha s been  tr eat ed a s a  socially s hamefu l a ct .
P romise -keep ing and an  in s t inct  for  fa i rness  and r eciproci ty a re
deeply em bedd ed  in  our  na tures  and u nde r lie  our  socia l
str uctu re. 141 I t  is  not  su rpr i sing tha t  most people feel grea t
persona l sha me from  a failure to keep their promises. It  is also
not  surprising that  society punishes  a n d s t igmat izes  an
ind ividua l’s failure t o keep h is promises. P ersona l sha me a nd
social stigma  go hand-in-ha nd. Sh am e is th e inter na l,
ps ych ologica l compass  that  forces  one to keep his word ; s t igma
is t he e xter na l, social constr ain t t ha t r einforces t his .142
Shame and s t igm a ass ocia ted  wit h  filing ba nkrupt cy
un que st iona bly remain  a  potent  force  r es t r a in ing  bankrup tcy
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143. S ee Whit e, supra  note 2, at  51-52.
144. S ee B u ckley & Br inig, supra  not e 11 8, a t 1 94 n .16 . (“[D]ebt ors  do n ot e xt ra ct
the ma xim um  econ omic a dvan ta ge from  Cha per  7’s fres h st ar t.”); Fay et  al., supra
no te 119 , a t 2 8 (di scu ss in g t he  effe cts  of st igm a on  th e d ecis ion  to fi le b an kr up tcy ).
145. Jones  & Shepa rd,  supra note 9, at pt. II.
146. S ee supra  no t es  2 -3  and accompany ing  t ex t .
147. Divor ce and ban kr upt cy ar e als o direct ly link ed t o one a not her . S ee infra
no te 264 a nd a ccompan ying t ext. 
148. Daniel  Dun aief, ‘Ea sy’ US  Ba nk ru pt cy A tt ack ed ,  S. CHIN A MORNING P O S T,
May 31, 1998, at 10. Indeed, just a s we have seen s er ial marriages and divorces,
se r ia l ban kr upt cy filers h ave be come m ore comm on. S ee i d . (citing stu dy of Chapt er
13 tr ust ees r eport ing t ha t t he pe rcen ta ge of debtors  with  mu ltiple filin gs was as  high
as 23%); see also McKinley, supra  no t e 125 , a t  38 ( repor t ing r esults of a Visa study
tha t  27% o f th ose  re sp on din g wou ld co ns ide r fi lin g a ga in ).
149. S ee Buckley & Br inig,  supra  note 118, at  200-06.
oppor tunism. As  noted  above,  a  la rge percen tage  of the
popu lat ion would be nefit  fina ncia lly from filin g ban kr up tcy,
espe cially wit h  a  rela t ive ly s mall a mount  of pr eb a n krup tcy
p lann ing.1 4 3 Although a far smaller percenta ge actua lly does
so,1 4 4 the impact of “defining bankr uptcy deviancy downward”
has become more pronounced.
The decline in  sh am e an d st igma  is r eflected in  th e
obs er va t ion  tha t  du r ing the  1950s ther e were two things that
“‘people never did: divor ce an d ba nk ru pt cy.’”145 Ju s t  a s  divorce
ra tes  ha ve risen s ince t he 1950s, bank ru ptcy ra tes h ave risen
as well.146 Of cou rse , changes  in th e law ma de both divorce and
bankr u p t cy easi er .147 But  an other  overlapping caus e ha s been
th e declin e in  the s hame a nd s t igm a ass ocia ted  wit h  divor ce
and bankrup tcy. As th ese ch oices ha ve become m ore socially
acceptable, r a tes of d ivorce  and bankrup tcy  have  both
increased, and  even m ult iple filings h ave p rolifera ted . Six-tim e
bankrup tcy filer F itzgerald  Giscombe of Brooklyn pu t it  well
when  he confes sed , “It  gets  ea sier  ea ch t ime . . . . The
psych ological p ar t of it h as  cha nge d.”148
While  it  is  di fficu lt  to mea su re d ir ect ly h ow t he d ecli ne of
shame and st igma  a re a ss ocia ted  wit h  the r ise of bankrupt cy
filings, it  is possible to do so indirectly. Thu s, a r ecent st udy by
Mar garet  Br inig and Frank Buckley suggests tha t both shame
and stigma  ar e significan t var iables in t he ba nk ru ptcy ra te,
and tha t  their  de clin e h as con t r ibu ted  sign ifica n t ly t o the
increase in bankru ptcies.149 An independent stu dy by  Fay,
Hurs t , an d White s imilar ly concludes tha t  bankrup tcy  st i gma is
a  high ly significan t va ria ble in th e decision w het her  to file
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150. S ee Fa y et a l., supra  note 119, at  19-20.
151. Id . at  28. This  conclusion is cons isten t wit h t hos e of oth er s tu dies. S ee VI S A,
U.S.A.,  IN C ., CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY: CAUSES AND IMPLICAT I O N S 13, 19 (1996). Given
tha t  Brinig and Buckley’s research was published some time ago, it  is curious that
Warr en  calls Visa’s s t ud y “[t]he  ma jor e ffort  to d eve lop m acr oecon omi c evid en ce of
som e less-m ent ioned ca use s of ban kr upt cy.” Warr en, supra  note 7, at  1085.
152. S ee generally David  B. Gross & Nicholas S. Souleles, Explaining the Increase
in  Bank rup tcy and Delinqu ency: Stigma vers us Risk-Composition 16 (Aug. 21, 1998)
(unpublished  manuscr ipt ,  on  fi le  w ith  au thor s).  Accor di ng t o Gros s and S ou le le s, “A
credit  card  holde r  in 1997 was 4 percentage points more likely to default, and 1
percen ta ge poin t m ore  lik ely t o de cla re  ba nk ru pt cy, t ha n a  car dh olde r w it h i den ti cal
risk characteristics in 1995. These magnitu des are app ro xim at ely  as  la rg e a s if t he
en t ir e population of credit card holder s  h ad become one sta ndar d deviation riskier
between  1995 a nd 1 997, a s me asu red  by ris k scor es.” Id .
153. S ee B a nk r up tcy  L aw  R evision , supra not e 13 0, a t *5  (not ing  th at  for m an y
re t a il er s “more than  40% of  the  bankrup tcy petit ions received are from customer s
(often long-sta ndin g) who ar e not  ser iously deli n q u e nt ”); Append ix to NBRC Dis sen t
Report  (visited  J an . 19, 1999) <h tt p://162.140.225.1 /repor t/24comm vi08.ht ml>
( rep roducing lett ers  from cred it u nions  an d oth er cr editor s not ing in cr ease  in
ba nk ru pt cy filin gs b y n on de lin qu en t b or ro we rs ).
154. S ee Kim Cla rk , Why So Many Americans Are Going Bankrupt , F O R T U N E,
Aug. 4, 1997, a t 24-25. 
155. S ee id .
bankrup tcy150 an d t ha t “social disapprova l of bankruptcy  has
been fallin g over t ime .”151 Research by David B. Gros s  a nd
Nicholas S. Soulele s h as  corrobora ted  th e findin g  t h a t the
decline  in t he const ra in t s of s ocia l s t igm a exp la in s m ost  of th e
increase in  cred it  card d efa ults  and  consumer  bankrup tcy
filings.152
Casua l emp iricism  rein forces th e find ings of these studies.
For  in st ance, n onde lin qu en t  bor rowers a re fil in g ba nkrupt cy a t
incr eas ing rat es.153 Th e in crea sing n umbers of t hese “sur prise”
ban kr upt cies suggest s th at  ban kr upt cy more an d  m or e is
looked  a t  a s  an  op t ion  of “firs t,” rat her t han  “last” resort. If
l a rge numbers of d ebtors a ctua lly  felt  sh ame fr om the d ecis ion
to file ban kr upt cy, one would expect them  to at  least  consider
t ry ing to work  out  a r epa ymen t a gree men t be fore filing
ban kr upt cy. The evidence increas ingly suggests t he opposite.
In  som e p la ces , su ch as M em ph is , t he s en se  of sh ame has
a l l but disappeared, leading to astonish in gly h igh  ra tes  of
persona l ban kr up tcy.154 In 1996, 4.3% of Memphis families filed
bankru ptcy, a lm ost  1 in  23, ea rn in g Me mph is  the s obr iqu et  of
the “bankrup tcy  cap it a l of Amer ica.”1 5 5  According t o a  Fortune
magazin e ar ticle, t her e is a  “cult ur e of bank ru pt cy” in
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156. Id . at 25.
157. Id .
158. Id .
159. Id .
Memphis, and bankrup tcy is “a wa y of life.”156 As  the magazine
notes, “Because so many people have l ived  th rough  bankrup tcy ,
th ere’s a  s t rong  in for m al su ppor t n etw ork for a nyone  in
fina ncia l trouble. Friends a nd n eighbors t ell each other
‘bankrup tcy works,’ says David Mon ypeny, Jer ry Lee Lewis’
[who als o filed ban kr up tcy] ma na ger .”157 Oth er in dicia of an
act ive bankrup tcy cultur e are prominent. The article continues,
“Ther e’s a l so p len ty of p rofessiona l suppor t  for  bankruptcy : The
Mem ph is Yellow Pages featu res m ore th an  a dozen la r ge
lawyers’ ad s offering t o wipe out deb t s  for  no down  paymen t ; a
Honda dea ler  (it s s loga n: ‘The ba nk ru ptcy specialists’) run s TV
comm ercials  promis in g t o se ll you  a  car  no mat ter  wh a t  you r
cred it h ist ory.”158
In  this postbankrupt cy apocalyptic world, trust ha s all bu t
disap pear ed in rou t ine  a rms’ lengt h  t r ansact ions  tha t  go
un noticed elsewher e. Consider  Fortune’s  descr ipt ion  of
ever yda y finan cial life in Memph is: “It’s alm ost impossible to
cash checks in Memp his. Used -car  dealer s char ge th eir
wholes ale  cos t  a s  a  down paym e n t . And lender s ar e either
t igh ten ing or giving up. First En t e r pr ise F in ancia l Gr oup,  for
inst an ce, an Illinois-based sub-pr ime len der , closed it s
Memphis opera t ions  in  May.”159 When the informa l norms of
shame and stigma break  down, the consequences for everyday
econ omic a ct ivi ty a re s ign ifica n t .
As de picted  by t he exper ien ce of celebr ities , who live a s well
after  ban kr up tcy a s before  th ey filed, ba n krup tcy  is
incr eas ingly seen as a big “game,” with the losers being those
who live wit h in  their  mea ns,  wh ile  the bankrupt s p ursu e m ore
int ere st ing and carefree lives. Examples abound. Compare  the
s itua t ions of a  b rother  and a  s is t e r  in  a fa mily we know who
bot h  got ma rr ied a nd  ha d sim ilar  fa m ily incomes. Th e broth er
lived in  a  mode st  house , t ook  m odest  vacat ions, se nt  his
children  to public schools an d th en pu blic un iversities, beca u se
tha t  was a ll they could afford. At th e sam e time, t he sist er
bough t  a lar ge house in a  wealth y north east ern  subu rb, t ook
ext ravagan t  vaca t ions , sen t  he r children  to pr ivat e high  schools
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160. Lynn  M. LoPu cki, Com m on S ens e Con su m er B an kr up tcy , 71 AM . BANKR. L.J .
461, 464  (199 7).
161. Jones  & She par d, supra  note 9, at pt. II.
162. Michelle  White has provided a rg um en ts  th at  exp la in  pa rt  of th e di ver gen ce
and college, fina ncin g everyt hin g th rou gh h eavy bor rowin g.
Toward  th e en d of th is pr ocess t he  sist er  filed ba nk ru pt cy an d
walked  away from it a ll. For her , borr owing was simply a way
to live a lifes tyle  tha t  sh e r ea lly  could  not  a fford.  Ba nkrupt cy
provided a painless way to mainta in that  lifestyle. Needless to
say, th e broth er wonder s whet her  he did th e right  th ing by
living within his mean s and  depr iving h ims elf an d h is fam ily of
th e benefits capt ur ed by his sist er.
Pr ofessor LoPucki colorfully sums u p th e problem:
Consum er  b a n k r u p t c y c on t r a d i ct s  t h e  m o r a li t y of Aesop ’s fab le
[of t h e  g r a s sh o p p er  a n d  t h e  a n t ].  Today’s  an t s  ea t  bean s  a t
h om e , d o n’t  b u y  t he  k ids  new  snea kers ,  an d  don’t  t r y  to  buy
t h e new h ouse  un t i l  t hey  have  s t a b le  jobs  and  down  p aym en t s .
They  h a n g  o n t o t h e jobs,  even w hen  th e going gets  t ough ,
p a r t i cu l a r ly  i f t h e  j o b s  co m e  w i t h  h e a l t h  i n s u r a n c e .  Th e
g r a ss h op p e r s eat  a t  th e pizza pa r lor  on F rida y n ig h t a n d  b u y
t h e new sn eake r s  and  the  h ouses .  They  qu i t  t he i r  j obs  when
t h e goin g ge ts  tou gh . Th e fa llou t la n ds  on  th eir  cr ed i t  ca rds .
When  w i n t e r  co m e s , t h e y  d i sc h a r g e  t h e  cr e d i t  ca r d  d e b t  in
b a n k ru p tcy . The  an t  p l ayed  by  the  r u l e s ,  t he  g ra s sh opper
d idn ’t .  In  the  en d ,  consum er  ban kru p tcy  mad e  them  equa l s .160
Is ther e a ny won de r  tha t  the n ext  t im e a round t he a n t  (or  the
an t ’s childr en) will  choose  to fol low the pa th  of t he  gra s shopper?
Of cour se , some of th i s r educt ion  in  shame and s t igma was
an  in ten t iona l  r esu lt  of the  changes  enacted in t he 1978 Code.
As the  di ssent  from the N BRC  Rep or t  obser ved , “[t]h e Code, for
inst an ce, replaced the  term ‘bankrup t ’ with  ‘deb tor ’ and
described a case filing as seek ing an  ‘order  for r elief.’”161 The
non discr imin at ion p rovisions  of § 525 wer e als o subs ta nt ially
expan ded to pr ohibit  ma ny form s of priva te d iscr imina t ion
against  bankrup tcy debtors. Given that one goal of the Code
refor ms was to reduce sham e and st igma , it should n ot be
su rpr is in g t ha t  it  in  fact  has d one s o.
Shame an d st igma  ha ve tr ad itiona lly coun te rba lanced the
economic benefit s a va ila ble  from ban kr up tcy, r est ra inin g ma ny
deb tor s from filin g.162 As  shame and st igm a have d ecli ned , h ow
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between  expected and actu al filing rat es, including the difficu lties of credit ors in
exe rci sing non-bankruptcy r emedies  and  the na tu re  of  the r igh t  to f il e  bankruptcy  as
an  option that  gives debtors a discount ed value of the benefit they would gain if they
actu ally filed. S ee Whit e, supra  note 121, at  215-29.
163. S ee supra  note s 121-22 an d accompa nyin g text .
164. S ee Fa y et a l., supra  note 119, at 27 (noting tha t th e importan ce of stigm a
in  the de cision to file rises as t he finan cial bene fit fr om  filing rises); Gross &
S ou leles, supra  not e 15 2, a t 1 6 (“Given  th e la rg e n um ber  of peop le wh o could
poten tia lly benefit from filing for bankru ptcy, even relatively sma l l d r op s  in  s t ig m a
can  gene ra te . . . la rge e ffects on de fault .”). 
165. S ee Gross  & Soule les, supra  note 152, at  16-17.
166. S ee Buck ley & Br inig, supra  note 118, at  194.
167. DAVID MCCULLOUGH , TR U M AN  151 (199 2).
ever, more and more debtors ar e r ecognizing t he e conomic
ben efits of ban kr up tcy. This  decline  in s ha me a nd  st igma  is felt
most pow er fu lly  wit h  res pe ct  to m iddle-cla ss  and u pp er -in come
debtors. J us t a s t he  economic ben efits  of filing ba nk ru pt cy ar e
greatest  for  upper -in come d ebtors, 163 a  corol la ry  is  tha t  the
re st r a in t s imp osed by sh am e an d st igm a  h a ve also been most
impor tan t  with respect to this cat egory of ind ividu als . As
shame an d st igma decline, th erefore, the m ar g in a l imp act  will
be felt  most  hea vily with  respect to upper-income debtors.164 As
the re is little rea son to believe tha t  the  decl ine  in  shame and
s t igma will r ever se  in  the im med ia te fu ture, w e ca n  exp ect  to
see increa sin g nu mbe rs  of higher -income deb tor s. Th is in  tu rn
indicates  tha t  means-test ing will become  increa sin gly
important t o require these debtors to repay their debts.165
History is r eplet e wit h t he t ales  of honest  an d n oble
ind ividua ls like Sir Walter S cott  and  Mark  Twa in  who worked
for  years  to repa y their  debts, even t hose th at  ha d been lega l ly
dischar ged.166 Pa r t  of Har ry  Truman’s lore  and repu ta t ion  as an
honest an d prin cipled ma n wa s h is r efusa l to file ban kr up tcy in
the face  of losses  incur red dur ing  the 1921 recess ion  tha t
rocked th e agr icultu ra l Midwest . Rat h er t ha n file ba nk ru pt cy,
Truman vowed to pay off his debt s. “Fifteen yea rs a fter t he
s tore went  under ,  Har ry would st ill be  pa yin g off on  the
ha ber da sh er y, and as a  consequen ce would  be  st rapp ed  for
money for  twen ty year s.”167 But  he d id it , even a fter  his  par tn er
filed bankr upt cy h im se lf.
In  the cu r ren t  socia l climate, i t  is  ea sy  to su s p ect  tha t
ind ividu als  like S cott, T wa in, a nd  Tru ma n would be considered
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168. ALLAN  BLOOM , TH E  CL O S IN G  O F  TH E  AM E R I CA N  MI N D 325  (198 7).
169. S ee J ones &  She par d, supra note 9.
n ot  a s h onest  an d n oble her oes but  as  sa ps. As Allan  Bloom
remar ked,
T h e r e i s  a  p e r en n ial a nd  un obtr us ive vie w t ha t m ora lity
cons i s t s  in  su ch th ings a s  te l l ing th e  t r u t h , p a yin g one ’s  deb t s ,
r e sp e ct in g on e’s pa re n ts  an d d oin g n o volu n t a r y  h a r m  t o
anyone .  Those  a re  a l l  t h ings  easy  to  say  and  h a rd  t o  do ; t hey
d o n o t  a t t r a ct  m u c h  a tt e n tion , a n d  w in  lit t le  h on or  in  t h e
wor ld. . . .  [I t ] i s  a  hu mble  n o t ion ,  access ib le  to  every  ch i ld , bu t
its  fulfillm en t is  th e a ctivit y of a lifet im e of per form in g  t h e
sim ple  d u t i e s  p r e s cr i b e d  by it .  Th i s  mora l i t y  a lways  r equ i r e s
sa cri fice. 168
Rather  th an  extolling th is sacrifice and st ru ggle to live with in
one’s means, t oo many  socia l factors  today encourage the
oppos it e .
IV. AL T ER N AT IV E  TH E O R I E S  E X P L A I N I N G  T H E  INCRE ASE IN
BA N KR U P TC IE S
 Advocates  of bankruptcy’s  s t a tus quo passiona te ly  deny tha t
filings  have i ncr ease d e ven  in  pa r t  because  of econ omic cost -
benefit  ca lcu la t ions  or  reduced shame and  s t igma. The den ia ls
r ing somew h a t  h ollow, as  it is  th ese s am e a dvocat es wh o ha ve
labored to en ha nce t he  re spe cta bilit y an d r e duce the costs of
filing bankru ptcy. Instead, the proponents of the sta tu s qu o
blam e th e ban kr upt cy boom on h igh  pe rson a l debt  levels  and on
events  su ch  as d ivor ce a nd t he cos t  of catast roph ic m ed ica l
ca re . In  th eir  eyes, ba nk ru pt cy filers  ar e bu ffeted by econom ic
and socia l forces  beyon d t heir  cont rol. An d,  eve n  if some deb tor s
a re abu sin g th e sys te m, t h eir  im pl icit  a t t it ude  is  “so wh at?” as
the costs of abuse a re sh ouldered by wealt hy ban ks a nd oth er
creditors.
Th is v is ion  of bankrup tcy  and  bankrup ts  is  fr e ighted with
im pl ica t ion s for  bankrup tcy pol icy. F or  in st ance, t he N at ion a l
Bankrup tcy Review Commission , mesm erized by this diagnosis,
declined to r ecommen d a ny s ign ifica n t  refor ms t o curb
bankrup tcy abuse, even among upper-income debtors.1 6 9  Nor
did  it  t ake a ny s tep s t o red uce t he economic los se s impos ed  on
cred it ors and  other  consumers  as  a  resu lt  of bankr up tcy .
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170. S ee Hi gh est  N um ber , supra  not e 3; NBRC  Repor t, supra  not e 113, a t 85. 
171. War ren , supra  note 7, at  1080-81.
Desp ite  i t s acceptance  by  a  ba re m a jor i ty of t he Commission ,
th i s view rests on little more t ha n sh allow emp iricism, isolated
anecdotes, a nd a n id eological belie f th at  refu ses t o adm it t ha t
any significan t n um ber of bankr upt cy debtors “game” the
system  by dischargin g debts t ha t t hey ha ve some ca p a ci ty to
repay .
The advoca tes  of the  st a tus  quo ar e forced to p rov ide some
exp la na t ion  for  t he  bankrup tcy  boom . They adva nce th ree
explana tions. Firs t, high levels of personal debt  relat ive to
in come “cause” increased bankr uptcy filings. Second, excessive
levels of per sona l debt  ar e st ron gly influ en ced by a ggre ssive
and even mislead ing m ar ket ing of credit  car ds t o vulne ra ble
borrowers. Th ird , t he  othe r  p r in cipal cau ses of consum er
bankrup tcy ar e forces beyond  th e contr ol of  individual debtors.
On furt her  examin at ion, however, none of thes e expla na tion s is
pers ua sive.
A. Debt and B ankru ptcy
 For  many schola rs an d comm ent at ors, ba nk ru pt cy is caused
by excessive levels of debt, piled  (app ar en tly in volun ta rily)
upon th e backs of Amer ican families.170 E lizabe th  Wa rren , for
inst an ce, a n a logizes Americans ’ ta king on consum er debt  to
hikers’ filling up their backpacks with r ocks:
T h r ou g h l i fe ,  t he  h ike  i s  somet imes  u ph i l l  and  somet im es
d ow n h ill, an d t he  pa th  is som etim es st re wn  wit h obs ta cles. As
t hey  hik e, th e a du lts  m ay  acqu ire  deb t, w hich  is m uch  lik e
p u t t in g r o ck s  i n  t h e i r  b a ck p a cks . If t he  pa cks  have  on ly  a  f ew
rocks , t h e  fa m i l y c a n  w it h s t a n d  m o s t  of t h e  ev en t s  a n d
ca lami t i e s  t h e y  a r e  l i k e ly  t o  en c o u n t e r .  B u t  a s  t h e  p a c k  gr o w s
h e a v ie r , sma l l e r  and  sm a l l e r  m i s fo rt u n e s  wi ll  ca u s e  t h e h i k er s
t o f a l l,  unab le  to  con t inu e  t h e  h ike .  The  on ly  way  they  can  ge t
b a ck  on  th eir  feet  is b y em pt yin g som e of th e r ocks fr om  th eir
packs . More  Amer icans ’ packs  a r e  ge t t i ng  hea v ie r  w i th  deb t s ,
a n d  more  o f  t hem f ind  th a t  t h ey  can  con t inu e  on ly  i f t hey
un load som e of  their  r ocks by declar in g ban kr up tcy.171
The th esis  th at  excessive de bt “caus es” ban kr up tcy is  flawed
in ma ny ways. A corr elation bet ween debt  and  bankrup tcy does
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172. S ee Hi gh est  N um ber , supra  note 3.
173. Rise in  Pers ona l B an kr up tcy , supra note 126, at  *18.
174. S ee J ona th an  McCar th y, Debt, Delinquencies, and Consu mer S pending ,
CURRE N T  IS S U E S  I N  E CON . AND F IN . (Fe de ra l Re se rv e Ba nk  of Ne w Yor k),  Feb.  1997,
a t  1, 3; Delinquency on Consum er Loans Before the House Comm . on Banking and
Fin. Servs. , 10 4t h  C on g. *5  (1996) [hereinafter Delinquency on Consum er Loans]
( st a t ement  of Ken net h Cr one, Vice-Pr eside nt  of VISA U.S.A., I nc. ), available in  1996
WL 520173 (noting tha t “measur ed by the a m o u n t of scheduled principal and interest
paymen t s th at  consum ers  ar e obligated to pa y as a percent age of their after ta x
income, con su me r d ebt  bu rd en s a re  bel ow t he ir  hi st or ic h igh ”).
175. We are n ot aware o f  an y  studies th at a ctually investigate whet her cur rent
debt  levels are linked to bankruptcy filing rates.
176. S ee Pet er S . Yoo, Still Charging: The Growth in Credit Card D ebt B etween
1992 and 1995 , RE V IE W (Federa l Reserve Bank  of St. Louis), J a n.-Feb. 1998, at 19.
177. The NBRC Rep ort a lso asse rt ed a lin k bet ween  over a l l d e bt  l evel s and
ba nk ru pt cy filing rat es, and m akes n o mention of the curren t  debt level. S ee NBRC
Repor t , supra  note 113, at  84-85 . Pr ofess or Au su bel a lso p re sen ts  da ta  on t he
corr ela tion  between overa ll debt levels and ba nkr uptcy, but  he  als o fails to expla in
not  equa te t o causa t ion , es pe cia lly  wh en  the p urpor te d ca u sa l
link  is  sp ur iou s.  Ta kin g a  h is tor ica l per sp ect ive , ba nkrupt cy
filings  in th e first  ha lf of 1997 exceede d t hose for t he e nt ire
decade of th e Grea t Depr ession, but n o one wou ld ser iously
con tend th at  consu mer  debt levels were m ore onerous on 1990s
deb tor s th an  th e bur dens born e by th e ir  grandpa ren t s’
gen er a t ion . Indeed , consu mer  ban kr upt cy rates  ar e 49.9%
higher  now than dur ing the height of the last recession .172 As
one comm ent at or observed, even if de bt -to-income r at ios ha ve
worsened, they h ave d one so gr adu a lly: “They did not get worse
by 29% in 1996 over 1995, bu t  ba nkrupt cies  did.  Th ey d id  not
worsen  aga in by 2 0% in 19 97 over  1996, bu t ba nk ru ptcies
did.”173
More funda men ta lly , t her e is  a  logica l flaw in th e pur ported
causa l link bet ween debt  an d ban kr upt cy. Even t hough debt
levels rela t ive to in come a re h igh , in ter es t  ra tes  a re a lso much
lower than  they h ave b een  in  many years.  Accoun t in g for
interest  rat es, consumers’ current debt bu rden , or  ser vice
paymen t s on debt , is lower t ha n it  often  was in the  pas t .174 If
debt  is r eleva nt  to ban kr up tcy, it is  becau se de bt m ak es it
imp ossible for  individuals to make deb t  payments  as t hey come
due. 175 Current  indebtedness m easu res  th is , n ot  tota l debt  or
d eb t -t o-in come rat ios.176 While the t otal debt  level may be
corr elated  wit h  ba nkrupt cy fil in gs , it  is  not  clea r  how tota l deb t ,
as opp ose d t o cur ren t  de bt  levels , cou ld  “cau se ” b a n krup tcy
filings.177
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how the purpor ted  casu al lin k could w ork. S ee Lawr ence M . Ausu bel, Credit Card
Defaults, Cred it C ard  Prof its , an d B an kr up tcy , 71 AM . BANKR. L.J . 249, 254-5 7 (19 97).
178. F o r insta nce, a sur vey by Visa r eported t hat  of those “who had filed  for
ba nk ru pt cy during a 12-month period in 1995 and 1996, nearly 29 percent stat ed that
the ‘main reason’ they filed for bankruptcy was excessive spen ding (i.e., th ey said
they  were ‘overext en ded ’), ra th er  th an  fam ily or  pr ofess iona l pr oblem s or
eme rgen cies.” Delinquency on Consum er Loans, supra note 174, at  *7.
179. Moreover, as will be discussed furth er below, credit card debt  is  jus t on e of
severa l ways tha t we can accomplish this sam e end . See infra no t es  206-12 and
accompany ing t ext .
180. S ee Ellen  Goodma n, A T em per an ce Pl edg e: ‘Don ’t bu y it !’, DE S MOIN E S  RE G .,
June  17, 1 998,  at  13 (“Wh at  we w an t gr ows  in t o what  we need, at a  sometimes
d iz zy in g r at e . . .  bei ng  mi dd le cla ss  is n o lon ger  good e nou gh .” (quot in g J ul iet  Sch or ,
au thor  of The Overspent Am erican )). A simila r se nt imen t wa s expressed  by a middle-
The idea  tha t debt  “cau ses” ban kr up tcy is flaw ed in  an other
wa y. Consid er P rofessor  War re n ’s  ana logy of consumers  as
h ike r s pickin g up “debt” stones a s th ey walk. In War ren’s view,
debt  i s someth ing  tha t ju s t  accumula t e s on  it s  own  over  t ime ,
as th ough cr edit ors s ecret ly slip add i t iona l  rocks  in  the
unsuspect ing hik er ’s ba ckpa ck. One is r emin ded of th e old
Cha r lie Brown  Ha lloween s pecial wh ere  all of th e oth er k ids in
the neighbor hood r ece ive  a  ba g fu ll of ca ndy wh ile  t r ick -or -
t rea t ing , bu t  Char li e Brow n  rep ea ted ly ge t s “a  rock.” For
War re n, d ebt  is a ll rocks  an d n o cand y.
This  is nons ense . Rock s  n o more m agically appear  in one’s
backpack than  de bt  doe s on  a  ba la nce s hee t . Con su mer s d o not
collect  debt, they collect th e things they buy with debt. The y
buy refr igera tor s, car s, ort hodont ics, college tuition, clothes,
and vaca t ions  on  credi t . I f the  h ikers  ha ve too ma ny r ocks in
th eir  back pa cks, it  is because  th ey put  th em t her e. Thus, if debt
“causes” ba nkrupt cy, it  is  only beca use overspending and an
unwillingness to l ive with in  one’s  means  “causes” debt. In
shor t , one can  simply recha ra cterize th e “debt cau ses
ba nk ru pt cy” th esis  as  “overs pen din g cau ses  ban kr up tcy.”178 The
purported causal link is ambiguous.
Warren and other “debt causes ba nk ru pt cy” th eoris ts  ha ve
confused  cause a nd effect: credit is t he m ea n s used  to
accomplish  th e end  of acquir ing posses sions  by borr owing
against  fu tu re  income. Wh at  we want ha s  noth ing to do with
how we  are going t o pa y for  it. 1 7 9  War ren  and others may
disa ppr ove of some of the pu rch as es t ha t w er e fina nced  th rou gh
borr owing. In deed , ma ny commenta tors  be li eve tha t  Amer icans
ar e incr ea sin gly un willin g to live within their means. 180 So why
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class bankr upt cy deb tor  wh o sa id of h is fa mi ly’s ban kr up tcy e xpe ri en ce, “We’re n ot
doing the pa uper  thin g. . . . We do stuff, but we’r e not  ext ra va ga nt . We  ha ve a  ni ce
h o use. We go to Foxwoods. We have his and her cars. It  took us a long  tim e t o go
fr o m Brooklyn  to Qu een s. We can ’t go ba ck.” San dra  War d, Bailing Out: Bankru ptcy,
Once a Disgrace, Has Become as American as th e Fourth of Ju ly, BARRON’S , Ju ne 17,
1996, at 17-18.
181. The role of credit cards in ban kru ptcy is discussed in m ore detai l infra  Pa r t
IV.B.
182. S ee Arth ur  B. Ken nicke ll & Mar th a St ar r-McClu er, Changes in Fam ily
Fin an ces from 1989 to 1992: Evid e n ce from  th e S ur vey  of Con su m er Fi na nces , 80 F E D .
RES ERVE  BULL . 861, 874 (1994) (noting t ha t cr ed it  car d d ebt  acco un te d for  2.3 % of a
household’s total ind ebtedn ess in 1989 an d 2.9% in 1992); Yoo, supra  note 176, at  19
(noting  th at  “cre dit  car d d ebt  is a  sm al l pa rt  of a h ou se ho ld’s t ota l in de bt ed ne ss ”).
183. S ee Personal Ba nk ru ptcy  Con su m er Cred it C ris es B efore t he S ub com m . on
Admin . Ov ersi gh t a nd  th e Cou rt s of t he S enat e Comm . on the J udiciary, 105th  Cong.
*6 (1997) [hereinafter Pers ona l B an kr up tcy  Con su m er Cr edi t  Crisis]  (s ta tement  of  Ian
Domowit z, Depart ment  of Economics and Institu te for Policy Research, North western
Un ive rs it y), available in  1997 WL 176665 (“[R]eal estate debt  account s for th e bulk
of ou ts ta nd in g con su me r d ebt .”).
184. Rise in  Pers ona l B an kr up tcy , supra  not e 126, a t *12 (em pha sis a dded ). 
185. Id . (em ph as is a dd ed ).
186. Id .
does Warr en believe it is th e debt t ha t consum ers s hould sh ed,
ra th er  than  the spending habits that  led to the debt ? Forcing
other hiker s to carr y “rocks” volun ta rily picked u p by th e
irr espon sible h ar dly seem s fair .
In  th is  melodrama  of bor rower versus lender, or perha ps
hiker  vers us  rocks, cr edit  car d lender s ha ve become t he
convenien t  villa in. 181 Th e u biq u it y a nd vis ibi lit y of cr ed it  cards ,
and their appar ent high interest ra tes, make them  easy tar gets.
Bu t , as e ven  the bankrupt cy a dvocat es know, credi t  ca rd  debt ,
a l though h is tor ica lly  h igh , is  not  near ly the lar gest component
of consumer  debt. 182 Tha t dist inction goes to housing debt,
in clu d in g m ortgages and home equity loans.183 According t o a
study by SMR Res ear ch Corp ora tion , “In  1997 t he t ota l doll a rs
owed on residen tial m ortgages wer e $4.027 t ri ll ion , and the
tota l owed on a ll re volving d eb t  h ad r ea ched  $529.7 b illion.”184
And while credit car d an d rela ted debt  increas ed by $375.8
bil lion  from 1 987 t o 1997, “mort gage  debt  in crea se d b y m ore
than  $2 trillion” du r ing tha t  sam e period.185 As  the r epor t
concludes,  “It jus t h app ens t o be tru e th at  most of the consum er
debt  i n t h is  coun t ry i s h ous ing d ebt , not  cred it ca rd  debt , an d
the rea l e sta te  debt  a l so i s wha t  ha s been  increasing most
ra pidly by far .”186 Cu rrent in de bt ed nes s on  credit  cards is even
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187. S ee Wendy M. Edelberg & Jonas D. M. Fisher , Household Debt , CHICAGO
F E D LETTER No. 123 (The Federa l Reserve Ban k of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.), Nov. 1997
(noting  th at  th e level of debt se rvice on cre dit car d debt  was on ly 0.5% of income in
199 5).
188. In  r esponse to th is ar gum ent , Ausub el ar gues t ha t som e am ount  of this
mort gage  deb t a ctu all y ju st  re pr ese nt s su bst itu tion  from  cre dit  car d loa ns (wh ich  a re
included as  cons um er  cre dit ) to h o m e e q u it y loan s (wh ich a re  a com pon en t of
mort gage  debt ). Ausubel pr ovides no est ima te a s to h ow mu ch hom e equit y debt is
at tr ibut able  to  th i s subst it u t ion effect. To the  exten t t ha t t his s ubst itu tion effect is
p re sen t , how eve r,  it  mu st  be t he  cas e t ha t consum er s a re  sh ift in g fr om cr edi t ca rd
to home equity debt at  least in pa rt because of the pr eferable interest  rat es present ed
by hom e eq uit y loa ns . Th e t ax-d edu ctib ilit y of in te re st  on m o r t ga ges  and home equ ity
loan s also m ake s th em m ore a tt ra ctive th an  credit  c a r ds . I n  that  case, it is even
more disap pointin g th at  Ausu bel’s re sear ch exam ines t otal overall debt levels rath er
than  curren t debt levels, as  the la tter  would reflect these lower  int ere st r at es. S ee
Bankruptcy R evis ion , supra  not e 11 4 a t *6 ; dis cus sion  supra  no t e 114 , and
accompany ing t ext .
189. Rise in  Pers ona l B an kr up tcy , supra  note 126, at  *21.
lower.187 Critics ar e not only wrong but  oppor tun is t ic i n sin gling
out  credit car d debt a s if it were th e ma jor  component  of the
per s on a l deb t  burden .188 No one is  forcing a nybod y to bu y a
larger  or m ore expe ns ive hou se t ha n t hey ca n r eas ona bly
afford.
But  consum er credit is not limited to its more visible for m s
of credit card a nd h ousing debt. As Stua rt  Feldstein  of SMR
Research noted in his testimony to Congress,
Any  busin ess  is  a  cre di tor  w hen  i t  provi d e s  good[s ] o r  s e rv i ces
a n d  w a its  to b e p a id for  th em  la te r on : ele ctr ic a nd  ga s
u t i l i t i e s , p h on e  comp an ies, la nd lord s, r et ail s tor es w ith  cred it
c a r d s or ot h er  cre dit  pla n s, d octor s, d en tis ts , h osp ita ls, a n d
o th e r s . A l l t hese  bu s inesses  ex tend  c red i t  w i thou t  col l a t e ra l
a n d  lose  wha t  t h ey  a re  owed  wh en  u nsecu r e d  d e b t s a r e
expun ged  in  bank rup tcy . So ,  t he  cos t  o f bank rup tcy  is  i nc luded
on  the  expen se  s ide  o f t he  income  s t a t e m e n t .  .  . .  Consu mer s
m a y or  m a y n ot  be  a wa r e of it , bu t m ost  of wh a t  t h e y  s p e n d
e ve r y m o n t h  h a s  a  b a n k r u p t c y cost  fact or b u ilt i n to it , from  t h e
p h on e  b i ll  t o t h e  c a r  p a y m e n t  t o t h e  r en t  a n d  t h e  cr e d it  ca r d
bill.189
Cont ra ry to the  mant ra  of those  wh o opp ose  ba nkrupt cy r efor m,
we all rea lly do pay for the la rge nu mber  of ban kr upt cies.
Given the ubiq uit y of consu me r cr edit  in t he  economy, if it is
t rue th at  debt cau ses  ban kr up tcy, th en it  is sim ply wrong  to l ay
the bla me a t  the d oor  of credit card  issuer s, or any oth er
par t icu la r segment of the consum er credit mark et. Instead, if
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190. S ee Chr istoph er C . DeMu th , T he C ase A gai ns t Cr ed it Card  Interest  Rate
R egul ati on , 3 YALE J . O N  RE G . 201  (198 6).
191. The role  of cred it ca rd s in  th e econ omy  an d t he ir  lin k t o ba n k r u p t cy law is
discussed in m ore det ail in T odd J . Zywicki, Cr edit Car ds in Ban kru ptcy (Nov. 15,
1998) (un pu bli sh ed  ma nu scr ipt , on  file  wit h a ut ho rs ), an ar ticle which will be
published  in 1999.
192. S ee NBRC R eport , supra  note 113, at 92 (noting tha t lenders  have ma iled
2.5 billion credit card solicitations each year  for th e p a s t  t hree years , not even
coun t ing te lep hon e m ar ke tin g, pr int  ad ver tis em en ts , an d ot h e r  form s of mar ket ing).
193. Id .
194. S ee id. a t  93.
debt  cause s bankr upt cy, t h is  is  an  in dictmen t  of all forms of
consu mer  cred it . In  fact , some h ave a dvocated  ju st  su ch  br oad-
ran ging l imi ta t ions  on  consumer  credi t , including d racon ian
regu la t ion s on  mor tgage lenders, home equity lenders,
un secu re d cre dit  car d len der s, a nd  secured  len de rs for  pe r son a l
pr oper ty.  While such a view a t  lea st  has t he vi r tue of
in tell ect ua l consist ency, it flies in th e face of cent ur ies of failed
and counter pr odu ct ive  effor t s  t o regulate credit terms. In
add it ion , su ch pr oposals  would not only inevitably disrupt
credit  ma rk ets  significan tly , th ey would ten d to ha rm  th e very
lowe r -in come and ma rginal borrowers the y ar e pr esu ma bly
intended to help.190
B. Credit  Card s a nd  Ban kru pt cy
 The  ar gum ent  aga ins t cr edit  car d iss uer s t ies in  closely with
the deb t -causes -bankr uptcy hypothesis.191 Thos e wh o believe
th a t  len de rs a re t akin g a dvantage of con su mer s s ound a
populist them e. T hey ca st iga te t he a pp aren t ly p romiscuous
marke t ing practices of credit card issuers  and  h igh  and
in flexible credit  car d in ter est  ra tes . They in veigh a gain st  t he
ad dictive  poten t ia l  sp awn ed  by m ill ion s of cr ed it  card
solicitations, many  of th em “pre-appr oved,” which ar e ma iled
every day by credit card issuers.192 Crit ics wor ry  tha t
“[companies ] specia lizing in  lending to bor rowers  wi th
ta rn ished  credit  his tor ies h ave be en a mon g th e fast est -growing
credit  issu ers  in  th e pa st  five year s” and  th at  th is m ar ket  will
pr obably expand in comin g years.193 Special disdain  is reser ved
for  market i n g t ar geted a t lower-income a nd young people,
especially college students. 194
Advocates  of the  st a tus  quo for  bankruptcy  play up  the
sign ifica nce of cred it ca rd  debt  for its obvious political value:
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195. S ee, e.g., Hilla ry Rodh am  Clint on, T alk in g It  Ov er, WA S H . TI M E S, Sept. 30,
1998, at  A2; Michelle Sin gleta ry, Bank ruptcy’s Personal Toll, WA S H . P O S T, Sept. 27,
1998, at  H2. E ven fre e-mar ket  economist  Walt er Willia ms la u n c hed an u nexpected
br oadside at  cre dit  car d is su er s, g ivin g t he m s ome  of th e bl am e for  in creased
ba nk ru pt cy filings. S ee Walt er Willia ms , Who’s  to B lame  for  our R a m p a n t Credit-
Card-Itis?, SEATTLE  TI M E S, J uly 17, 1 998, a t B5.
196. S ee Lawr ence M . Ausu bel, Failure of Competition in the Credit Card M a r k et ,
81 AM . E CON . RE V. 50 (1991); Ausu bel, supra  note 177.
the issuers a re r ich ba nk s, t hey “hook” consu mer s wit h
aggr ess ive an d even m islea din g ma rk et ing ca mp aign s, a nd
because  of the high interest  r a t e s,  consumers  become caugh t  on
an  endless treadmill of monthly paym e n t s before t hey k now
what  hit  th em . Sin ce credit  car d iss ue rs  ha ve been  am ong t he
voca l proponents of bankru ptcy reform, their proposals, like
th eir  abil it y-t o-rep ay r es ea rch , ca n  be char acterized as an
agenda to en tr ench  pa ra sit ic lendin g pr act ices. In s hor t, cre dit
cards have  become  the modern  equ ivale nt  to Willia m J en nin gs
Bryan’s “Cross  of Gold,” cru cifying consumers  in  the  pu r su it  of
ever-greater profits.
The a t t ack  on  credi t  ca rd issu ers  ha s ga ined  cur ren cy in th e
popula r  press 195 an d on Capit ol Hill. Given th e widesprea d
mis imp res sion of th e link bet ween  credit  ca rds and  bankrup tcy ,
it  i s necessa ry  to d iscuss  the is su e in  som e d et a il.  We d o not
a im to defend ever y as pect of credit car d lendin g policies, but
we will illust ra te t ha t credit  card m ar ket s ar e compet itive t o a
degree that th e atta cks on credit card issuers ar e ill-founded.
The case  aga in st  cred it  card iss uer s i s r ooted  in  the r es ea rch
of Pr ofessor Lawr ence Ausubel.196 Ausube l emphas izes  the
inflexibilit y of consum er use of credit cards, the “stickiness” of
interest  rat es at a high level, and th e issuers’ supranormal
profits. Tak en t ogeth er, t hes e factor s su ggest  to Ausu bel t ha t
the ma rk et for cr edit  cards is ins ufficient ly comp etit ive, lead ing
to cond it ions  in  which  the  is suers  have  the abil ity a nd  incen tive
to exploit t heir  cust omer s in  th e pu rs uit  of ever-high er p rofits .
Alth ough  Ausu bel has  rea ched a r ema rk able level of notoriety
in  ba nkrupt cy cir cles  because  of the p olit ica l im pl ica t ion s of h i s
resea rch , all of his centr al findings a nd conclusions ha ve been
ser iously undermined by more compreh ensive an d curr ent
resea rch .
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197. S ee Ausu bel, supra note 196, at  71-72; Ausu bel, supra  note 177, at  261-62.
198. Ausu bel, supra  note 177, at  261-62 (c ita tion om itt ed). Ausub el’s me th odology
for  col lect ing the  da ta  t ha t  underlies the u nderest imation h ypothesis has been
criticized. See generally Thom as F . Ca rgill & J ean ne We nde l, Bank  Credit Cards:
Con su m er Irr at ion ali ty  ver su s M ark et F orces , 30 J.  CONSUMER AF F . 373 , 37 5-77  (199 6).
199. A var iat ion on Au sub el’s th eme  is offered by Vin cent  D. Rougea u, w h o
argues  tha t absen t inter est-rate r estrictions, credit card issuer s  can ea rn u nlimited
prof it s by p re yin g on  bor row er s’ wea kn es s a nd  des ir e t o consu me, which often reaches
an  irr at iona l level. S ee Vincent  D. Rougea u, R edi scov ering Usury: An  Ar gu m ent  for
Legal  Con tr ols on  Cred it C ard  In ter est  R at es,  67 U. COLO . L. RE V. 1 (19 96).
200. S ee Dagober t  L. Br ito & P ete r R. H ar tley, Consum er Rationality an d Credit
Cards, 103 J.  P OL . E CON . 400, 401 (1995 ). 
1. Consum er credit card debt as a result of spendin g habits
 Ausubel  first a sser ts  t h a t  con s u m er s  a r e t oo ign oran t  or
inflexible t o modify th eir credit car d usa ge in order t o prevent
bein g exploited.197 Critical to Ausubel ’s inflexibilit y hypot hes is
is  t h e  cl a im  “th at  ma ny consum er s sys tem at ically
underest imate the  ex ten t  of the ir  cur ren t and  fu tu re  credi t  ca rd
borr owing and , u s ing these u nd ere st ima tes , ma ke s ubopt ima l
de cis ion s regar ding th e ch oice and u sage of credit cards. In
pa r t icu lar , consum ers under estim at e th eir credit car d bala nces
and,  thus, underr ate th e importa nce of credit card interest
ra tes  . . . .”198 For Ausu bel, credit  card compan ies consider  a
“good” credit car d consu mer  a s  on e  wh o r out inely
un deres tim at es his a bility to repay h is balan ce and t hu s carr ies
over a  ba lance  from m on th-to-month .  Because so many
consumers behave  in  this  mann er, Au su bel believes  th at  credit
ca rd issu er s a re gu aran teed s ubs tan t ia l profit s for  the
indefinite fut ur e.199
Theories  wh ose va lid it y dep en ds  on the a ss umpt ion  tha t
consumers are stu pid a b ou t  their money ought t o arouse
su spicion . And , un su rp ris ingly, a  mor e pla us ible expla na tion  is
availa ble. The  tr an sa ction  between credit card issuers and
consumers is far  mor e complex a nd  ha rd ly as e xploita tive a s
Ausubel supposes. Credit car ds ar e useful for consumer s in two
ways.200 The y a r e a  use fu l m ea ns for  fin ancin g t r ansa ct ion s for
so-called “convenien ce user s” wh o use  them  as a  su bs t it u te for
cash and ch eck s.  Cr ed it  cards  a re a lso a  use fu l source of shor t -
t e rm credit for “revolvers” who carr y over ba lances fr om  one
month  to the  nex t .
D :\ 1 9 9 9- 1\ F I N A L \ J O N - F I N . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
177] IT’S TIME FOR MEANS-TESTING 231
201. S ee id . at  401 (n otin g th at  cre dit  car ds “com pet e wit h p re cau tion a r y  m oney
balances  as  a m ed iu m fo r fi na nci ng  tr an sa cti on s”).
202. Indeed, the en tire cata logue/phone order  indu str y alm ost cert ain ly wou ld n ot
exist if not for the widespre a d  a va i la bility of credit  card s. S ee Ellis, supra  note 119,
a t  5. 
203. By contra st,  the credit card issuer carries an open, zero-int er est  accou nt  for
th is entire period. As Donald Hester observes,
t h e c h ar g e car d a llows  [its  own er ] to s hift  th e bu rd en  of car ry ing  zer o-
inter es t -bea ring tr an sa cti on b al an ces  from  hi ms elf t o th ose  iss ui ng  th e ca rd
for  a t  l east  a  month . With  a  charge  card he can  re du ce h is d em an d a ccoun t
ba la nce [s] . . . . [and] it is  less im port an t t o wast e tim e an d effort tr ying to
min imize  t h e m .
Donald  D. He ste r, Mon etar y Pol icy in  th e ‘Ch eckles s’ Econom y ,  27 J . F IN . 279, 285-86
(1972) (cit at ion s om it te d).
204. Brit o an d Ha rt ley est ima te t ha t if ban k accoun ts a re ea rn ing a  rea l interes t
r a t e of 4.2% ann ua lly (highe r t ha n m ost ch eckin g accoun ts), a n d credit card balan ces
accrue in te re st  at  19.6 % an nu al ly (h igh er  th an  mos t ca r ds), an d credit  card s begin
to accr ue  in te re st  im me dia te ly wh en  cha rg es  ar e m ad e (wh ich  is r ar ely  th e ca se ),
credit  card s would  still b e us ed t o finan ce abou t 23% of consu mer  tr an sact ions. S ee
Br ito & Ha rt ley, supra  note 200, at 406. Given the har sh and u n rea li st i c a s sumpt ions
used  in their calculations, the 23% figure almost certainly understa t e s  t h e r eal world
For  convenien ce user s, cre dit  car ds offer a n a tt ra ctive
subs t it u t e for cash and checks,201 mak ing i t  unnecessa ry to
main ta in  cash reser ves sufficient a t a ll times t o cover curren t
expenditures.  Given tha t cash and checking accounts usu a lly
produce no or little int erest , consu me rs  will see k t o min imize
the am ount  of time t ha t t heir  m oney sit s in  th eir w allet s or in
low-interest  check ing  accounts . For  some t ransact ions , such  as
catalogues, int ern et s ales , an d ph one ord ers , credit  ca r ds  are
esse nt ial. 202 Cr ed it  cards  a lso a llow th e consu me r t o carr y a
ba lance in ter es t -free  not  only d ur in g t he cr edit cycle, but even
for  a  “grace p er iod” of twenty or more days after th e cred it
per iod ends. Th is featu re a llows th e consu mer  to cont inue t o
have access to his bank balances.203
Cre dit  ca rds offe r  othe r  t ransact iona l bene fi t s over  checks
and cash . Many compan ies award fr equen t  fl ye r mi les  and
“bonus point s” th at  can  be r edee me d for goods and services.
En d-of-yea r  credit card s u mmar ies  pr ovide in form at ion  use ful
in  ca lcu la t ing  t axes  and  household budgets. Consumers  can  use
the lever age of cr ed it  card com pa nies  to cha llenge su ms d ue on
defect ive merchandise. Card issuers offer  su ch  pr odu ct s a s ca r
ren ta l and p urchase  insu ra nce. The Discover Car d even gives
its  users cash rebates on t h e amounts  charged.  Nei ther  checks
nor  cash tran sactions offer th is wide range of benefits.204  No
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percen ta ge of tran sactions that  would be conducted by credit cards.
205. S ee Car gill & Wen del, supra  note 198, a t  379  (r epor t ing tha t  “[t]he 1989
Survey  of Consumer F inances indicates that 68 percent of households report t hey
nea rly  a lways pay c red it  card ba la nce s in  ful l,” t he re by a ccr ui ng  no  in te re st  cha rg es ).
Crone notes th at convenience use of credit cards is r ising much faster  t h an  r evo lv ing
use, increa sin g 20% in on e yea r a lone. See Del inquency on  Consumer  Loans, supra
no te 174, at *4-5.
206. S ee Br ito  & Hart ley, supra  note  200, at  401. Brit o and  Ha rt ley refer  to th is
use of credit car ds as  “smoothin g irr egula r consu mpt ion or in come flows, or providin g
insu rance aga in st  unan t icip a ted  shock s to e xp en di tu re o r  in com e. ” Id . at 402.
207. S ee Delinquency on Consumer  Loans, supra  note 114 (discussing fallen
interest  ra te s a nd  eli mi na ti on  of an nua l fee s);  Ausu bel, supra  note 177, at  262
(di scuss ing te as er  ra te s).
208. S ee Delinquency on C on sumer Loans, supra note  114, at  *4. Despite  th is
good news , Ausub el rem ain s un convinced t ha t compet ition h as t ake n r oot in t he
credit  card mar ket. In par ticular, he argues th at redu ced opera t ing expenses  and
increased  use  of “hidd en fee s” have  ma int ain ed pr ofit levels. S ee A us u b el, supra  no t e
177, at  263. But see infra  note 259 (concluding that many su c h  fe e s a r e not a ctua lly
enforced in  pr act ice).
209. Br ito & Ha rt ley, supra note 200,  a t 402  (em ph as is a dd ed ).
wonder  tha t  mor e  t h an half of the usage of bankcards is for
conve n ience only a nd i s p a id  off im med ia tely  wit hout
re volving.205
For  revolver s,  cred it  ca rds  a re a n  effect ive  de vice  for
fina ncin g sh ort -ter m s wings  in  exp en di tu res  on pu rchase s s uch
as unan t icipa t ed ca r  or  home repa i r s,  Chr i stmas  shopping , and
vacations.206 Fu r ther , i nt e res t  r a t es  on  credit  car ds ha ve fallen
su bst an tia lly in recent  years , initial “teaser ” ra tes  a re even
lower,207 an d an nu al fees ha ve bee n  el imina ted  for  many
cards.208 Again, it  m ust be remembered tha t credit cards ar e
mer ely a  means t o conduct  t hese tr an sactions a nd m ust  be
compared agains t a lter na tive s our ces of short -ter m cr edit .
Cre dit  ca rds  enab le  consumers  to bor row amounts  wi th in  the ir
credit  limit a t close to zero tr an sa ction costs . The low
t ransact ion  cos t s  of these  loans  more  than  offse t  the  h igher
interest  r a tes of bor rowing  on  cr e di t  ca rds . For  instance , a
deb tor  could t ry to get a  bank  loan  to cover  such  shor t -t e rm
expenses, a s  ca r  r epa i rs  or  t he pu rchase of a  r e fr ige ra tor .
Accordin g to Brito an d Ha rt ley, “A senior bank  officer  told us
tha t  th e costs t o the ban k of pr ocessin g a loa n a re  so high  th at
th ey cann ot afford t o make a  loan of less th an  $3,000 for 1 year
except at interest  rat es above t hose char ged on  cred it ca rd s.”209
Thus, bank  loans  of s imi la r  size and  durat ion either do not exist
or  are available only at terms m ore onerous th a n  t hose offered
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210. Br ito an d H ar tle y concl ud e t ha t “[e]ven  mod er at e t ra ns act ions  cost s [for
regula r  ba nk loans] ca n  le ad t o s ubs tan t ia l b or rowin g on  cr ed it  ca rds .” Id . at 408.
211. Br ito and  Har t ley  repor t  tha t “[i]nquiries in H ouston in F ebrua ry 1992
revealed  ra tes r an ging from 17 percent and a  $100 fixed fee for a collater alized 1-year
loan  at  a b ra nch  of a m aj or  na ti on al  fin a n ce  co m pan y to over 50 p ercen t for sm all
loan s ($30 0 m axi mum) a t  a  loca l fin ance  com pa ny. ” Id . at 402 n .6.
212. Poor  people ar e also less  likely to h ave a ccess to oth er form s of competit ive
c red it , such as h ome equity loans, furth er increasin g their n eed for accessible credit
ca rd credit . S ee Car gill & Wen dell, supra  note 198, at  385.
213. S ee Ausu bel, supra  note 177, at  53-56.
214. S ee Brit o & Ha rt ley, supra  note 200, at  418.
215. S ee Delinquency on Consum er Loans, supra  note 114 . In  fac t , a s  a  h i sto r ica l
ma t t e r , an nu al  fee s fir st  ap pe ar ed  as  a m ech an ism  for  car d is su er s t o offset  t he
by credit card issuers.210 In  fact, few r evolvers ca rr y bala n ces
close to th at  figur e.
Absen t credit  car ds, t her efore, th e pr act ical alt er n a t ives for
a  de bt or  se ek in g a  sh or t -t e rm loan  a re  pawn shops , loan
shar ks, or low-interest layaway plans.211 Alter na tive ly, a
consumer  could sell some of his per sonal a sset s for wh at ever he
can  get  for  them . E it her  wa y, t he burde n  on th e debtor is h igher
than  th e int ere st  ra tes  an y debt or is pa ying on credit cards.
Rest rict ing the acces s of low-in come an d youn g debt ors t o credit
cards ma y seem like a f ine idea t o some, but  it would eith er
dr ive man y Americans into the arms of pawn shops, loa n
shar ks, and  even  h ighe r-inter est len ders  or force on th em
difficult financial choices.212
2. S t i ck iness of  cred i t cards  is  not  ev idence of  lack  of
com petition
 Ausubel  a ls o charges that  the “stickiness” of credit  ca r d
interest  r a tes evide nces  a  la ck of compe t it ion  in  the cr ed it  card
market .213 Br it o an d H ar t ley’s a na lys is  refu t e s t h is char ge.
Ausubel’s model looks only at  th e supp ly of fun ds t o the credit
ca rd market  and  ignores consumer  deman d for credit cards.
Once consum er d ema nd  for credit  car ds is  consider ed, it  is
evident  th at  cred it ca rd  int er est  ra te s will ch an ge i n t andem
with in ter est r at es on compet itive asset s, such a s int erest  ra tes
on  check ing  accounts  and  the ava ilab ility of regular  ban k
loans. 214 Focusin g solely on credit  ca r d interest ra tes is also
mis lea din g, in  tha t  i t  ignores  many  of the other benefits of
credit  car ds id ent ified above, su ch a s t he e limin a t ion  of annua l
fees an d cobra ndin g benefits such a s frequen t flyer miles.215
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effect s of statut ory interest-rate ceilings d u r in g  t he high -inflation  period of th e lat e
1970s an d ea rly 198 0s. S ee Glen n B. Ca nn er & C ha rles  A. Lucke tt , Devel opments  in
the P r ic in g of Cr edi t Ca rd  S erv ices , 78 F E D . RE S E R VE  BULL . 652, 654 (1992 ). Thu s, th e
elim ina tion  of annu al fees in  recen t yea rs m ay h ave  b ee n  a su bst itu te  for r edu ction s
in  interest rat es.
216. S ee supra  no te 205 and  accomp an ying te xt. Cons um ers  who pa y th eir
balances  in  ful l, of cou rs e, a ccru e n o in te re st  cha rges. S ee Ca rgill & We nde l, supra
no te 198, at 379. In addition, “Visa estimates th at alm ost  60  percen t  of  tota l
bankca rd volu me  gen er at es n o int er est , up  from  rough ly 50 per cent  six yea rs a go.”
Deli nq uen cy on Consumer Loans, supra  note 174, at  *5.
217. S ee Can ner  & Luck ett , supra  note  215, at  663 (“Inter est r at es ar e lar gely
i r r el evan t , of cour se, for convenie nce us ers .”). Thu s, it sh ould no t  be  surpr is ing tha t
conveni en ce user s ar e relat ively unconcerned a bout credit car d inter est r ates  but a r e
qu it e s ensi t ive to  the  amoun t  of the a nnu al fee and th e length of the inter est-free
grace per iod. See id.
218. Cann er  an d Luck ett  note  th at  for a fam ily owing th e med ian  level of credit
ca rd debt in 1989, approximately $1,250, “a 3 percenta ge point drop in the r ate  wou ld
reduce the a nnu al inter est char ge b y l es s  t han  $40.” Id . at  664 . Mor eove r,  th e ca rd
holder will  lik ely l ose  som e be ne fit s (s uch  as  a h igh  cre d it  l im i t ) and  wil l have to
un dergo  th e ha ssle a nd u ncer ta int y of switching to a new company. Thu s, they
conclude, “I t  is  ques t ionable whe the r  a  $40 annua l  sav ing  wou ld  be enough  to induce
a  car dh olde r t o swi tch  fr om a  car d t ha t h as  bee n p rov idin g sa tis fact ory  ser vice or
at tr active  enh an cemen ts.” Id .; see also Cargill & Wendell, supra  note 198, at  380-81
(noting  tha t  for  “each  $100  of  ba lance  car ried through t he year, t he consumer  saves
$1 per  year  for each  100 ba sis poin t r edu ction in  th e effective a nn ua l int ere st r at e,”
mean ing tha t  a  household wit h a  bala nce of $1,000 th rough  th e year  can s ave only
$10 per  yea r for  ea ch 1 00 b as is p oin t r edu cti on in the in terest  rat e). As discussed
below, th e h igh  tr an sa ction  cost s of de ali ng  wit h cr edi t ca rd  accou nt s m eans  tha t  t he
cost  o f funds  makes  up  much  l es s  of  the  in t e re st  r a t e  t han  fo r  othe r  for ms  of cr ed it ,
ther eby making credit card interest rates less re s po n si ve  t o cha ng es i n t he  cost  of
funds ra te. See infra note s 248-49 an d accompa nyin g text .
219. Ausube l a l so  a rgues  tha t t h e  n on comp et it ive n at ur e of t he  cre dit  car d
mar ket  is reflecte d by alleged  prem ium s paid  by ban ks for cre dit car d receiv ables . S ee
Ausu bel, supra  note 196, at 50. According to Brito and Ha rtley, however, a large part
of this m ark -up can be explained by the fact tha t th e p u r ch a sing ba nk  will be able
t o save  th e tr an sact ion costs  of processin g th e ap plicat ion. S ee Brit o & Har tley,  supra
no te 200 , a t 4 24.  On ce t hi s va ri ab le i s a dd ed  in , m ost  of th e p r em ium d isappears ,  as
the rem ain ing a moun ts of th e ma rk -up can  be expla ined by a  re lat ively sma l l g rowth
in  th e out sta ndin g bala nce on  th e accoun ts a t t he r at e of inflat ion. See id.
Sign ificant ly, t he  major i ty  of ca rd user s ar e convenien ce users
w h o pay the ir  ba lances  each  month .216 For t hem , inter est r at es
are irrelevant, especially compared to th e other  benefits offered
by credit cards.217 Even  for  those  wh o us e th eir ca rd s for cred it
and revolve balances from month-to-month, the adva n t a g es of
sh oppin g for lower ra tes  ar e min ima l.218 Us ing  in te res t  r a tes  as
the on ly p roxy for  vigor ous com pe t it ion  i s t an tamount  to saying
tha t  t he  automot ive  indust ry is noncompe t it ive  because  car
manufactu re r s incr ea se qu alit y th r ou gh im pr oved sa fety,
comfor t , or ga s m ilea ge, ra th e r  than  simply cutting prices.219
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220. Shenk, supra  no te 131,  a t  17  (quot ing Wil li am Binz el, a  spok esm an  for t he
credit  car d in du st ry ).
221. Id .
222. S ee Jam es J . Daly, S avin g on Postage , CREDIT  CARD MG M T., May 1997 , a t
68 (no t ing  tha t , i n  c on t r a s t  to t ele ma rk et ing , th e m ost  fea sib le a lte rn at ive v eh icle for
solicit at ion  by car d issu ers , di r e ct  m a il solicitat ions r equir e people t o “go thr ough a ll
t he wor k t o re spon d t o a d ir ect -ma il soli cita tion ”); see also Chu ck Pa ust ian  & Kelly
She rmach , Tough T imes i n  Card  Market ing, CREDIT  CARD MG M T., May 1998, at 42
(noting  tha t  t he  overa l l r e sponse rate for direct m ail solicitat ions fell to 1.3% in 1997,
the lowest level e ver t ra cked by Ma il Monitor  tr ackin g servi ce, and down  from 1.4%
the previous year, with t he drop at tribut able to the “clutt er” of m u l t ip le  compe t ing
offers by i ss ue rs ).
Such  a  conclu sion  wou ld  obviously be  in cor rect  when  applied  to
cars, and it is equally incorrect when applied to credit cards.
3. Credit  car d  com pa nies ’ m as s m ai ling m ar keti ng pra cti ces
are not exploitative
 Ch a s t is in g t h e  m ar k e t in g p r a ct ices of cred it  ca r d
compan ies, as  ma ny cr itics d o, is als o misgu ided . Mailed  credit
ca rd solicita tion s a re “mer ely ad vert isem ent s,” says Willia m
Binzel,  a  spokes ma n for t he  cred it ca rd  ind us tr y.220 “Jus t  a s
consumers ough t n ot go ha ve a B ig Ma c every t ime  th ey see a
McDonald’s ad, t hey pr obably ought  not a vail them selves of
every cred it ca rd  solicita tion  th ey re ceive.”221 Nobody is h olding
a  gun to consumers’ heads and forcin g th em t o send  in cre dit
ca rd ap plicat ions . I n deed,  the a lt er na t ive s t o di rect  mail,  su ch
as in-per son s olicita tion s a nd  tele ma rk etin g, ar e fra ugh t wit h
far  more p oss ibi lit ies  of abu se  and m anipula t ion  th an is dir ect
mai l.
In  a  market  full of cred it ca rd  choices, aggr essive  ma il
sol icit a t ion s may be  necess a ry t o in form con s u m ers  of the
a l te rna tives. Mail s olicita tion s a re p erh ap s t he on ly relia ble
way to ob ta in  in format ion  on  the  cus tomer ’s  finances  tha t  will
allow a n is su er  to de cide wh et he r t o sup ply a  ca rd . At  the same
t ime, however, respond ing to direct-ma il solicita tions r equires
effor t  on the borrower’s part,  which explains the low yield rate
for  individuals con t a ct ed via d irect  ma il.222 Fina lly, it mu st be
rem ember ed tha t  mass cred it ca rd  solicita tion s a re  ha rd ly a
u n i qu e sour ce of jun k m ail a nd  th at  ma ss s olicita tion s of credit
pu r chases  ar e not u nique t o credit  card issu ers. E very tim e a
merchan t  accep t s a  check  in  pa ym en t , t he m er chant  is
exte nd ing shor t -t e rm credi t  wi thout  knowing the  consumer ’s
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223. The evi de nce  in dica te s t ha t m uch  of th e increase in credit card indebtedness
a m o n g low-income families is merely as a subst itute for other forms of debt. Thus,
it  has  been  observed tha t
the increase in  the cre dit  car d de bt  bu rd en  for t he  lowes t in come  gr oup
appea r s t o be offset by a drop in the installment debt bur den. This suggests
tha t  ther e ha s not been  a subs tan tial increa se in high -interest  debt for low-
incom e hou seh olds , bu t t ha t t he se h ous eh olds  ha ve m er ely s ub st itu te d on e
type of high-interest  debt for another .
Ede lbe rg & Fis her , supra not e 187, a t 3. 
224. S ee Yoo, supra  note 176, at  19.
225. S ee i d . at 21-22.
226. S ee i d . at 22-23.
227. S ee id. at 21-23.
228. S ee id. at  27. T his  als o only speaks  to average  ou ts tand ing  ba lances  and
does not adjust for changes in interest r ates an d oth e r  measu res  of  cu r ren t
indebtedness.
bank ba la nce. Mass  marke t in g m ay expe nd m illi ons of t he
issuers’ dollars, but  it  is  not  se lf-ev iden t  tha t  it  pr eys  upon
consum ers.
Accusa t ion s tha t  cr edi t  ca rd issue rs  “exploit ” youn g an d
low-i ncome cust omer s a lso miss t he p oin t  bot h  logica lly an d
emp irica lly. Fir st , it is  not  clear  wh y it is  a p roblem  for you ng
and lowe r -in come cu st omer s t o have cr ed it  cards . Bot h  gr oups
a re un lik ely  to have a cces s t o a lt er na t ive  sou rces  of compet itive
credit , such  as  home equ ity  loans. Credit  cards a llow th em t o
bor row aga ins t  cu r ren t a n d fu tu re  income  wi th low t r ansact ion
cost s an d wit h ou t  ha ving t o pledge t he ir p er sona l pr oper ty a s
collater al. 223
Secon d,  if cr ed it  card i ss uer s a re a ctua lly  ta rget in g you ng
and low-i ncome bor rowers t o “hook ” th em  on cred it  ca rds , the
evide nce sugges t s t ha t  t hei r  tact i cs  a r e not working. First,  most
of th e growth  in  cr edit  car d deb t in  recen t yea rs  is a tt ribu ta ble
to incr ea ses  am ong upper-in come d ebtors,  not  lowe r -in come
debtors.224 In  1995, u pper -incom e households  were  more  than
t h ree times  more likely to ha ve a credit car d as t hose i n  t he
lowest  income gr oups ,225 and  credi t  ca rd  indeb tedness  was
nea rly  twice as high among upper-income households as lower-
in com e.226 Moreover, both credit card ownership and
indebtedness levels in crea sed w ith  in come .227 And while low-
in come hou seh olds wer e incr eas ing t heir  tot al cr edit  ca rd
indebtedness a lon g wit h  eve ryon e e lse, t he gr owt h in  tota l
balan ces ha s been consisten t with  previous era s.2 2 8 The  claim
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229. Id .
tha t  cred it  cards  a re exploit i n g low-income consu mer s is
difficult to squa re with  th e evidence.
While  ther e is  anecd ota l ev iden ce t ha t  cred it  card is suer s
a re aggr essive ly solicitin g youn g an d college-age cu st omer s, t he
claim  tha t  cr edi t  ca rd  is suer s ar e exploitin g young bor rower s is
also su spe ct. Most  of the  growt h in  credit  car d in debt edn ess is
“at tr ibut able  t o h igher  aver age cr edit  car d deb t p er h ouseh old,
not  from more households wit h a ccess t o credit  car ds.”229 Youn g
borrowers, by definition, will tend  to be new credit car d user s.
Thus, if credit  car d iss ue rs  wer e bein g su ccessful in  “hookin g”
you ng borrowers,  the d at a wou ld ind icat e a gr owth  in cre dit
ca rd indebtedness am on g new  credit car d customer s, ra th er
t han  exi st in g cr ed it  card h older s.  As w it h  the cla im  tha t  credit
ca rd issuer s ar e exploiting low-income customer s, th e dat a
re fu t e the  hypothesi s t ha t  cr edi t  car d iss uer s a re e xploitin g
young customers as well.
The confusion  of those  wh o fault credit card issuers for
sol icit a t ion s concerning “pre-approved” cards is illustrated by
an  old joke about t he per son  w h o opened  a n ew check ing
account  and  though t  he  cou ld go ou t  and  wr i te a l l his checks:
“After  all, t h ey wouldn’t have given them t o me if I wasn’t
sup posed to use th em.” Of course, we know we a r e  n ot  a llowed
to wr it e a ll t hose  check s i f we  do n ot  have su fficient funds to
pay for  t h e m . If a check bounces, no one would blam e th e ban k
for  g iv ing  ou t  the  checks  and “inducin g” the  cus tomer  to wr it e
t h e m . Why, then,  should “pre-approved ” credi t  ca r d
app lica t ions stand on a different footing from “pre-approved”
checks? Both  a re  offe red  on  the  assumpt ion  tha t  they will be
used only if one h as t he a bility to honor th e debts in curr ed.
4. Moderation in credit card profits suggests robust
com petition in the credit card indu stry
 The th i rd p rong of Ausubel’s t hesi s i s t ha t  ca rd  is suer s have
the incen t ive to exp loi t  consumers  because of the  supranormal
p rofi t s ea rn ed on  cred it ca rd s. Wh ile t his  claim  ma y ha ve had
some empir ical support  at  some point in r ece n t  h ist ory, it is
que st iona ble toda y. In 19 91, wh en Au su bel condu cted h is in itia l
study, profits ma y have been  higher , as consum ers a nd ba nk s
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230. The e ra  of  ef fect ive  in teres t  ra te der egulation on credit cards can be da ted
t o t he Sup rem e Cour t’s decision in Marquette National Bank v. First Omaha S ervices
Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978), in wh ich th e Cour t h eld th at  th e app licable us ur y ra te
for  credit  was t ha t of the  lende r’s home st at e, rega rdles s of a lower r at e lim it at ion
in  the cust omer’s stat e of residence.
231. Lindsey no tes  t ha t  t he r at e of re tu rn  on t ota l as set s for  cre dit  car ds for  th e
30 largest  issuer s was 2%, while the  ra te  of  retu rn  on  other  banking  act ivi t ies  was
1.3%.  Lindsey fu rt her  note s th at  “While credit ca rd ba nk s re ma ined m ore pr ofitable
than  o ther  ban ks, t heir  profita bility ha s declined  a good bit in  recen t yea rs owin g to
heighten ed comp e t it i on  and t he e rosion  of credit q ua lity.” Deli nq uen cy on  Con su m er
Loans, supra  not e 114. 
232. Rise in  Pers ona l B an kr up tcy , supra  not e 126, a t *24. 
233. S ee id . O ther  c om m e n tators agree that  profits will remain low at least
t hr ough  th e en d of the  cent ur y. S ee J am es J . Daly, Back  f rom the Br ink , CR E D I T
CA R D MG M T., May 1998, at 54 (noting t hat  Char les M. Hegar ty of Wachovia Ban k
Car d Se rv ices “predicts th e [profit] squeeze will rema in thr ough the r est of this year
and even int o 1999”).  Ka t hy McShane of Kendrew Group said, “I think the indust ry
will rem ain  flat for s ever al yea rs.” Id. 
234. S ee Lind a P un ch, Su bprime’s Dangerous Waters, CRE D I T CARD MG M T., Mar .
1998, at 77.
235. S ee Daly, supra note 233, at 54. The data  in  Ausu bel’s st udy r un  out in
1993, before t his d ecline in  credit  card  profits . S ee Ba nk ru pt cy R evision , s u pra no t e
114, at  259. This  is somew ha t su rpr ising, h owever, a s th e rem ain der of his  dat a is
reported  thr ough 1995 an d 1997.
236. F o r instance, credit card loans are u nsecured and usu ally mu ch sm aller  in
amoun t th an  oth er  ty pe s of cr ed it . Th us , t ra dit ion al  en for c em e n t  measures such  as
re poss ess ion  and lawsu its often are n ot effective measur es to co mpe l rep aym ent . S ee
Ran dall  J .  P ozden a, S olvi ng  th e My st ery of  Hi gh  Cred it C ard  R at es, FRSBF  WKLY.
LE T T E R NO . 91-42, Nov. 29, 1991.
were  lear nin g to dea l with  th e explosion of cons um er cr edit  in
the 1980s.230 Ea rly en tr an ts  int o ma rk ets  can  ear n econom ic
rents,  which are dissipated a s the ma rket m atu res. Thus,
Ausu bel’s initia l stu dy concern ed a per iod of time th at  m ay
ha ve been  un iqu ely fert ile for pr ofits on cr edit  car ds. 
Banks’ profits on credit car ds ha ve, however, declined
ra pidly in t he p eriod following Ausu bel’s stu dy an d ar e expected
to contin ue t o fall.231 S tua r t  A. Feldst ein  of SMR Res ea rch
observes tha t  for  the sixty largest credit card issuers, from 1994
to 1996 “aft er -ta x profits  as a  percent  of avera ge man aged
asset s declin ed fr om 2.26 % to 1.31%,” prim ar ily due to
bankr upt cy-relat ed losses.232 Feldstein furt her predicted that
for  1997, t he p rofit  margin  wil l fa ll t o just  over  1%.233 Another
study r epor t s an  after -tax ret ur n of 1.2% in 1996234 an d 1.5% in
1997, well below the pea k pr ofitability of 1993.235
Cre dit  card loans,  moreove r , a re s ign ifica n t ly r i sk ier  than
other loans;236 thus, risk-adjusted  pr ofits ar e sign ificant ly lower
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237. S ee Delinquency on Consum er Loans, supra  note 114.
238. Id . 
239. S ee R ise i n P erson al B an kr up tcy , supra  note 126,  a t  *24-25  (no t ing  tha t
Advan ta Corp. a nd AT&T h ave bot h h ad t o sell th eir  credit card operat ions to other
i ssue r s as  a r esu lt of los ses ); see also Mar k Ca lvey, B a n k  Wooing Continues, Bu t On
N ew Terms?, 18 BU S . J.–P HOEN IX, Ja n. 30, 1998, at 30  (no t ing  tha t  Wel ls  Fargo bank
is cur ta iling cr edit  card  ma rk etin g in t he fa ce of large los ses). 
240. Daly,  supra not e 23 3, a t 5 4; see also Cann er & L u ck e t t, supra  no te 215,  a t
662 (discussing how “it would  be expect ed th at  when  th e economy is p erform ing
well . . . [large cred it car d compa nies] t ha t bea r m ore r isk w o u ld  ou t p e r fo rm more
conservative” sm al ler  cre dit  car d com pa ni es ).
than  Ausubel  s u ggest s. As a r esu lt of th is h igher  ris k, cred it
ca r d issu ers  als o ma int ain  significan tly h igher  aver age eq uit y
to asset  and loan loss reser ves to tota l loan  ra tios th an  for oth er
operat ions.237 Law re nce Lin dse y, a  mem ber  of the Board of
Gove rnors of th e Fed er al Re ser ve System, testified to Congress,
T h e s t rong  ea r n ings  p ro f i le s  of t h e  cr e dit  ca r d  ba n k s , a n d  t h eir
a s soc ia t ed  ca pi ta l a n d r es er ve  a lloca ti on s, a r e r efle cti on s of t h e
r i sk s  as socia te d w ith  th is for m  of lend in g .  H ighe r  r i sk  an d
h ighe r  r e t u r n  g o  h a n d - in -h a n d , a n d  t h e h ig h er  ca p it a l a n d
rese rves  a s soc ia t ed  w i th  th i s  fo rm o f  cred i t  a r e  r equ i r ed  t o
b a la n ce  the  r i sk .  Pu t  an o the r  wa y ,  lende r s  a ctive  in t he  cred it
ca r d  bus iness  a r e  consc ious  o f  h ighe r  po ten t i a l  l o s s  r a t e s  and
e x p ect  re tu rn s t ha t w ill fully a bsor b t he se loss es a nd  st ill
pr ovide  an  ad equ at e pr ofit m ar gin .238
Because  the profits that  exist ar e not evenly distribu ted among
a l l is su er s in  the m arket , seve ra l ca rd i ss uer s h ave cu r ta i led
the ir  credi t  ca rd  opera t ions in  the fa ce of mounting losses.239 As
one ar ticle observes,
T h e ban k car d ind ust ry s e e m s  to b e d ivid in g in to a  societ y of
haves  a n d  h a v e-n ot s . O n  t h e on e  h a n d, t h e re  a r e t h e m onolin e
cred it  ca r d  i s s u ers  an d  a  h an dfu l  o f ca rd  opera t ions  owned  by
l a r ge  b a n k s . Ma ny  of th ese  car d p rogr am s r epor te d p rofit
in c reases  of  20% or  m ore in  199 7 desp i te  high  char geoffs a n d
r e co rd  consu mer  bank rup tc i e s . On  th e  o the r  h and  a re  th e
g r ea t  m a j or i t y of car d is su er s t h at  ar e ex pe rie n cin g p oor or
med ioc re  r e tu r ns . 240
The p rofi t s from credi t  ca rds du r ing the  ea r ly 1990s may
also have been  in fla t ed w hen  compa red  to the r et urns fr om
other s ector s of th e ban kin g indu st ry. Th e pr ofits from cr edit
cards ma y be overst at ed because of the r elative unprofitability
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241. S ee R ise i n P erson al B an kr up tcy , s u pra note 126, at *22 (“As recently as the
l a t e 1980s, commercial mort gage lo a n s a nd  loans on  apa r tmen t  bu i ld ings had  ve ry
high  delinquency and loss rates, due in part t o sloppy lending and due  in p ar t t o t he
fact  th at  sh oppi ng  cen te rs , ap ar tm en ts , an d office bu i ld ings were ove rbu il t  in  t he
198 0s .”).
242. Deli nq uen cy on Consumer Loans, supra  note 114, at  *11-12.
243. Br ito & Ha rt ley, supra not e 200, a t 400 . 
244. S ee id . at 425 n .23.
245. As Dian e Ellis  sum ma rizes  th e sit ua tion , “Th e opp or t u n i t y to ear n h igh
prof it s ha s a tt ra cte d in te ns e com pet iti on, w hich  ap pea rs  to b e erodin g som e of t he
high  profits  ear ned  in t he e ar ly 1990s . . . .” Ellis, supra  note 138, at  9.
of other  se ctors of ban k a ctivit y.241 There  is  subs tan t ia l evide nce
t h a t  th is was in deed th e case an d th at  profits were lower t ha n
usua l in  ot her sectors of the banking industr y “due to [banks’]
exposures  to developin g count rie s, en er gy sect or bor rower s, a nd
commer cial re al e st at e m ar ket s,”242 all of which st ru ggled
during the 1980s and early 1990s.
The moderation of profits for  cr edit card issuers was th e
inevit able  cons equen ce of t he explosi on of compet it ion  in  the
credit  ca rd  indust ry in r ecen t  yea r s.  As  Br i to and  Har t ley s t a t e
the issue, “Several aut hors . . . ha ve a rgu ed t ha t e ven  th ough
the  market  for  bank credit cards is unregulated, has th ousands
of independen t  fi rms,  many of them recen t  en t ran t s , and  has
mill ion s of consu mer s, it never th eless a ppear s to be
non compet itive .”243 Between  1988 and 1 991, for  in s t a nce, th e
nu mber  of com pa nies  is su in g cr ed it  cards  gr ew from
ap pr oximat ely 4,000 to 6,000.244 Millions  of Amer icans  ca r ry
credit  ca rds.  Compet i t ion  ha s significan tly redu ced the very
profit s of which Ausu bel compla ins .245 Consid er t he following
d iscuss ion  from Credit  Card  Man agem ent ma gazine:
I s su e r s n e e d  lo ok  b a ck  n o  fu r t h e r  t h a n  t h e  onse t  o f  the  1990s
for  a  t ex tbook  case  of  such  an  occur r ence . A t t h e  time ,  money
cen te r  ba n ks  we re  th e d om in an t is su er s, t h a n k s  to t h e
r e s ources  b rough t  on  by  th e i r  s i ze . Desp i t e  t he i r  power ,  t h ey
h a d  become  l e th a rg ic , cha rg ing  in t e r e s t  r at es  of 18.9 % or
19 .8% a n d  $ 20  a nn ua l  f ees  fo r  p l a in -van i l la  ca rds .  When  the
s p e ci a lt y ca rd  i s sue r s ,  such  a s  H ouseho ld ,  AT&T,  and  F i r s t
U S A , began  sh ak in g  up  th e  bu sin e ss  w it h  con t r a r ia n
m a r k e tin g s t r a t e g i es  t h a t  e l i m in a t e d  a n n u a l  f ees , s l a shed
in te re s t  r a t e s,  a n d  offe r ed  c ard hold er s r ich r ew ar ds for  us ing
D :\ 1 9 9 9- 1\ F I N A L \ J O N - F I N . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
177] IT’S TIME FOR MEANS-TESTING 241
246. Peter  Luca s, An  Irr esis tib le For ce?, CREDIT  CARD MG M T., Ja n. 1998, at 34.
247. Id .
248. Unl ike o ther  bank  loans , credit  card s pr esen t a  lar ge volume  of relat ively
sma ll tr an sa cti ons  an d a  la rg e n um ber  of acco u n ts. Thus, credit card operations are
more costly per dollar of receivables than other types of ban k len ding. S ee Canner  &
Lucke t t , supra  no t e 215 , a t  658. Ca nn er  an d Lu cke tt  not e t ha t for  cre dit  car d
accounts,  “Operat ing costs (in cluding s uch d iverse  activit ies  as servicing accounts,
soliciting  new cu stom ers , an d process ing m erch an t cred it car d receip t s ) a c coun te d for
nea rly  60 pe rcen t  of th e t ot a l cos t , a nd t he c os t  of funds  27  pe rce n t .” Id . By contrast,
“[T]he  cost of funds . . . accounted for 60 percent of total expenses for ins t a l lmen t
lendin g, about 70 percent  for commercial lending, and n earl y 80 percen t  for  mor tgage
lend ing.” Id .
249. S ee Brit o & Ha rt ley, supra  note 200, at  424.
250. S ee Luca s, supra not e 24 6, a t 3 4 (de scr ibin g join t ve nt ur e a mon g
BankBoston , Ban k of Montr eal, a nd F irst  Anna polis Consu lting I nc. t o  jo in t ly run  a
credit  car d b an k).
t he i r  card s ,  the  mon ey cente rs  w ere n ot  creat ive enou gh t o
cou n t e r t h e  as sa u lt  on  t h e ir  d om a i n .246
The r e su l t was a  p recipi tous l oss  of marke t  share  for  l ead ing
banks su ch a s Ba nk  of Amer ica ,  Chase,  and others.  Of the
money cen ter s,  only t he t op iss uer  Cit icor p “managed to hold i t s
p lace in  the s t and ings , b u t  i t s g rowth  ra te in  recen t  years  has
lagged  th at  of the  spe cialist s.”247
Ausubel’s focus on th e allege d p r emia on interbank sales of
credit  card accounts as evide n ce  of supranormal  retu rns  and  a
la ck of compe t it ion  in  the cr ed it  car d  m a r ket is also misplaced.
It  fails  t o accoun t  for  t he  tr ansact ion  cos t s  of cr edi t  ca rd
account s, wh ich  ten d t o be  su bs tan t ia lly  h igh er  than  for  other
types  of bank loans.248 Thus, the higher amount s paid on
in terbank sales of account s probably simp ly re flect t he  sa vings
on t ransact ion costs  of the  purchasing bank.249
In  short,  Ausubel continues to sound war nings abou t  t he
“credit  ca rd  menace” withou t  rea li zing th at  th e consu me rs  ha ve
a l ready w on  th e cred it ca rd  Cold War . The h eavy m ar ket ing
tha t  has been described in dicates  th at  th e cred it ca rd  ma rk et is
ferociously compe t it ive  and h as gen er a ted  many be nefit s for
consum ers, from no annua l  fees, t o fal ling in te re st  ra te s, t o
fre qu e n t flyer miles. Sma ller card iss uer s ha ve begun t o enter
in to joint ventures with compa n ies with complemen ta ry
resources, so as to meet  consum er demand for these
“cobranding” perquisites.250 In su ch a h eavily contest ed ma rk et,
common sen se a lone s ugges ts  th at  long-t e r m  high profits ar e
not  su st a in able , a nd t he evid en ce confirms  th is view.  It furth er
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251. As Ch ar les  M. H ega rt y, pr esi den t of Wa chovi a B an k Ca rd  Ser vices  observes ,
“Cardho lde r s h ave become more sa vvy, more dema nding,” and th is is eatin g into bank
profits. Daly, supra  note 233, at  54.
252. In  fact, surveys indicate tha t th ose wh o re volve b ala nce s fr om m ont h t o
m o n t h are m ore likely than convenience users t o shop around for lower rat es. S ee
Cann er  & Luck ett , supra  note 215, at  663.
253. J e ff Bailey  & Scott  Kilma n, Mor e Bor row ers A ppea r to b e Wis in g Up  Abou t
Credit , STAR TRIB . (Minnea polis-St. Pa ul), Mar . 1, 1998, at  D5. Ausu bel seem s t o h ave
missed  th is fact in  his a na lysis of consu mer  swit ches. S ee Ba nk ru pt cy R evision , su pra
no te 114, at 263. Even a ssum ing tha t th e credit card  mar ket is cha racter ized by
subs tan t ia l sear ch/switch  costs, th ose who h ave t he m ost t o gain from  incu rring these
sea rch  an d sw itch  cost s wi ll do s o. Th is w ill ge ne ra lly be  th ose w ho a re carr ying t he
highest balances. It should be noted th at  Ausu bel provide s no evide nce for his
su gges tion  th at  th e cr edi t ca rd  ma rk et  is ch ar act er ized  by s ub st an ti al  se ar ch/s wit ch
costs. My personal experience suggests that it  is extremel y ea sy t o swit ch fr om on e
credit  car d is su er  to a not he r or  to i nd uce  conce ss ion s fr om a  give n cr edi t ca rd issuer
pur ely by threa tening t o switch. Indeed, the evidence  s h ow s  t h at most  Americans own
two or more credit cards issued by competing issuers . Thu s, swit ching is a s sim ple
as pulling one card out of your wa llet rath er th an a nother .
254. Bailey & Kilma n, supra note 253, at  D5.
255. Id . More than 60% of all Visa and Mast er Ca rd  offers  incl ud e a n in tr odu ctor y
low-interest  ra te. See id.
256. Id .
sugges t s tha t  cred it  card loss es  do n ot  simply r ed uce
supr anormal ban k pr ofits, bu t m us t be  pa ssed  on in a
compet itive  market .  Th us,  ther e a re efficie ncy losses, not  ju s t  a
wealth tra nsfer from creditors to debtors.
The incr eas ed compet ition  am ong issuer s is mir rored by
increas ed soph is t ica t ion  among  consumers  who a re  turn ing i t  t o
their own ends.251 The heaviest  borrowers ar e the ones wh o will
find it  most  wor thwh ile  to change cr ed it  car d s  in  r esponse to
low “teaser” rates.252 According to one  r epor t , cr edi t  ca rd
holde r s “a re  lea rn ing to jump  from one promotional low-
in teres t -ra te len de r  to the n ext , ju st  lik e s hopp in g for  the
lowes t -p r iced tank  of gas.”253 One su ch “card su rfer” whittled
down ma ssive credit  card bil ls  by ju mping t h rough  the low
“tease r” ra te s of five differen t ca rd s. “I’m b ea tin g th e m  at t heir
own  game,” he says.254 In de ed , ca rd i ss uer s com pla in  abou t
th eir  ina bilit y t o keep t hese car d switcher s “captu red,” ther eby
req uir ing them to “s tea l[ ] the same people over  an d over .”255 An
ana lyst obs er ves  tha t  sa vvy cr ed it  card con su mers  “pay off
Pet er  with  Pau l—at  a  lower  ra te . .  . .  And  by  the t ime Pau l
w a nt s a bigger pa yment , Ja ne comes ar ound wit h a  bett er
offer .”256 Given  the low  ra tes  offer ed  by t hes e ca rds, it is
di fficu lt  for banks t o actua lly make profits from th ese
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257. As Robert Bzezensky, pres ident  of North  Amer ican In tegr at ed Ma rk etin g,
observes, “There is no way you can ma ke profits in the bank car d indus try a t a 5.9%
interest  ra te. . . . You will be at tr actin g more ra te s urfers t han  potential (long-term )
cust omer s.” Daly,  supra  note 222, at  68.
258. S ee Ausu bel, supra  note 177, at  263.
259. S ee Daly, supra  note 233, at 54 (“Despi t e  r a pid increases in penalty fees,
with  lat e fee s ju mp ing  from  an  ave ra ge of ab out  $18 t o about $20, the lower nu mber
of revolvers  and  banks’ unwi ll ingness  to anger th eir cardholders conspired to keep
ac tua l [pr ofit ] cat egor y gr owt h t o a m er e 2% .”).
260. S ee DeMu th , supra  note 190 , at 238 . As DeMuth notes, this was because
only la rge  re ta il er s  s u ch a s Sea rs could a fford t he la rge costs  ass ociated wit h set tin g-
up an d ru nn ing a  credit  opera tion in  addit ion to its  norm al bus ines s.  In  tu rn ,  Sea r s
could bury th ese credit costs in the price of its goods and services, spreading the costs
across many tr ansactions and also allowing it  effectively to evade usury rest rictions.
S ee id. The sprea d of Visa and Mast erCar d enabled ret ailers  t o s e p a r a te th e credit
tr an sact ion from the retail transaction, increasing the ability of small retailers to
compete with  Sea rs a nd ot her  lar ge re ta ilers . S ee id. at 238-39.
borrowers  du r ing the  in t roductory per iod .257 And while banks
have increased late fees and other charges,25 8  in  pract ice  banks
a re r e luct an t  t o en force thes e fees  because  of their  fea r  of losing
customers.259 I n  shor t , th e im age  of consu me rs  as  pa ssive  sheep
being shorn  by rut hless credit  card issu ers is out dat ed.
To the ext en t  tha t  cred it  cards  a re b la med  for  the
bankrup tcy boom,  the charge would appear  to l ack  subs tance .
Cre dit  cards h ave emp owered consu mer s,  fu rn i sh ing them
conven ien ce an d n onm onet ar y ben efits . Moreover , th ey ha ve
also aided in  th e gr ow t h  of millions of sma ll business es by
reducing th e bu sin esse s’ ris k of los s  from nonpaymen t  of
accoun t s an d by enablin g them  to compet e with S ear s an d other
big ret ailer s wh o used  to dom ina te t he r eta il credit  ma rk e t .260
The crea t ion  and  growth  of n iche  in t e rnet  and cat alogu e
busin esses  is  a lm ost  complet ely  de pe nde nt  on widespread
access to cre dit  car ds. That  car d iss uer s r eap ed good pr ofits
dur ing th e ea rly yea rs  of their  in nova t ion  is  neit her  exce pt ion a l
nor  blameworth y. What is blameworth y is that  the industr y
should be  de monized in  orde r  to avoid  confr on t ing the  rea l
causes of escalat ing ba nk ru pt cy filing rat es an d t o stifle
bankru ptcy reforms.
C. Ot her Cau ses  of B an kru pt cy
 Advoca t es of the  st a tus  quo ha ve  poi n te d t o a d d it i on a l
pur ported  cause s of bankr upt cy t ha t  fort ify t heir  bel ief t ha t
bankrup tcy represents not  a  choice b u t  a  necess it y. P rofes sor
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261. War ren , supra  note 7, at  1101.
262. Id . 
263. Id .
264. Brauche r , supra  note 12, at  5.
265. S ee Wa rren  Ch all eng es, supra  note 57, a t A8  (d is cu ssin g fact or s such  as “the
coverage  an d s ti ffne ss  of th e s ocia l sa fet y n et , t he  im plica t ion s of la ck  of me dica l
insur ance, job layoffs an d down sizing” (citing W ar ren , supra  no te  7, a t 1 101 )).
W a rr en , for instan ce, writes that “inquiries [and possible
solutions] mu st r each well beyond  th e ba nk ru pt cy syst em .”261
To th e extent  th at  debt a nd cred it  ca rds a re  not  t he  prob lem,
she points t o “[t]h e coverage a nd st iffness  of th e social safety
ne t , t he  implica t ion s of lack of med ica l in su rance, [a nd] job
la yoffs an d down sizin g.”262 The solutions r equ ire “[b]etter
hea lth  ins ur an ce coverage , limit s on cr edit  solicita tion s, a nd
bett er  consum er credit disclosures.”263 J ean  Bra uch er s imila rly
ar gues  that  the causes of ban kr upt cy include “the combined
effect  of var ious form s of social in st abilit y, includ ing divorce,
la ck of med ica l insurance , and chan ges in emp loymen t pr actices
(such  as  d ow n sizing and  increased use of con t r act  and  pa r t -
t ime work er s).”264 The se fact ors h ave be en r eport ed in  ot h er
publications.265
Alth ough  often -rep ea ted , t her e is  lit t le e mpi r ica l suppor t  for
these views. Indeed, most cred ible empir ica l ev iden ce
un derm ines  their  pr es upp osi t ion s.  Th e ch a lle nge i s n ot  to
expla in  every ban kr upt cy filing of the 1990s bu t to exp la in  the
d rama t ic in cr eas e from les s t ha n 80 0,000 consu mer  filings in
1993 to 1.35 million in 1997.
We also do not  cl a im tha t  none  of t hese  othe r  factor s  a ffect s
bankruptcy filings. Tim e an d fur th er s tu dy m ay r evea l th eir
impact , but  her e we em ph as ize t ha t t he  crit ical st ud ies h ave
not  yet been  done . On  th e cont ra ry, s ever al of th e popu lar ly-
cited factors  seem refu ted by ava ilable evidence. In our view,
the re ar e a ddit iona l hyp oth et ically r ea sona ble fact ors t ha t h ave
been routinely ignored but should pr ovok e fur th er s tu dy. We
suggest  on ly tha t  many  of the  factors  commonly advanced as
bankrup tcy det e rminan t s lack emp irical supp ort, while other
high ly-plau sible  factors ha ve been arbit r a r ily  exclude d fr om the
ban kr upt cy debate.
Consider  the references to “job layoffs and downsizing.” In
the fir st  place, n eit her  Wa r ren  nor  Bra ucher  defines  the t e rm
“downsizin g,” nor do they ide n t ify h ow ma ny worker s ha ve been
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266. To the extent  that  downsizing is defined in  relation to th e loss of middle-
manage m en t  jobs in large corporations, the evidence indicates tha t downsizing is a
myth . Recent  dat a in dicate  th at  th e propor tion of ma na gers a nd s uper visors in  priva t e
nonfa rm employment ha s grow n  dur ing t he 199 0s, n ot sh ru nk . S ee DAVID M. GORDON ,
F AT  AND ME A N: TH E  CO R P OR AT E  SQ U E E ZE  O F  WORKING AM E R I CA N S A N D T H E  MY T H  O F
MANAG ERI AL “DO W N S IZ I N G” (199 6).  There is also little evidence to suggest that job
s t ab il it y i s l ower  than  i t  has been  in  the p ast , fur the r  ca s t ing  doubt  on  the  not ion  o f
“downsizin g.” Moreover, t he pr oportion  of workers  in volat ile, employm ent -uns ta ble
manufac tu r ing has  decl ined  subs tant ially in r ecent  year s, sugge stin g th at  job stab ility
shou ld be increasing over time.
267. Som e studies have found th at m any ban kru ptcy filers suffered employment
in t er rup t ions within two years  of filing bankr uptcy, but th ose studies ha ve not been
scient ifically c on t r ol le d  in  a  m a n n er  t h a t  wo ul d p e rm i t d r a wing re l iab le  s ta t is t i ca l
conclusions. Indeed, one such stu dy concluded tha t th e purport ed link between
unemploymen t a n d ban kr upt cy is “only specula tive.” The res a A. Su llivan  et a l.,
Con su m er Debtors T en Y ears Later: A Financial Comparison of Consum er Bankrupts
1981-1991, 68 AM . BANKR. L.J . 121, 130-31 (199 4).  At  bes t , s t u dies have identified a
corr ela tion  between previous job loss and later bankr upt cy filin g, bu t t he y h ave  not
established  (or even  tr ied t o esta blish ) causa tion . S ee Ph i li p Shuc h m a n, Book Review,
Social S cien ce R esear ch on  Ba nk ru pt cy, 43 RUTGERS  L. RE V. 185, 201-05 (1990)
(reviewing TE R E S A A. SULL IVAN E T AL ., AS  WE  F ORGIVE OUR DEBTORS : BANKRUPTCY
A N D CONSUMER CR E D I T I N  AME RICA (198 9)).
268. S ee Buckley & Br inig , supra  note 118, at  204-05.
269. S ee Fa y et a l., supra  note 119, at  22.
270. S ee Sulliva n et  al., supra  note  267, at  130 (notin g th at  job inter ru ption w ill
be re flect ed  in  lowe r i nco me s).
271. S ee Domowit z & Eova ldi, supra note 137, at  825.
subject t o “downs izing.”266 To t he ext en t  tha t  in divid ua l “job
la yoffs” ar e some th ing differ ent  from d ownsizin g, in a n
econ omy where unemployment st ands  a t  fi ve  to six per cent  it is
ha rd to imagine t ha t t his could explain th e recent  ma ssive
increas es in bankru ptcy filings.267 Brin ig and  Buckley , for
inst an ce, found little su pp or t  for  the h ypothes is  tha t  job los s or
poverty was  a  significan t fa ctor in  ban kr up tcy filings .268 Fay ,
Hurs t , an d Wh ite’s stu dy a lso found  tha t  unemploymen t  by a
head of a household or spouse is not  significan tly corr elated
with  bankrup tcy filings.269 Wa r ren ’s a nd Braucher ’s impl ica t ion
tha t  there is widespread frag il ity  in  the  labor  marke t , l ead ing
to high e r  sy st emic level of ban kr upt cies, lacks pr oof. And even
if l ayoffs  d id  cause bankrup tci es , t he  unemployed  a re th e low-
income debtors t ha t m ean s-test ing would leave un affected. 270
Large un ins ur ed m edical bill s  and a ccident s by unin sur ed
motor i st s ar e a lso often  cited  as  cau ses  of ban kr up tcy.271
Empir ica l su ppor t for t his  pr opositi on is a lso lack ing, a s F ay,
Hurst , and Wh ite found that  health problems for the head of a
hou seh old or t he s pous e ar e not  significan tly corr elat ed with
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272. S ee Fa y et a l., supra  note 119, at  22.
273. S ee McKinley, supra  note 125, at  35.
274. Dur ing t h e  p er iod t ha t t he  su rg e in  ba nk ru pt cy filin gs occu rr ed,  he al th  car e
costs  rem ain ed st able, r ising on ly at  a r at e su fficient t o keep  up w ith  inflat ion. S ee
Bruce J aps en, Health Coverage Fraying Soarin g Costs, Job Changes Drive Many Ou t
of P lans, CH I . TRIB ., Dec. 31, 1998, at 1 (noting “several years” of health  care cost s
“keeping pa ce wit h t he  ra te  of infla tion ”); Nan cy Ann J effrey, S tu dy  S ays  Em ploy ees
at S m all  Fir m s Fi nd  Ma na ged C are a  Diff icu lt C hoi ce, WALL ST . J ., Sept .  8,  1997,  a t
B2 (no t ing  annua l i ncreases  in  hea lth  ca re cost s of one  to two pe rcen t  in  r ecen t
yea rs ); Ron Win slow, Hea lth  Car e Cost s A re E xpec ted t o R ise 3 .3% in  199 8, E m ploy er
Su rvey F inds, WALL ST . J ., J un e 16 , 19 98,  at  B7 (n oti ng  “four  years  of leve l m edi cal
cost s”).
275. S ee R ise i n P erson al B an kr up tcy , supra note 126, at  *8-9.
276. S ee M u rra y Weiden bau m, How  Gov ern m ent  R edu ces E m ploy m ent , in  LABOR
MARKETS , E MPLOYMENT P O L I C Y, AN D J OB CREATION  279, 284 (Lewis C. Solmon & Alec
R. Le ven son  ed s.,  199 4) (“[T]he grea t  mass  of  the research  has  concluded  tha t
bankrup tcy filings .272 More import an t, no corr elation h as been
shown between such problems, ad mit ted ly a  factor  i n some  core
level of ban kr up tcies , an d t he  re cent  explosive  growth  of filings .
Fur ther , it  sim ply does not follow th at  “bett er h ealth  insu ra nce”
is th e an swer t o the pr oblem of high m edica l bills, as the
cur ren t system  of employer -p rov ided  hea l th  in su rance  is  par t ly
res pons ible for  t he  cu r ren t h igh cos t s  of t he  med ica l  sys t em.273
The idea  th at  high  med ical bills can  expla in t he s pir alin g
increase in  ba nkrupt cy fil in g r a tes  is  a lso cont radicte d by t he
moder at ion in  the rise of health care costs during this period.274
And for  bot h  med ica l bills and a u tomobil e a cciden t s,  tor t  refor m
would  be a logical way t o reduce th e costs  of th ese var iables,
perha ps ma king t hem  less cata clysmic. The claim th at  “bet t er
hea lth  insu ra nce” is th e solution—to the exclusion of all these
ot h er  factors—reflects ideological bias, rat her  th an  sober
ana lysis.
In  con t r a s t  t o specu lat ive  obse rva t ions  abou t  job  layoffs,
down sizin g, me dical b ills, a n d uninsur ed auto accidents,
Warren and  Braucher  ignor e  other  factors  tha t  actua l ly  have
been demons t r a t ed  to a ffect  certa in cons um er s a dver sely:
legalized gam b ling, st ud ent  loans , incre as es in  th e min imu m
wage, and high tax ra tes. A close associat ion h as been
d em onst ra ted  between  legalized gambling an d high r at es of
bankrup tcy in t he vicini t y  of the ca sin os or sim ilar
establishments.275 Jus t  a s p rovoca t ive a re the n ega t ive  effect s of
the min imu m w age, m ost s tr ongly felt by m ar gina l worke r s,
such  as  th e youn g an d u ns kil led.2 76 While econom ist s a re
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increases  in t he comp ulsor y min imu m wa ge caus e a r ise  in  u n employmen t . The
segmen t of the workforce most affected  consis ts  of  those  a t  or  nea r  t he min imum
wage. This is a group made up pr i m a rily of teena gers an d other s with low skills who
ther eby lose  th e op por tu ni ty  to g ai n t he ir  in it ia l wor k e xpe ri en ce.”).
277. R icha rd M. Alston  et a l., I s  T h ere a Consensus Among Economists in the
1990’s?, 82 AM . E CON . RE V. 203, 204 (1992). Anot he r 2 2.4% a gr eed  to t he  val idit y of
the sta tem ent  “with pr ovisos,” with on ly 20.5% gen era lly disa gree ing. See id.
278. S ee Nicolas  William s & J effrey A. Mills, Minim um  Wage Effects by G end er,
19 J . LAB . RE S . 397, 409 (1998). Williams a nd Mills note tha t th e unem ployme n t
cre a t ing effect s of t he  mi nim um  wa ge d iss ipa te  as  econ omi c grow th  an d in flat ion
cause the s t atu torily set minimu m wage to fall below the m ark et-clearing wage.
W il li a m s and Mills’s findings are consis tent with  similar stu dies conducted over a
ra nge  of ma ny  deca des. S ee C h arles  Brown  et a l., Th e Effect of the Min im um  Wage
Law  on E m ploy m ent  an d U nem ploy m ent , 20 J.  E CON . L I T . 487, 508 (1982) (“In
sum ma ry,  our  survey ind ica tes  a  r e d u ct ion of between  one an d th ree p ercen t in
teen age  employment  as  a  resu l t  of  a  10 pe rcen t  inc rease  in  the  federa l  min imum
wa ge. ”).
279. S ee Richa rd B . McKenzie , Another Minim um -Wage Clash , 48  F REE MAN  676,
677 (1998) (arguin g th at  increa ses in  th e min imu m wage  will lead t o redu ctions in
o ther  emp loyee ben efits); Weide nba um , supra not e 276, a t 286 -87. 
280. It  should be kept in m ind tha t th ere is little evidence  to suppor t  the
hypot hes is th at  un emp loymen t is gen era lly a st at istically sign ifican t p re dict or of
ban kr upt cy. To t he  ext en t s uch  a li nk  exis ts , how eve r, i t w oul d be most likely to be
p resen t am ong th ose low-skill worke rs d isplaced b y th e min imu m wage. Thus, furt her
study  on this point is warran ted.
not orious for t heir  in abil it y t o agr ee  on many  concepts , a  r ecen t
sur vey of a  cross -sect ion  of professional economists reveals that
56.5% of th ose sur veyed “genera lly agree” with t he st at emen t
tha t  “[a ] min imum wage in crea se s u nem ploym en t  among you ng
and unski lled work er s.”277 A recen t  study est imated  tha t  each
10% increas e in th e minim um  wage red uces employmen t by
ap pr oximat ely two to four percent  over a t wo year per iod .278
Moreover , increas es in t he m inim um  wage  als o ar e gene ra lly
offset by red uct ions in  oth er b ene fits, su ch a s elim ina tin g
bonuses, cut t in g pa id  va ca t ions and s ick  lea ve,  and r ed uct ion s
in  severan ce pay and sick pay.2 79 Depr ivat ion of thes e an cillary
ben efits  would seem  to be r elat ed t o th e pr opens ity t o file
ba nk ru pt cy, as  th ey imp ose grea ter  vuln era bility in  tim es of
illness an d forced u nem ploymen t. Th us , incre as es in  th e
min imum wage  inevit ably r esu lt in  la yoffs an d r edu ced ben efits
to t he  most  vuln er ab le work er s in  th e economy. 280
Omit t ing th e bur den of taxes  fr om  t he li st  of ba nkrupt cy
causes is a n eve n m ore glar ing overs ight . A 1997 Gallu p P oll
reve aled  th at  10% of bankr upt cy debtors filed part ly because  of
t ax burdens, a percentage that exceeded college expenses and
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281. S ee McKinley, supra note 125,  a t 34 (citing Ch rist ine D uga s, Ba nk ru pt cy
S tigm a Lessens, U SA T ODAY , J un e 10 , 19 97,  at  B1).
282. S ee Visa, Consumer Ban kru pt cy: Prel im in ary  R eport , An nu al B an kr up tcy
Debt or Su rvey (April 1997) (visit ed J an . 19, 1999) <h tt p://www.abiw orld.org /r e sea rch/
resea rchfront .htm l>. 
283. S ee Tax ing S avin gs, INVESTOR’S  BU S . DAILY, Aug. 5, 1998, at  A6. Feder al t ax
revenues  a lone  a re 21.8 % of GDP , an d pe rs ona l fede ra l ta x pa ym en ts  as  a s ha re  of
wage  an d sala ry in come ar e alm ost 27%, alm ost a  one-th ird  increase in the pa st th ree
years. S ee Lawren ce Kudlow , Big Government Return s, SAN  DIEGO UNION -TRIB ., Jan .
31, 1999, a t  G4. This is a record peacetime h igh and is close to the tax bur den at  th e
he igh t of World War  II. S ee St eve  For bes, Fact  and  Comment, F O R B ES , Feb. 8, 1999,
a t  31.
284. The savings rat e for 1997 was 2.1%, the lowest level since the Grea t
Depres sion . S ee Taxin g S avin gs, supra  not e 28 3, a t A6 . Accor din g t o Com me rce
Depar tmen t dat a, in 1 997 Amer icans  ear ned $ 6.8 tr illion in  income  an d spe nt  $5.7
tr illion  on goods a nd s ervices , mea nin g th at  Amer icans  ear ned  $1.1 tr illion  more than
they  spent . Of tha t $1.1 t rillion, t axes d evour ed $989 billion, lea ving $121 bill ion i n
net  savin gs (2.1% of disposa ble in come). See id.  The d eclin ing savings  r a t e  appea r s
to be primar ily a function of increased taxes, ra ther  tha n in c r eas ed s pen din g. F rom
1990 to 1997 taxes increased 58%, while consum er spendin g increased on ly 43%. S ee
dea th  in fa mily,  and was  five tim es h igher  th an  th ose re port ing
tha t  gambl ing  pushed  them in to bankruptcy.281 A Visa  poll
showed tha t  3.1 % of res pon de nts fi led  ba nkrupt cy be cause  of
taxes.282 Test imon y before the NBRC suggested tha t ta x
ar rea ra ges play an  even grea ter  role tha n  t h ese st at ist ics
iden tify.
Of course, the survey data do n ot  a ccount for th e ways in
which  taxes  st r ip  familie s of t a k e -h ome  pay and  sap  them of
sa vings  th at  would other wise be available to withs tand
fina ncia l difficulties. Because large tax paym ents come “off the
top” of fam ily in come, s urvey  res pon de nts w ould  ten d n ot  to
th ink of them a s a  proximate cause for  bankrup tcy , bu t  t hey a re
un que st iona bly significan t in  th e ab ility to pay family expenses
and to sa ve for eme rgen cies. Taxes  devour  ma ssive  a m ou n t s of
persona l income tha t would be ava il able to finance consumpt ion
without  ha ving to tak e on addit ional debt.  For some people,
ta xes t ake  as much  as forty t o fifty p ercen t of th eir in come. This
bur den  ha s in crea sed s ubs ta nt ially du rin g the same per iod  tha t
ban kr upt cies ha ve risen. F rom 1990 t o 1997 t a xes increa sed
58% and  a s a  percent age of GNP now stand near  their highest
ever pe rcen tage l eve ls , t her eby cu t t i n g subs tan t ia l ly  in to
workers’ ta ke-h ome p ay. 283  Taxes also dr ain ext ra  income tha t
Amer icans could  sa ve t o de a l wi th  unexp ect ed financia l
catastrophes.284 Nonetheless, wh ile  Br aucher  bemoans t he low
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id ; see als o Bria n S. We sbu ry, The Ta x Man is S tealing Our S avin gs, WALL ST . J .,
Nov.  19, 1998, a t  A22 (noting that  since 1993, consumpt ion as  a per cen ta ge of in come
rema ined s t ab le , bu t  t axes  a s a  pe rcen ta ge of income rose dra mat ically, thereby
squeezing out p ers onal s avin gs). The “double -t axation” of income and investm ent
earnings, of cour se, crea tes a  disincen tive  for savin gs gene ra lly. For similar reasons,
d ou ble-t axa tion  will tend to caus e a sh ift in savings pa tter ns from m ore-liquid for m s
of inves tmen t s  t ha t  gene ra te  r egu la r  inter est, su ch as  savin gs accoun ts, t o less-liquid
inves tmen t s such  as h ouses, w her e income ca n be d eferr ed an d will be sub ject  t o
deferred  incom e an d capit al gain s ta xes. In creas ing t he a moun t of money in  liquid
asset s will als o ten d to m ak e a fa mily m ore vu lner able t o economic down tu rn s. 
285. S ee Bra uch er, supra  not e 12 , at  7 (“It w ould  be h ar d for  an yone  to d i sa g r ee
with  the pr oposition tha t America ns  have too much  deb t  and no t  enough  sav ings , and
tha t  if we h ad  les s de bt  an d m ore  savin gs, t her e would be le ss ba nk ru ptcy. Sa vings
provide a wa y to  de a l w it h  a sudden loss of income or una nticipated expenses,
withou t in cur ri ng  de bt .”).
286. S ee supra  note s 182-87 an d accompa nyin g text .
287. Ian Domowitz notes that  “[i]f mortgage debt is increased fr om t he  leve l of
the genera l popula tion t o tha t t ypically obser ved in Ch apt er 7 filings , th e proba bility
of a ban kru ptcy filing increa ses by an e stima ted 133 percent, rising to 172 percent
for  hou seh olds  wi th  in com e a bove  the a ve rage .” Personal Bank ruptcy Consum er Credit
Crisis, supra  note 183, at  *7-8.
288. S ee Todd J . Zywicki, Environmental Externalit ies and Polit ical Externalit ies:
The Polit ica l Economy of Environm ental Regulation and R eform , 73 TU L . L. RE V.
(fort hcomin g 1999) (man uscr ipt a t 36, on file wit h a ut hors ) (obser ving t hat pr ote ction
of th e sp ott ed ow l by t he  En da ng er ed S pecie s Act  alon e r ais es h ousing p rices $300
for  eve ry  $10 0,0 00 of h ou sin g pr ices ).
sa vings  ra te, 285 neither she, Warren, nor the NBRC suggests
tha t  tax reform a nd tax redu ct ion  wou ld  be  a  solu t ion  to
escalating bankru ptcies.
It  should a lso be remem bered th at  most  consum er d ebt  is
a ct ually hous ing deb t .286 This  su ggest s a  nu mbe r of possible
refor ms designed eith er t o reduce hous ing debt  di rect ly or
ind irect ly by r ed ucin g h ousing cost s.  For  ins ta nce, it  seems  tha t
those who express  concern  abou t  consumer debt would oppose
the ta x dedu ctibilit y of int eres t  payments  on  mor tgages . The
abilit y t o deduct  mor tgage interest pa yments invariably leads
home buyers to minimize their down pay m en t s  and t ak e on
grea t e r mor tgage  debt  than  they can  a fford . I f deb t  and
bankrup tcy ar e, in fact, correlat ed, th en t his increa ses th eir
leverage, potent ially mak ing th em m ore vulner able to
ba nk ru pt cy.287 Similar ly, War ren , Brau cher, and  the NBRC a re
silent  a s  to the  env ironmenta l , labor, zoning, and oth er
regu la t ion s which  ar tificially in flat e th e cost of hou sin g,
th ereby increasing consumer indebtedness.288 Indeed,  it  appears
tha t  su ch t ax a nd  regu la t or y  r e form s n ever  even r egist er in
their world views.
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We ar e not  claim ing t ha t m inim um  wa ge, ta xes, or  a
runaway tor t  sys tem expla in  t h e l arge number  of consumer
bankru pt cies or th e ra pid growth  in recent  years . These ar e
mere hyp oth eses , but  th ey ar e logically just  a s  rela ted  to the
problem as  economic downs iz ing and  h igh  medica l bil ls . In  fact ,
t o th e best  of our  kn owledge, th e factor s we h ave id ent ified
remain  un test ed, wher eas t her e is  su bs tan t ia l em pi r ica l
evide nce rebut t in g t he fa ctors ide nt ified by a dvocat es  of th e
s ta tus quo. Their list is  li t t le  more  than  hand waving and
facult y lounge speculat ion, perha ps rooted in  ideological biases
bu t most  definit ely not  in s cient ific evidence. I nd eed, a s
Professor  War ren  r ecognizes, th e factors th at  ha ve caused
increas ed filings war ra nt  furt her  investigat ion. But t o be
fru i t fu l , fur ther  in ves t iga t ion  sh ould  pr ocee d i n  a n air  of full
honesty and  not  accord ing to a  highly-selective list of var iables
ident ified prim ar ily on ideological or other  nonscient ific
grounds.
V. CO N C L U S I O N
 The t im e for  pr i n ci pl ed  m ea n s -t e s t in g  h a s come. Toda y,
judges  str uggle to apply mea ns-tes ting u nder  § 707(b) but h a ve
spa wned  confus ion , unnecessa ry litiga tion , non -un iformit y, an d
both  actual and perceived abuse and un fairness. The
bankrup tcy boom  has b een  a ided  and a be t t ed  by a  combin a t ion
of th e increas ing net  economic ben efi t s of bankruptcy  and the
fad ing self-res tr ain t t r a d it ionally produced by th e sha me a nd
socia l st igma  of bank ru pt cy. Mean s-tes tin g will he lp  r es tore
ba lan ce, pr edicta bility, equ ity, a nd  pu blic confiden ce in t he
sys t em. As pa sse d by t he  Hou se, it  re qu ire s well-off, in come-
earn ing debtors t o earn  th e benefit of th e au t om a t ic s t ay and
disch ar ge by making modest payments t o unsecured,
nonpriority creditors.
Shame and st igma  a re p reca r iou s s ocia l va lu es  tha t  can
erode rapidly. As we see from th e examples in Memphis,
eve ryon e is  considered a chea t u nt il proven other wise. The
resul t ha s been t o para lyze the system  of consu mer  credit  in
Memphis. In  th e end, all consum ers  pa y for ba nk ru pt cy th rou gh
higher  p r ices  and h igh er  in ter es t  ra tes . It  is  t im e for  the
bank r u p t cy syst em  to become le ss  pr o-de bt or  and m ore p ro-
consumer .
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289. S ee Amer ican  Bankruptcy Ins t it u t e , Personal  Bankruptcy  Fil ings  By Qu art er
1990-1998 (last  modified Au g. 11, 1998) <h tt p://www.ab iworld.o r g /s t a t s/
big98quar ter .htm l>.
Personal Bankruptcy Filings By Quarter
1990 (3rd quarter) - 1998 (2nd quarter)
(in thousands)
TABLE I 289  
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290. S ee Amer ican  Bankruptcy Ins t it u t e , U.S . Bank ruptcy Filings 1980-1996 (last
modified Mar . 2, 1997) <http ://www.abiworld.org/sta ts/an nu algra ph.h tm l>.
TABLE II  290
